Moore General Equilibrium and Welfare Economics

An Introduction
1. Auflage 2006
ISBN: 978-3-540-32223-8
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 576 Seiten

This book offers the basic grasp of general equilibrium theory that is a fundamental background for advanced work in virtually any sub-field of economics, and the thorough understanding of the methods of welfare economics, particularly in a general equilibrium context, that is indispensable for undertaking applied policy analysis. The book uses extensive examples, both simple ones intended to bolster basic concepts, and those illustrating application of the material to economics in practice.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Moore, James C.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Preface;6
1.1;Mathematical Notation;7
2;Contents;9
3;An Introduction to Preference Theory;14
3.1;1.1 Introduction;14
3.2;1.2 Binary Relations and Orderings;15
3.3;1.3 Preference Relations and Utility Functions;24
4;Algebraic Choice Theory;33
4.1;2.1 Introduction;33
4.2;2.2 The General Algebraic Theory of Choice;34
4.3;2.3 Some Criticisms of the Model;37
4.4;2.4 Stated Preferences versus Actual Choices;40
4.5;2.5 The Specification of the Primitive Terms;42
4.6;2.6 Weak Separability of Preferences;45
4.7;2.7 Additive Separability;51
4.8;2.8 Sequential Consumption Plans;53
4.9;2.9 The BPL Experiment Reconsidered;56
4.10;2.10 Probabilistic Theories of Choice;57
4.11;2.11 Are Preferences Total?;59
4.12;2.12 Are Preferences Transitive?;62
4.13;2.13 Asymmetric Orders;66
5;Revealed Preference Theory;70
5.1;3.1 Introduction;70
5.2;3.2 Choice Correspondences and Binary Relations;70
5.3;3.3 Regular-Rational Choice Correspondences;75
5.4;3.4 Representable Choice Correspondences;78
5.5;3.5 Preferences and Observed Demand Behavior;81
5.6;3.6 The Implications of Asymmetric Orders;88
6;Consumer Demand Theory;95
6.1;4.1 Introduction;95
6.2;4.2 The Consumption Set;95
6.3;4.3 Demand Correspondences;98
6.4;4.4 The Budget Balance Condition;100
6.5;4.5 Some Convexity Conditions;104
6.6;4.6 Wold’s Theorem;106
6.7;4.7 Indirect Preferences and Indirect Utility;107
6.8;4.8 Homothetic Preferences;114
6.9;4.9 Cost-of-Living Indices;118
6.10;4.10 Consumer’s Surplus;121
6.11;4.11 Appendix;135
7;Pure Exchange Economies;140
7.1;5.1 Introduction;140
7.2;5.2 The Basic Framework;140
7.3;5.3 The Edgeworth Box Diagram;142
7.4;5.4 Demand and Excess Demand Correspondences;147
7.5;5.5 Pareto Efficiency;151
7.6;5.6 Pareto Efficiency and ’Non-Wastefulness’;159
8;Production Theory;163
8.1;6.1 Introduction;163
8.2;6.2 Basic Concepts of Production Theory;163
8.3;6.3 Linear Production Sets;169
8.4;6.4 Input-Output Analysis;174
8.5;6.5 Profit Maximization;179
8.6;6.6 Profit Maximizing with Constant Returns to Scale;184
8.7;6.7 Production in General Equilibrium Theory;186
8.8;6.8 Activity Analysis;190
9;Fundamental Welfare Theorems;199
9.1;7.1 Introduction;199
9.2;7.2 Competitive Equilibrium with Production;199
9.3;7.3 Some Diagrammatic Techniques;204
9.4;7.4 Walras’ Law with Production;209
9.5;7.5 The ‘First Fundamental Theorem’;213
9.6;7.6 ‘Unbiasedness’ of the Competitive Mechanism;219
9.7;7.7 A Stronger Version of ‘The Second Theorem’;227
10;The Existence of Competitive Equilibrium;234
10.1;8.1 Introduction;234
10.2;8.2 Examples, Part 1;236
10.3;8.3 Assumption (c) and the Attainable Set;242
10.4;8.4 The Gale and Mas-Colell Theorem;246
10.5;8.5 An (Especially) Simple Existence Theorem;248
10.6;8.6 Appendix;251
11;Examples of General Equilibrium Analyses;256
11.1;9.1 Introduction;256
11.2;9.2 Optimal Commodity Taxation: Initial Formulation;256
