Morselli Inside Criminal Networks

1. Auflage 2008
ISBN: 978-0-387-09526-4
Verlag: Springer-Verlag
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 204 Seiten

What do an illegal drug importer, a stolen car exporter, a Hells Angels member, an accountant, and an airplane hijacker have in common? Like most people, they all operate in social networks – and at times, they come together in criminal networks which, though tightly structured and controlled, undergo constant change. Inside Criminal Networks takes a social network perspective to a variety of illegal enterprises, focusing on these organizations’ "flexible order" and the collective coping and adjustment strategies of offenders when key members or opportunities are lost.

Rich with communication data, electronic surveillance material, and other law-enforcement investigative sources, case studies pursue a number of analytical paths into the partnerships, pecking orders, and situations in flux (e.g., street gang presence within drug distribution), and identify central challenges to research (e.g., are these failed networks if members are arrested?). Flexibility is revealed as a driving force as the book examines: Operational structures and dynamics - Roles of key and peripheral players - The tentative balance between efficiency and security - Criminal network positions and individual traits - Uses of legitimate actors in illegal settings - Adaptation when networks are disrupted.

Compellingly written and meticulously presented, Inside Criminal Networks offers rare up-close insights to readers in the criminology and organized crime research fields, and to social network theorists and analysts.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Morselli, Carlo

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Acknowledgments;6
2;Contents;9
3;The Criminal Network Perspective;13
3.1;I. The Criminal Network Difference;17
3.2;II. Flexible Order;21
3.3;III. Centrality and Key Player Designations;24
3.3.1;Direct Centrality and Visibility;24
3.3.2;Brokers as Key Players;27
3.4;IV. Seek, Rather than Assume, Structure;30
3.5;V. Organization of the Book;33
4;Case Study Sources and Designs;34
4.1;I. Case Selection and Access;34
4.2;II. Case Study Descriptions;38
4.2.1;Krebs’ Terrorist Network;39
4.2.2;Project Ciel;40
4.2.3;Project Caviar;40
4.2.4;Projects Siren and Togo;41
4.2.5;Operation Springtime 2001;43
4.2.6;Street Gangs and Drug Distribution in Montreal North;45
4.3;III. Designing the Criminal Networks;46
4.3.1;The Matrix and the Sociogram;46
4.3.2;Assembling the Final Network Representation;48
4.4;IV. Centrality and Analogous Network Measures;49
4.4.1;In the Thick of Things;50
4.4.2;In Between;50
4.4.3;In the Thick of the Thick;51
4.4.4;Less Efficiently In Between;51
4.4.5;Localized Clustering;51
4.5;V. Challenges in Criminal Network Analysis;52
4.5.1;Clarity and Attributes in Relational Data;53
4.5.2;Missing Data Beyond the Final Network Representation;55
4.5.3;Missing Data Within the Final Network Representation;58
4.5.4;Are Central Participants Simply Central Targets of a Police Investigation?;59
4.5.5;Are Law-Enforcement Intercepted Networks Simply Failed Criminal Networks?;60
5;Partnership Configurations in Illegal Drug- Importation;62
5.1;I. Resource-Sharing in Crime;63
5.2;II. Two Networks in One;66
5.3;III. Direct and Indirect ConnectivityWithin the Ciel Network;69
5.4;IV. Conclusion;71
6;The Efficiency–Security Trade-Off;73
6.1;I. The Network’s Objective and Time-to-Task;74
6.2;II. Snakes and Clusters;76
6.3;III. Centrality Issues and Distinctions;78
6.4;IV. Conclusion;81
7;Legitimate Strengths in Criminal Networks;82
7.1;I. Legitimate Actors in Criminal Settings;84
7.2;II. Differences Between Trafficker and Nontrafficker Subsets;86
7.3;III. Seeds in the Network;88
7.4;IV. The Direction of Contact;89
7.5;V. Discrete Participants and Pawns;91
7.6;VI. Conclusion;92
8;Law-Enforcement Disruption of a Drug- Importation Network;94
8.1;I. Coding for Criminal Network Dynamics;94
8.1.1;The Context of Control;95
8.1.2;The Uniqueness of the Caviar Case;98
8.2;II. Characteristics of the Overall Caviar Network;99
8.3;III. Changes in the Caviar Network Across Investigative Phases;101
8.3.1;Decentralization and Core Changes;105
8.3.2;Disorder and Accountability;107
8.4;IV. Conclusion;109
9;Brokerage Qualifications in Ringing Scripts;111
9.1;I. Crime Scripts and Flexibility;112
9.2;II. Merging Crime Script and Social Network Frameworks;113
9.3;III. The Case Study Design;115
9.3.1;Determining Brokerage Qualifications;115
9.3.2;Assessing Participant Removal Impact on Script Permutation;117
9.4;IV. Criminal Network Flexibility and Script Permutation;118
9.4.1;Overall Scripts;118
9.4.2;Networks Within the Scripts;121
9.4.3;General Participant Removal and Impact;124
9.4.4;The Broker Impact on Flexibility;125
9.4.5;Nonbroker Impact on Flexibility;127
9.5;V. Conclusion;128
10;Hells Angels in Springtime;130
10.1;I. Hells Angels Inc.;131
10.2;II. The Hells Angels Network in Operation Springtime;137
10.2.1;Variations in Key Participant Status Across the Network;139
10.3;III. Conclusion;144
11;Street Gang Presence in Drug-Distribution Operations;146
11.1;I. Gangs and Flexible Order;147
11.2;II. Past Research on “Gang Networks”;152
11.3;III. Three Investigations, One Network;155
11.3.1;Identifying Gang Members;156
11.3.2;Single-Case Versus Overlapped-Cases Representations;157
11.4;IV. Where are the Gang Members?;160
11.5;V. Conclusion;164
12;Summary and Extensions;165
12.1;I. Extensions of the Criminal Network Perspective;167
12.1.1;Assessing Change Within Disrupted Networks;168
12.1.2;Content Analysis of Electronically Monitored Conversations;169
12.1.3;Expanding on the Social Embeddedness of Network Participants;170
12.1.4;Criminal Network Position and Individual Traits;170
12.1.5;Criminal Networks and the Criminal Career;172
12.1.6;Criminal Networks Beyond the Individual;173
12.1.7;The Master Network;174
13;Appendix;176
14;References;194
15;Index;205