E-Book, Englisch, 208 Seiten
Lu From Partisan Banking to Open Access
1. Auflage 2017
ISBN: 978-3-319-67645-6
Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
The Emergence of Free Banking in Early Nineteenth Century Massachusetts
E-Book, Englisch, 208 Seiten
Reihe: Palgrave Studies in Economic History
ISBN: 978-3-319-67645-6
Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
How did banking in early nineteenth-century Massachusetts evolve? Lu provides a compelling narrative about the connection between inclusive political systems and open access economies, hypothesizing that entry into banking was firstly made upon partisan grounds before later becoming open access/free entry. Lu investigates state level institutional change and studies the transition to open access from an economic perspective. What was the relationship between banking and political elites? Why were elites, who enjoyed privileges under dominant institutions, willing to dissolve these institutions and eliminate their privileges? The author provides new insights into American economic history, explaining how a society moves from limited access to one of openness.
Qian Lu is Assistant Professor at the School of Economics, Central University of Finance and Economics in Beijing, China.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Foreword I;7
2;Foreword II;10
3;Foreword III;13
4;Acknowledgements;14
5;Contents;17
6;List of Figures;19
7;List of Tables;23
8;1 Was the US Born Modern?;25
8.1;Abstract;25
8.2;1Is Civil Society a Natural Outcome of Democracy?;26
8.3;2Why did Americans Opened Access to Corporations?;28
8.4;3Conceptual Framework: Impersonal Rules and Open Access for Organizations;31
8.5;4Preview of the Book;33
8.6;Bibliography;36
9;2 The History of Partisan Banking;38
9.1;Abstract;38
9.2;1Banking History, 1780–1810;39
9.3;2From Deferential Politics to Partisan Politics;42
9.4;3Partisan Banking, 1799–1810;45
9.5;4Democratic-Republicans, Elbridge Gerry, and Political Reform of 1811;47
9.6;5Banking Reform of 1811;50
9.7;6Parties, Banks, and Laws, 1820–1850s;55
9.8;7Conclusion;59
9.9;Bibliography;63
10;3 Empirical Studies on Bankers, Legislators, and Political Parties, 1790–1859;66
10.1;Abstract;66
10.2;1Introduction;67
10.3;2Data;68
10.3.1;2.1Sample of All Bankers;75
10.3.2;2.2Sample of Boston Bankers;80
10.4;3Regimes of Party Competition;84
10.4.1;3.1The First Party Regime: 1780–1821;84
10.4.2;3.2The Non-party Regime: 1820–1830;93
10.4.3;3.3The Second Party Regime: 1830–1860;94
10.5;4Regression Studies on Parties and Legislators, 1797–1824;96
10.6;5Bank Level Analysis;102
10.7;6Conclusion;105
10.8;Bibliography;107
11;4 Empirical Studies on Political Connection of Suffolk Legislators, 1790–1859;108
11.1;Abstract;108
11.2;1Introduction;108
11.3;2Data and Empirical Tests;109
11.4;3Conclusion;113
12;5 Empirical Studies on Bankers’ Wealth and Bank Balance Sheets;115
12.1;Abstract;115
12.2;1Introduction;115
12.3;2Bankers’ Wealth, 1829–1859;116
12.3.1;2.1Introduction;116
12.3.2;2.2Data;118
12.3.3;2.3The Basic Results;122
12.3.4;2.4Robustness Checks;131
12.4;3Bank Balance Sheet;152
12.4.1;3.1Introduction;152
12.4.2;3.2Data;154
12.4.3;3.3Empirical Results;159
12.5;4Conclusion;176
12.6;Bibliography;178
13;6 An Intra-Elite Explanation of Open Access;179
13.1;Abstract;179
13.2;Bibliography;185
14;7 Conclusion: Democracy, Civil Society, Elites, and Impersonal Rules;186
14.1;Abstract;186
14.2;Bibliography;194
15;Appendix;195
16;Bibliography;200
17;Index;204
