Miron The Geography of Competition

Firms, Prices, and Localization
1. Auflage 2010
ISBN: 978-1-4419-5626-2
Verlag: Springer
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 456 Seiten

This book provides a comprehensive, up-to-date, and expert synthesis of location theory. What are the impacts of a firm's geographic location on the locations of customers, suppliers, and competitors in a market economy? How, when, and why does this result in the clustering of firms in space? When and how is society made better or worse off as a result? This book uses dozens of locational models to address aspects of these three questions. Classical location problems considered include Greenhut-Manne, Hitchcock-Koopmans, and Weber-Launhardt. The book reinterprets competitive location theory, focusing on the linkages between Walrasian price equilibrium and the localization of firms. It also demonstrates that competitive location theory offers diverse ideas about the nature of market equilibrium in geographic space and its implications for a broad range of public policies, including free trade, industrial policy, regional development, and investment in infrastructure. With an extensive bibliography and fresh, interdisciplinary approach, the book will be an invaluable reference for academics and researchers with an interest in regional science, economic geography, and urban planning, as well as policy advisors, urban planners, and consultants.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Miron, John R.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Preface;8
2;Acknowledgments;20
3;Contents;22
4;1 The Craft of the Story Teller;26
4.1;1.1 Introduction;26
4.2;1.2 Geographic and Other Perspectives on Localization;28
4.3;1.3 Marshalls Perspective as a Starting Point;33
4.4;1.4 The Development of Economics Since Marshall;35
4.5;1.5 Why Is Competitive Location Theory Problematic?;43
4.6;1.6 Location Theory and Geography;45
4.7;1.7 My Approach;47
4.8;1.8 What This Book Is About;49
4.9;1.9 What This Book Is Not About;51
5;2 The Firm at Home and Abroad;54
5.1;2.1 The GreenhutManne Problem;54
5.2;2.2 Model 2A: Non-spatial Monopolist;55
5.3;2.3 Model 2B: Monopolist Selling at Two Places; Factory at Place 1 Only;68
5.4;2.4 One Market or Two?;75
5.5;2.5 Pricing Strategies;77
5.6;2.6 Model 2C: Factory at Each Place;78
5.7;2.7 Model 2D: Choice of Sites and Localization;80
5.8;2.8 Two Markets Identical;82
5.9;2.9 Differing Markets;84
5.10;2.10 Comparative Statics in Model 2D;86
5.11;2.11 Risk Aversion and Multiple Plants;87
5.12;2.12 Model 2E: Contestability and Preemption of Competitors;87
5.13;2.13 Final Comments;90
6;3 Logistics and Programming;93
6.1;3.1 The HitchcockKoopmans Problem;93
6.2;3.2 An Illustrative Example;99
6.3;3.3 Model 3A: Non-spatial Version of the Model;100
6.4;3.4 The Example in a Non-spatial Version;102
6.5;3.5 Model 3B: Spatial Version of the Model;105
6.6;3.6 The Example: A Spatial Version;111
6.7;3.7 What Is a Market?;116
6.8;3.8 Final Comments;117
7;4 The Struggling Masses;120
7.1;4.1 The CournotSamuelsonEnke Problem;120
7.2;4.2 Model 4A: Autarky;123
7.3;4.3 Model 4B: Integrated Market Solution: Zero Shipping Cost;130
7.4;4.4 Model 4C: Spatial Price Equilibrium with Shipping Costs;136
7.5;4.5 Final Comments;145
8;5 Arbitrage in the Grand Scheme;148
8.1;5.1 The SamuelsonTakayamaJudge Problem;148
8.2;5.2 Model 5A;151
8.3;5.3 Social Welfare at Place i ;155
8.4;5.4 Net Social Payoff and Global Net Social Welfare;157
8.5;5.5 A Special Case: Horizontal Supply Curve at Each Place;160
8.6;5.6 Three Examples of Multiregional Shipment;161
8.7;5.7 Application;165
8.8;5.8 Case Study;167
8.9;5.9 Final Comments;170
9;6 Ferrying Inputs and Outputs;173
9.1;6.1 The WeberLaunhardt Problem;173
9.2;6.2 Model 6A: I = 2 Input Places, J = 1 Output Place; Location on a Line;177
9.3;6.3 Model 6B: I = 2 Input Places, J = 1 Output Place: Location on a Two-Dimensional Plane;181
9.4;6.4 Model 6C: Substitutability, Scale, and Location;187
9.5;6.5 Model 6D: Price Elasticity;192
9.6;6.6 Model 6E: More Than 2 Input Places and/or More Than 1 Output Place;193
