Niemeyer / Dreicer / Stein Nuclear Non-proliferation and Arms Control Verification

Innovative Systems Concepts
1. Auflage 2020
ISBN: 978-3-030-29537-0
Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 449 Seiten

This book strives to take stock of current achievements and existing challenges in nuclear verification, identify the available information and gaps that can act as drivers for exploring new approaches to verification strategies and technologies.  With the practical application of the systems concept to nuclear disarmament scenarios and other, non-nuclear verification fields, it investigates, where greater transparency and confidence could be achieved in pursuit of new national or international nonproliferation and arms reduction efforts. A final discussion looks at how, in the absence of formal government-to-government negotiations, experts can take practical steps to advance the technical development of these concepts.


Irmgard Niemeyer, Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH, Nuclear Waste Management and Reactor Safety, Jülich, GermanyMona Dreicer, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Center for Global Security Research, Livermore, California, USAGotthard Stein, Consultant, Bonn, Germany

Autoren/Hrsg.

Niemeyer, Irmgard

Dreicer, Mona

Stein, Gotthard

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Foreword;5
2;Acknowledgements;7
3;Contents;8
4;Contributors;11
5;Systems Concepts: Structuring a New Verification Approach;14
5.1;1 Introduction;15
5.2;2 A Systematic Approach;16
5.3;3 Nuclear Weapons Complex;17
5.4;4 The Regime Today;19
5.5;5 More Pieces of the Puzzle;21
5.6;6 Innovative Systems Concepts for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control Verification;22
5.7;References;23
6;Part I Status of Verification Strategies;25
6.1;History, Status and Challenges for Non-proliferation and Arms Control Verification;26
6.1.1;1 On Verification;26
6.1.2;2 On Verification and Confidence-Building;29
6.1.3;3 On Verification Provisions;30
6.1.4;4 Verification in the Nuclear Field: The Role of Technology and Technological Expertise;32
6.1.5;5 Current Status of Verification Technologies in Arms Control Verification;32
6.1.6;6 Information Barriers: Attributes and Templates;34
6.1.7;7 Fixed and Potentially Movable Constraints;35
6.1.8;8 The Continuing Importance of Progress;35
6.1.9;References;37
6.2;The Evolution of Safeguards;38
6.2.1;1 Background;39
6.2.2;2 Early Strengthening Measures;40
6.2.3;3 State Evaluation;41
6.2.4;4 Integrated Safeguards;42
6.2.5;5 Furthering the Development of the State-Level Concept;43
6.2.6;6 The State-Level Concept;44
6.2.6.1;6.1 Establishment of Safeguards Objectives;44
6.2.6.1.1;Acquisition/Diversion Path Analysis to Establish Technical Objectives;46
6.2.6.2;6.2 Development of a State-Level Safeguards Approach;48
6.2.6.2.1;Applicable Safeguards Measures;48
6.2.6.2.2;Annual Implementation Plan;48
6.2.6.3;6.3 State-Specific Factors;49
6.2.6.4;6.4 Strengthening the State Evaluation Process;50
6.2.6.5;6.5 Drawing Safeguards Conclusions;50
6.2.7;7 Conclusions;51
6.2.8;References;52
7;Part II Factors Influencing the Development of a Systems Concept for Verification;53
7.1;Legal Issues Relating to Risk and Systems Driven Verification;54
7.1.1;1 Introduction;55
7.1.2;2 Future Verification Missions;56
7.1.3;3 Verification Objectives;57
7.1.4;4 Some Key Legal Considerations;58
