Mou Substantive Perspectivism: An Essay on Philosophical Concern with Truth

1. Auflage 2009
ISBN: 978-90-481-2623-1
Verlag: Springer-Verlag
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 217 Seiten

I have been thinking about the philosophical issue of truth for more than two decades. It is one of several fascinating philosophical issues that motivated me to change my primary re ective interest to philosophy after receiving BS in mathem- ics in 1982. Some serious academic work in this connection started around the late eighties when I translated into Chinese a dozen of Donald Davidson’s representative essays on truth and meaning and when I assumed translator for Adam Morton who gave a series of lectures on the issue in Beijing (1988), which was co-sponsored by my then institution (Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Science). I have loved the issue both for its own sake (as one speci c major issue in the phil- ophy of language and metaphysics) and for the sake of its signi cant involvement in many philosophical issues in different subjects of philosophy. Having been attracted to the analytic approach, I was then interested in looking at the issue both from the points of view of classical Chinese philosophy and Marxist philosophy, two major styles or frameworks of doing philosophy during that time in China, and from the point of view of contemporary analytic philosophy, which was then less recognized in the Chinese philosophical circle.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Mou, Bo

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Preface;6
2;Contents;10
3;1 Starting Point and Engaging Background;12
3.1;1.1 A Summary of Substantive Perspectivism;13
3.2;1.2 A Variety of Distinct Projects in Philosophical Concern with Truth;18
3.2.1;1.2.1 A Characterization of Various Projects Concerning Truth;18
3.2.2;1.2.2 Further Explanations and Clarifications;22
3.3;1.3 A Background Debate: Deflatinism Versus Substantivism;27
3.4;1.4 Methods and Strategy;32
3.4.1;1.4.1 Methodological Considerations;33
3.4.2;1.4.2 Strategy of Argumentation;36
3.5;Notes;38
4;2 Case Analysis I: Tarskis Semantic Approach in the Metaphysical Project;46
4.1;2.1 Tarskis Strategy, Schema (T), and Convention T;47
4.1.1;2.1.1 An Analysis of Pre-Theoretic Understanding of Truth and Its Perspective Elaborations in Ordinary Language;47
4.1.2;2.1.2 Schema (T) and Convention T;53
4.2;2.2 Adequacy of Convention T: Two Diagnoses;58
4.2.1;2.2.1 Diagnosis I;59
4.2.2;2.2.2 Diagnosis II;62
4.3;2.3 Enumerative Character of Tarskis Definition and Its General Character in a Tarskian System;65
4.3.1;2.3.1 A Background Introduction;66
4.3.2;2.3.2 Conditions for Extending Enumerative Definitions to New Cases ;68
4.3.2.1;2.3.2.1 The Definition-Extending Pattern Requirement;69
4.3.2.2;2.3.2.2 The Fixing-New-Sentence-Meaning Requirement;70
4.3.3;2.3.3 Convention T and Potential General Character of the Tarskian Definition;72
4.3.3.1;2.3.3.1 Can Convention T Meet the Definition-Extending Pattern Requirement?;73
4.3.3.2;2.3.3.2 Can Convention T Meet the Fixing-New-Sentence-Meaning Requirement?;75
4.4;2.4 A Tarskian General Definition of What It Is to Be a Truth Definition;77
4.5;Notes;84
5;3 Case Analysis II: Quines Disquotational Approach in the Linguistic Project;90
5.1;3.1 Quines Disquotational Approach;91
5.1.1;3.1.1 Quine's Dual-Character Interpretation of (T);91
5.1.2;3.1.2 Dual Character of (T) or Two Different Equivalence Theses?;95
5.1.3;3.1.3 Is the Conflation of Two Equivalence Theses Justifiable?;97
5.1.4;3.1.4 Is the Conflation Innocent?;99
5.2;3.2 Deflationist Disquotational Account, Schema (T), and Deflationist PLD Argument;101
5.3;3.3 An Analysis of Multiple Facets of the Speech-Act Equivalence Thesis Concerning True;107
5.4;3.4 The Concept of Truth and the Linguistic Project;111
5.5;Notes;115
6;4 Case Analysis III: Davidson's Approach in theExplanatory-Role Project;118
6.1;4.1 Thesis of Truth Centrality Concerning Explanatory Role and Its Sub-Theses;119
6.2;4.2 Truth Nature, Truth Means, and Justificatory Norm;122
6.3;4.3 Truth Pursuit as Strategic Goal and Truths Pursuit as Tactic Goal;125
6.4;4.4 The Semantic-Ascent Version and the Paraphrase-Explanatory-Reduction Version of the TNG Thesis ;128
6.5;Notes;133
7;5 Case Analysis IV: A Cross-Tradition Examination---Philosophical Concern with Truth in Classical Daoism;136
7.1;5.1 Truth Concern and Dao Concern;137
7.2;5.2 Truth Pursuit as Dao Pursuit in the Dao-De-Jing ;140
7.3;5.3 Zhuang Zi on True Agent and True Knowledge: An Account of Truth-Pursuing-Agent Dimension of Truth Concern;147
7.4;5.4 From Dao-Language Deliverance of Truth Concern to Folk Language Deliverance of Pre-Theoretic Understanding of Truth;152
7.5;5.5 How the Cross-Tradition Examination Can Enhance Understanding;159
7.6;Notes;165
8;6 Substantive Perspectivism Concerning Truth;170
8.1;6.1 Substantive-Perspectivist Theory of Truth;170
8.2;6.2 On Adequacy of SPT (I): Substantive Nature of SPT and Its Transcendental-Perspective Character;177
8.2.1;6.2.1 Substantive Nature;177
8.2.2;6.2.2 Transcendental-Perspective Character of SPT;179
8.2.2.1;6.2.2.1 Transcendental Perspectivism: A General Meta-Philosophical Framework;179
8.2.2.2;6.2.2.2 Transcendental-Perspective Character;184
8.2.2.3;6.2.2.3 Transcendental-Perspective Character and Pluralist Approach;187
8.3;6.3 On Adequacy of SPT (II): Ontology and Ideology;190
8.3.1;6.3.1 Ontological Presupposition and Ontological Neutrality of (ATNT);190
8.3.2;6.3.2 Ontology and Ideology of (STD);193
8.3.2.1;6.3.2.1 Complexity of the Ideology of a List-Like Definition;193
8.3.2.2;6.3.2.2 T-Sentences and Some Distinct Notions of Truth;195
8.4;6.4 On Adequacy of SPT (III): A Unified Account of Non-Linguistic Truth and Linguistic Truth Predicate;201
8.4.1;6.4.1 From Non-Linguistic Truth to Linguistic Truth Predicate;201
8.4.2;6.4.2 A Moderate Semantic Redundancy Thesis;204
8.4.3;6.4.3 A Denominalization-Disquotation Thesis;206
8.5;Notes;208
9;References;216
10;Index;222