9.7;6.7 Model 6F: Location on a Transportation Network;194
9.8;6.8 Final Comments;197
10;7 What the Firm Does On-Site;199
10.1;7.1 The MarshallLentnekMacPhersonPhillips Problem;199
10.2;7.2 Inventory Models in Management;203
10.3;7.3 Model 7A: The Firm Doing Repairs In-House;205
10.4;7.4 Model 7B: Outsourced Repairs;210
10.5;7.5 Model 7C: The Decision to Outsource;213
10.6;7.6 Model 7D: The Advantage of Agglomeration;215
10.7;7.7 How Far Away Can the Contractor Be?;219
10.8;7.8 Final Comments;219
11;8 Staking Out the Firms Market;222
11.1;8.1 The Market Area Problem;222
11.2;8.2 Range and Geographic Size of Market;226
11.3;8.3 Trade Area and Market Area in Retailing;232
11.4;8.4 Model 8A: Two Firms Selling Commodity at Same f.o.b. Price;233
11.5;8.5 Model 8B: Market Area Boundary Between Two Firms Selling Same Commodity at Different f.o.b. Prices;236
11.6;8.6 Model 8C: Why Do Prices Differ Among Firms?;238
11.7;8.7 Model 8D: Market Area Boundary Between Two Firms with Different Capacities;241
11.8;8.8 Model 8E: Market Area Boundary Between Two Firms with Different, but Perfectly Substitutable, Commodities;242
11.9;8.9 Model 8F: Market Area Boundary Between Two Firms with Different, but Perfectly Substitutable, Commodities When Customers Are of Two Types;243
11.10;8.10 Model 8G: Market Area Boundary Between Two Firms Supplying Different Commodities;244
11.11;8.11 Model 8H: Destination Choice Under Uncertainty;247
11.12;8.12 Final Comments;248
12;9 The Cautious Farmer and the Local Market;251
12.1;9.1 The EconomidesSiow Problem;251
12.2;9.2 The Barter Market;253
12.3;9.3 Uncertainty and Rationality;256
12.4;9.4 Model 9A: Non-spatial Market;260
12.5;9.5 Model 9B: Cooperation in a Spatial Market;269
12.6;9.6 Model 9C: Competition for Land in a Spatial Market;279
12.7;9.7 Final Comments;284
13;10 Farming for Cash;287
13.1;10.1 The ThnenLeeAverous Problem;287
13.2;10.2 Model 10A: Farms Producing Wheat Along a Line;293
13.3;10.3 Model 10B: Farms Producing Wheat on a Rectangular Plane;299
13.4;10.4 Model 10C: Farms Producing Two Independently Demanded Crops Along a Line;305
13.5;10.5 Model 10D: Farms Producing Two Independently Demanded Crops on a Rectangular Plane;313
13.6;10.6 Final Comments;315
14;11 The City and Its Hinterland;319
14.1;11.1 The ThnenBeckmannSamuelson Problem;319
14.2;11.2 Model 11A: Factor Substitution with One Crop and in the Absence of Shipping Cost;322
14.3;11.3 Model 11B: Factor Substitution with One Crop and in Presence of Shipping Cost;326
14.4;11.4 Model 11C: Factor Substitution with Two Crops in Presence of Shipping Costs;332
14.5;11.5 Model 11D: Non-spatial Version of Samuelsons Model of a Thnen Economy;338
14.6;11.6 Model 11E: Spatial Version of Samuelson Model;343
14.7;11.7 Final Comments;351
15;12 Local Production and Consumption;354
15.1;12.1 The ThnenMiron Problem;354
15.2;12.2 Local Production in the Farm Economy;356
15.3;12.3 Model 12A: Farm in Autarky;358
15.4;12.4 Model 12B: Farm Purchasing Soap from the Factory;363
15.5;12.5 Comments on Model 12B;374
15.6;12.6 The Soap Factory as Profit Maximizer;375
15.7;12.7 Model 12C: The Factory as Monopolist Using f.o.b. Pricing;377
15.8;12.8 Model 12C: The Factory Using Discriminatory Pricing;381
15.9;12.9 Model 12D: The Factory as Bilateral Monopolist;385
15.10;12.10 Final Comments About This Chapter;392
15.11;12.11 The Connecting Topics;397
16;Appendix A Assumptions and Rationale for Localization;403
16.1; Assumption Block A: The Regional Economy ;403
16.2; Assumption Block B: Market for Commodity or Crop ;404
16.3; Assumption Block C: Demand ;405
16.4;Assumption Block D: The Enterprise ;405
16.5;Assumption Block E: Shipping Cost ;406
16.6;Assumption Block F: Competition ;406
16.7;Assumption Block G: Uncertainty ;407
16.8;Assumption Block H: Location ;407
16.9;Assumption Block I: Economies of Scale ;407
16.10;Assumption Block J: Land Use ;408
16.11;Assumption Block K: Capital ;408
16.12;Assumption Block L: Labor ;408
16.13;Assumption Block M: Firm's Pricing Policy ;409
16.14;Rationale for Localization ;409
17;Appendix B ;411
18;Bibliography;429
19;First Author Index;463
20;Subject Index;469