7.1.4.1;4.1 Non-compliance: Standard of Proof;58
7.1.4.2;4.2 Obligation to Cooperate;59
7.1.4.3;4.3 Non-discrimination;59
7.1.4.4;4.4 Use of and Access to Information;60
7.1.4.5;4.5 Verification Tools: Inspections and Monitoring;62
7.1.4.6;4.6 Dispute Resolution;65
7.1.4.7;4.7 Treaty Structure;65
7.1.5;5 Conclusions;68
7.1.6;References;68
7.2;Verification: The Politics of the Unpolitical;69
7.2.1;1 Introduction;69
7.2.2;2 Lessons of History Forlorn;70
7.2.3;3 Lessons of History Regained;72
7.2.4;4 The Evolution of Safeguards;73
7.2.5;5 Authority and Authenticity in International Verification;78
7.2.6;6 Verification and Deterrence;81
7.2.7;7 Reconciling International Politics and Verification;85
7.2.8;8 Afterthoughts: The Crisis of Multilateralism;86
7.2.9;References;89
7.3;Military Dimensions;91
7.3.1;1 Introduction;91
7.3.2;2 Setting the Scene;94
7.3.2.1;2.1 Growth of Nuclear Arsenals;94
7.3.2.2;2.2 Fissile Materials and Technology Control;95
7.3.2.3;2.3 De-escalation;95
7.3.2.4;2.4 Proliferation Awareness;96
7.3.2.5;2.5 Post-NPT Era (1970–1990);96
7.3.2.6;2.6 Post-Cold War Era (1990–2010);97
7.3.2.7;2.7 Current Context;98
7.3.3;3 Military Dimensions of Nuclear Disarmament;99
7.3.3.1;3.1 Existing Commitments;99
7.3.3.2;3.2 A Brief Review of the Components of the Military Dimension;101
7.3.4;4 Conclusions and Future Prospects;104
7.3.5;References;105
7.4;Strategic Export Control;107
7.4.1;1 Historical Developments;108
7.4.1.1;1.1 The Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT);108
7.4.1.2;1.2 The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG);109
7.4.2;2 Strategic Export Control and Nuclear Safeguards;109
7.4.3;3 Addressing Non-nuclear Proliferation;112
7.4.3.1;3.1 The International Export Control Regime;112
7.4.3.2;3.2 Other Treaties and Agreements;113
7.4.4;4 An International Legal Basis for Export Control: UNSCR 1540;114
7.4.5;5 The Export Control Process;115
7.4.5.1;5.1 Control Lists;115
7.4.5.2;5.2 Other Control Lists;116
7.4.5.3;5.3 Key Elements of the Export Control Process;117
7.4.6;6 Conclusions and Relevance to Disarmament and Arms Control;118
7.4.7;References;118
8;Part III Methods and Models;120
8.1;NTI Nuclear Security Index: A Model for State-Level Approaches to Nonproliferation and Arms Control;121
8.1.1;1 Introduction;121
8.1.2;2 About the NTI Index: Goals and Methodology;122
8.1.2.1;2.1 Goals of the NTI Index;122
8.1.2.2;2.2 NTI Index Methodology;123
8.1.3;3 Applying the NTI Index Methodology to the State-Level Concept;124
8.1.3.1;3.1 Developing a Framework;124
8.1.3.2;3.2 Research and Data Gathering;125
8.1.3.3;3.3 Government Engagement and Outreach;126
8.1.3.4;3.4 Operational Capacity;127
8.1.3.5;3.5 Key Differences Between the NTI Index and the State-Level Concept;127
8.1.4;4 Conclusions;128
8.1.5;References;129
8.2;Formalizing Acquisition Path Analysis;130
8.2.1;1 Introduction;130
8.2.2;2 The Game-Theoretical Model;131
8.2.2.1;2.1 Extensive Form;132
8.2.2.2;2.2 Normal Form;134
8.2.2.3;2.3 Graph Representation;135
8.2.2.4;2.4 Equilibrium Multiplicity;136
8.2.2.5;2.5 Parameters;136
8.2.3;3 A Case Study;139
8.2.4;4 Discussion and Outlook;143
8.2.5;References;144
8.3;Metrics for Detecting Undeclared Materials and Activities;145
8.3.1;1 Introduction;145
8.3.2;2 Potential Clandestine Proliferation Paths;146
8.3.3;3 Characteristics of the Data Available to the IAEA;149
8.3.3.1;3.1 Safeguards Data;150
8.3.3.2;3.2 Non-safeguards Data;151