11.3;9.3 A Reconsideration of the Problem;259
11.4;9.4 The Simplest Model of Optimal Commodity Taxa-tion;262
11.5;9.5 Some Results;263
11.6;9.6 Optimal Income Taxation;266
11.7;9.7 Monopoly in a General Equilibrium Model;276
11.8;9.8 Money in a General Equilibrium Model;279
11.9;9.9 Indivisible Commodities;283
12;Comparative Statics and Stability;287
12.1;10.1 Introduction;287
12.2;10.2 Aggregate Excess Demand;288
12.3;10.3 The ‘Law of Demand’;292
12.4;10.4 Gross Substitutes;297
12.5;10.5 Qualitative Economics;300
12.6;10.6 Stability in a Single Market;304
12.7;10.7 Multi-Market Stability;308
12.8;10.8 A Note on Non-Tˆatonnement Processes;313
13;The Core of an Economy;316
13.1;11.1 Introduction;316
13.2;11.2 Convexity and the Attainable Consumption Set;319
13.3;11.3 The Core of a Production Economy;322
13.4;11.4 The Core in Replicated Economies;325
13.5;11.5 Equal Treatment;334
13.6;11.6 Appendix;335
14;General Equilibrium with Uncertainty;338
14.1;12.1 Introduction;338
14.2;12.2 Arrow-Debreu Contingent Commodities;338
14.3;12.3 Radner Equilibrium;344
14.4;12.4 Complete Markets;350
14.5;12.5 Complete Markets and Efficiency;355
14.6;12.6 Concluding Notes;360
15;Further Topics in General Equilibrium Theory;363
15.1;13.1 Introduction;363
15.2;13.2 Time in the Basic Model;363
15.3;13.3 An Infinite Time Horizon;370
15.4;13.4 Overlapping Generations;373
15.5;13.5 A Continuum of Traders;376
15.6;13.6 Suggestions for Further Reading;383
16;Social Choice and Voting Rules;386
16.1;14.1 Introduction;386
16.2;14.2 The Basic Setting;387
16.3;14.3 Voting Rules;390
16.4;14.4 Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem;395
16.5;14.5 Appendix. A More Sophisticated Borda Count;405
17;Some Tools of Applied Welfare Analysis;409
17.1;15.1 Introduction;409
17.2;15.2 The Framework;410
17.3;15.3 Measurement Functions;411
17.4;15.4 Social Preference Functions;413
17.5;15.5 The Compensation Principle;418
17.6;15.6 Indirect Preferences: Individual and Social;422
17.7;15.7 Measures of Real National Income;424
17.8;15.8 Consumers’ Surplus;430
18;Public Goods;439
18.1;16.1 Introduction;439
18.2;16.2 A Simple Model;439
18.3;16.3 Public Goods;443
18.4;16.4 A Simple Public Goods Model;444
18.5;16.5 Lindahl and Ratio Equilibria;448
18.6;16.6 The ‘Fundamental Theorems’ for Lindahl Equilibria;457
19;Externalities;469
19.1;17.1 Introduction;469
19.2;17.2 Externalities: A First Look;470
19.3;17.3 Extending the Model;477
19.4;17.4 The ‘Coase Theorem’;482
19.5;17.5 Lindahl and Externalities;486
19.6;17.6 Postscript;489
20;Incentives and Implementation Theory;491
20.1;18.1 Introduction;491
20.2;18.2 Game Forms and Mechanisms;492
20.3;18.3 The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem;497
20.4;18.4 Implementation Theory;504
20.5;18.5 Single-Peaked Preferences and Dominant Strate-gies;506
20.6;18.6 Quasi-Linearity and Dominant Strategies;513
20.7;18.7 Implementation in Nash Equilibria;522
20.8;18.8 Nash Implementation with Public Goods;524
20.9;18.9 The Revelation Principle Reconsidered;527
20.10;18.10 Notes and Suggestions for Further Reading;529
21;Appendix. Solutions for Selected Exercises;532
21.1;19.1 Chapter 1;532
21.2;19.2 Chapter 2;534
21.3;19.3 Chapter 3;534
21.4;19.4 Chapter 4;537
21.5;19.5 Chapter 5;538
21.6;19.6 Chapter 6;541
21.7;19.7 Chapter 7;543
21.8;19.8 Chapter 8;544
21.9;19.9 Chapter 9;549
21.10;19.10 Chapter 10 ;549
21.11;19.11 Chapter 11;549
21.12;19.12 Chapter 12;551
21.13;19.13 Chapter 13 ;552
21.14;19.14 Chapter 14;552
21.15;19.15 Chapter 15 ;552
21.16;19.16 Chapter 16;552
21.17;19.17 Chapter 17;553
21.18;19.18 Chapter 18;554
22;References;556
23;Author Index;569
24;Subject Index;572