8.3.4;4 Development of Metrics for Detecting Undeclared Activities;152
8.3.5;5 Conclusions;156
8.3.6;References;156
8.4;Game Theoretical Models for Arms Control and Disarmament Verification;158
8.4.1;1 Introduction;159
8.4.2;2 Unannounced Interim Inspections;160
8.4.2.1;2.1 Game Theoretical Model;161
8.4.2.2;2.2 Analysis;165
8.4.2.3;2.3 Effective and Efficient Inspections;166
8.4.2.4;2.4 Extensions;168
8.4.3;3 Conclusions: The Art of Modeling;168
8.4.4;References;170
8.5;Societal Verification for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control;172
8.5.1;1 Introduction;172
8.5.2;2 Societal Mobilization;174
8.5.3;3 Societal Observation;175
8.5.4;4 Mobilization for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control Verification;176
8.5.5;5 Observation for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control Verification;179
8.5.6;6 Challenges and Considerations;180
8.5.7;7 Conclusions;183
8.5.8;References;184
9;Part IV Technologies;187
9.1;Futures Research as an Opportunity for Innovation in Verification Technologies;188
9.1.1;1 Introduction: Technology Foresight of Verification Techniques;189
9.1.2;2 The Classic Technology-Foresight Approach;191
9.1.2.1;2.1 Scanning and Monitoring;192
9.1.2.2;2.2 Cross-Fertilization of Future Technologies;193
9.1.3;3 ``Trend Archaeology'': Bibliometrics for Technology Foresight;193
9.1.3.1;3.1 The Bibliometric Workflow;194
9.1.3.2;3.2 The Potential of Bibliometrics for Technology Foresight;198
9.1.4;4 Novel Technological Solutions;199
9.1.4.1;4.1 Prediction of New Technological Trends with Text/Web Mining and Clustering;199
9.1.4.2;4.2 Methodology;199
9.1.4.3;4.3 Case Study;200
9.1.5;5 Including Experts and Practitioners: Participatory Approaches;201
9.1.6;6 Conclusions;202
9.1.7;References;203
9.2;Attribute Information Barriers;206
9.2.1;1 Disarmament Verification;207
9.2.2;2 Why an Information Barrier?;208
9.2.3;3 Attribute Approach;208
9.2.3.1;3.1 Attribute Definition Issues;209
9.2.3.2;3.2 Measurement Issues;210
9.2.4;4 How to Authenticate Nuclear Warheads?;213
9.2.5;5 When the Light Is Red …;215
9.2.6;References;216
9.3;Minimally Intrusive Approaches to Nuclear Warhead Verification;218
9.3.1;1 Background;219
9.3.2;2 Confirming Numerical Limits on Declared Nuclear Warheads;219
9.3.3;3 Confirming the Authenticity of Nuclear Warheads;225
9.3.4;4 Conclusions;230
9.3.5;References;230
9.4;Advances in Seismic and Acoustic Monitoring;232
9.4.1;1 Introduction;232
9.4.2;2 Basics of Acoustics and Seismology;234
9.4.3;3 Advances in Teleseismic Monitoring;235
9.4.4;4 Advances in Infrasound Monitoring;237
9.4.5;5 Research for Seismic Monitoring During CTBT On-Site Inspections;238
9.4.6;6 Applications for Peace Keeping and Early Warning;241
9.4.7;7 Research for Safeguards at Underground Final Repositories;243
9.4.8;8 Conclusions;247
9.4.9;References;247
9.5;Radiation Detectors and Instrumentation;250
9.5.1;1 Introduction;250
9.5.2;2 Special Nuclear Material Signatures;251
9.5.2.1;2.1 Uranium Signatures;251
9.5.2.2;2.2 Plutonium Signatures;253
9.5.3;3 Radiation Detection Monitoring and Verification Techniques;254
9.5.3.1;3.1 Radiation Pulse Counting;254
9.5.3.2;3.2 Spectroscopy;255
9.5.3.2.1;Gamma Spectroscopy;255
9.5.3.2.2;Alpha Spectroscopy;258
9.5.3.2.3;Mass Spectrometry;258
9.5.3.3;3.3 Neutron Detection;259
9.5.3.4;3.4 Imaging Techniques;260
9.5.4;4 RDE Implementation Challenges;261
9.5.4.1;4.1 Arms Control Implementation Challenges;261
9.5.4.2;4.2 General Implementation Challenges;262
9.5.5;5 Conclusions;263
9.5.6;References;265
9.6;Environmental Signatures and Forensics;266
9.6.1;1 ``Signatures'' as Source of Information;267
9.6.2;2 Environmental Particle Signatures and Measurements;267
9.6.2.1;2.1 New Instruments Opening New Avenues: The LG-SIMS;268
9.6.2.2;2.2 Expanding the Set of Established Signatures in Bulk and Particle Samples;269
9.6.3;3 Nuclear Forensic Signatures;270
9.6.3.1;3.1 Radiochronometry;273
9.6.3.1.1;Age Dating of Plutonium;274
9.6.3.1.2;Age Dating of Uranium;275
9.6.3.2;3.2 Isotope Correlation for Pu Reactor Type Determination;276
9.6.4;4 Confidence in Results;277
9.6.5;5 Synergies Between Safeguards, Non-proliferation and Nuclear Forensics;279
9.6.6;6 Conclusions;281
9.6.7;References;281
10;Part V Information Analysis;284
10.1;Information Management: The Role of Information Technology in Treaty Verification;285
10.1.1;1 Introduction;285
10.1.2;2 Establishing the System Requirements;286
10.1.3;3 Sources of Information;288
10.1.4;4 Data Transmission;289
10.1.5;5 Data Storage and Processing;291
10.1.6;6 Verification System Information Processing;292
10.1.7;7 Data Integrity;294
10.1.8;8 Conclusions;295
10.1.9;References;296
10.2;Enhancing Verification with High-Performance Computing and Data Analytics;298
10.2.1;1 Introduction;298
10.2.2;2 Underlying Technologies: From High Performance Computing to Machine Learning;299
10.2.2.1;2.1 High Performance and Data Intensive Computing;299
10.2.2.2;2.2 Bringing the Data Together: Machine Learning and Multimodal Semantic Feature Spaces;302
10.2.3;3 Possible Applications;304
10.2.4;4 Next Steps;305
10.2.5;References;305
10.3;Open Source Analysis in Support to Non-proliferation: A Systems Thinking Perspective;307
10.3.1;1 Introduction;307
10.3.2;2 What Is Open Source Analysis?;308
10.3.3;3 How Can Open Source Analysis Monitor an Engineering Programme?;309
10.3.3.1;3.1 Defining the System to be Analyzed: A Systems Thinking Approach;309
10.3.3.2;3.2 Hard Layers' Observables;310
10.3.3.3;3.3 Soft Layers' Observables;311
10.3.3.4;3.4 Taking the Context into Account;314
10.3.4;4 Types of OS Analysis Scenarios for Nuclear Non-proliferation;316
10.3.4.1;4.1 Puzzle Solving;316
10.3.4.2;4.2 Data Foraging;317
10.3.4.3;4.3 Model Building;318
10.3.4.4;4.4 Mystery Framing;318
10.3.5;5 Conclusions;319
10.3.6;References;320
10.4;Geospatial Information and Technologies for International Safeguards Verification;323
10.4.1;1 Introduction;323
10.4.2;2 Geospatial Information and Technologies for Nuclear Safeguards Analysis;325
10.4.2.1;2.1 Additional Protocol;325
10.4.2.2;2.2 Satellite Imagery;325
10.4.2.3;2.3 Open Source Information;326
10.4.2.4;2.4 Inspection Results;326
10.4.2.5;2.5 GIS-Based Information Integration and Analysis;326
10.4.3;3 Geospatial Information and Technologies for On-Site Inspections;329
10.4.3.1;3.1 3D Laser Scanning;329
10.4.3.2;3.2 Location-Based Services;330
10.4.4;4 Challenges for Applying Geospatial Technologies to Nuclear Safeguards;332
10.4.4.1;4.1 Information Security;332
10.4.4.2;4.2 Legacy Infrastructure;332
10.4.4.3;4.3 Safeguards Culture;332
10.4.4.4;4.4 Operator Acceptance;333
10.4.5;5 Conclusions;333
10.4.6;References;334
10.5;Remote Sensing Data Processing and Analysis Techniques for Nuclear Non-proliferation;336
10.5.1;1 Introduction;336
10.5.2;2 Data Sources;337
10.5.2.1;2.1 Electro Optical Data;337
10.5.2.2;2.2 Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) Data;338
10.5.3;3 Data Storage Formats;339
10.5.4;4 Pre-processing Remote Sensing Data;340
10.5.5;5 Processing Remote Sensing Data;341
10.5.5.1;5.1 Enhancements;341
10.5.5.2;5.2 DEM Generation;342
10.5.5.3;5.3 Classification;343
10.5.5.4;5.4 Change Detection;344
10.5.6;6 Conclusion;345
10.5.7;References;346
10.6;Commercial Satellite Imagery: An Evolving Tool in the Non-proliferation Verification and Monitoring Toolkit;348
10.6.1;1 Introduction;348
10.6.2;2 The Number of Satellites Is Rapidly Increasing, and Capabilities Are Improving;349
10.6.3;3 Temporal Resolution Improvements: Observing Activity;350
10.6.4;4 Spatial Resolution Improvements: Seeing Greater Detail;352
10.6.5;5 Spectral Resolution Improvements: Seeing Beyond the Visible;352
10.6.6;6 Improvements in Accessibility and Pricing;354
10.6.7;7 Multi-Satellite/Multi-Sensor Data Fusion: Creating Innovation in Verification Applications;356
10.6.8;8 Imagery Analysis Is Critical for Effective Use of Commercial Satellite Imagery;359
10.6.9;9 Advances in 3D Modeling;362
10.6.10;10 Conclusions;364
10.6.11;References;365
10.7;Strategic Trade Analysis for Non-proliferation;369
10.7.1;1 Introduction;369
10.7.2;2 Reference Lists of Strategic Items;370
10.7.3;3 Data Sources for Trade Analysis;372
10.7.4;4 Mapping Strategic Items to Trade Descriptors;375
10.7.5;5 Use Cases for Strategic Trade Analysis;377
10.7.5.1;5.1 Micro Views;378
10.7.5.2;5.2 Macro Views;379
10.7.6;6 Conclusions;383
10.7.7;References;384
11;Part VI Applications;387
11.1;A Systems Approach for Evaluating a Warhead Monitoring System;388
11.1.1;1 Introduction;389
11.1.2;2 Evaluation Methodology;390
11.1.2.1;2.1 Evaluation Framework;390
11.1.2.2;2.2 Monitoring Approach Specification;393
11.1.2.3;2.3 Evaluation: Modeling and Simulations;395
11.1.3;3 Warhead Monitoring Example;396
11.1.3.1;3.1 Notional Treaty Provisions and Monitoring Approach;396
11.1.3.2;3.2 Considerations When Applying the Evaluation Framework;398
11.1.3.3;3.3 Quantitative Evaluation;400
11.1.4;4 Conclusions;404
11.1.5;References;405
11.2;Physical Model and Acquisition Path Analysis: Applicability to Nuclear Disarmament Verification;406
11.2.1;1 Introduction;406
11.2.1.1;1.1 The Physical Model in IAEA Safeguards;406
11.2.1.2;1.2 Use of the Physical Model in Acquisition Path Analysis;407
11.2.2;2 Physical Model and Acquisition Path Analysis in Arms Control Verification;409
11.2.2.1;2.1 Adapted Physical Model;409
11.2.2.2;2.2 Pathways Analysis;411
11.2.3;3 Physical Model and Acquisition Path Analysis in Arms Control Verification;418
11.2.4;4 Application for Biological Weapons;418
11.2.5;5 Conclusion;419
11.2.6;References;420
11.3;Investigating Development of Nuclear Arms Control Verification: Requirements at the State Level;421
11.3.1;1 Introduction;422
11.3.2;2 Applying Systems Level Analysis to Arms Control;423
11.3.3;3 Exercise One;424
11.3.3.1;3.1 State Strategic Security Objectives;424
11.3.3.2;3.2 Verification Objectives;425
11.3.3.3;3.3 Acquisition Pathways;426
11.3.3.4;3.4 Pathway Attractiveness;427
11.3.3.5;3.5 Detection Goals;429
11.3.3.6;3.6 Verification Priorities;430
11.3.3.7;3.7 Technical Verification Measures;433
11.3.4;4 Exercise Two;439
11.3.5;5 Lessons Learned;440
11.3.6;Appendix: Fictitious States of Trenzalia and Azaria and Model Treaties;442
11.3.6.1;Exercise One;442
11.3.6.2;Exercise Two;445
11.3.7;References;449