Nolan Safety and Security Review for the Process Industries

Application of HAZOP, PHA, What-IF and SVA Reviews
3. Auflage 2011
ISBN: 978-1-4377-3519-2
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 6 - ePub Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 174 Seiten

Safety and Security Review for the Process Industries: Application of HAZOP, PHA, What-IF and SVA Reviews, Third Edition, describes the responsibilities, methods, and documentation required for the performance of qualitative hazard analysis for industrial and commercial processes, specifically Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), What-If, and Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) reviews. It is a guideline and reference book that explains how the methodology and procedures used for these reviews can be adopted and applied for Security Vulnerability Analysis (SVA) to avoid the major risks that have the potential to severely impact the industry. Organized into 13 chapters, the book relies mainly on practices commonly observed in the petroleum, chemical, and petrochemical industries. It begins with an overview of PHA, What-If, and HAZOP reviews, including their limitations and advantages. It then moves into a discussion of safety reviews that are increasingly used in the process industries: Bow-Tie Analysis (BTA), Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA), and Safety Integrity Level (SIL). The book looks at review team members, their qualifications and responsibilities, and senior management support and responsibilities for the safety and security of a facility. The reader is also introduced to review procedures and worksheets, review applications, preparation and distribution of the study report, and handling and resolution of recommendations. The book concludes by explaining the estimation of review scheduling and cost. This book will serve as a reminder to members of PHA, What-If, and HAZOP review teams about their duties and responsibilities.

Dr. Dennis P. Nolan has had a long career devoted to risk engineering, fire protection engineering, loss prevention engineering and systems safety engineering. He holds a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Business Administration from Berne University, Master of Science degree in Systems Management from Florida Institute of Technology and a Bachelor of Science Degree in Fire Protection Engineering from the University of Maryland. He is a U.S. registered professional engineer in fire protection engineering in the state of California.He is currently on the Executive Management staff of Saudi Aramco, located in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, as a Loss Prevention Consultant/Chief Fire Prevention Engineer. He covers some of the largest oil and gas facilities in the world. As part of his career, he has examined oil production, refining, and marketing facilities under severe conditions and in various unique worldwide locations, including Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, Russia, and North and South America. His activity in the aerospace field has included engineering support for the NASA Space Shuttle launch facilities at Kennedy Space Center (and for those undertaken at Vandenburg Air Force Base, California) and 'classified” national defense systems. Dr. Nolan has received numerous safety awards and is a member of the American Society of Safety Engineers, He is the author of many technical papers and professional articles in various international fire safety publications. He has written at least four books, several published by Elsevier.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Nolan, Dennis P.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Safety and Security Review for the Process Industries;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Contents;8
5;Preface;14
6;Acknowledgments;16
7;About the Author;18
8;1. Purpose;20
9;2. Scope;24
10;3. Objective and Description of PHA, What-If, and HAZOP Reviews;26
10.1;1. Definition;28
10.2;2. Objectives;28
10.3;3. Origins of Qualitative Safety Reviews;28
10.4;4. Limitations or Disadvantages;29
10.4.1;4.1 Limitations;29
10.4.1.1;4.1.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis;29
10.4.1.2;4.1.2 What-If reviews;29
10.4.1.3;4.1.3 HAZOP reviews;30
10.4.2;4.2 Advantages;30
10.4.2.1;4.2.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis;30
10.4.2.2;4.2.2 What-If reviews;30
10.4.2.3;4.2.3 HAZOP reviews;30
11;4. Adaptation to Security Vulnerability Analysis;32
11.1;1. Comparison to Process Hazard Analysis Reviews;33
11.2;2. SVA Overall Procedure;33
11.3;3. Major Differences Between Security Vulnerability Analyses and Process Hazard Analyses;34
11.4;4. Threat Analysis Necessity;34
12;5. Specialized Reviews—Bow-Tie Analysis, Layers of Protection Analysis, and Safety Integrity Levels;36
12.1;1. Bow-Tie Analysis;36
12.2;2. Layers of Protection Analysis;37
12.3;3. SIL Analysis;40
13;6. Team Members, Qualifications, and Responsibilities;44
13.1;1. Team Members;45
13.1.1;1.1 Minimum team members;45
13.1.2;1.2 Supplemental members;46
13.2;2. Team Member Qualifications;47
13.2.1;2.1 Team leader;47
13.2.2;2.2 Scribe;48
13.2.3;2.3 Project manager (project, process, manufacturing, or facility engineer);48
13.2.4;2.4 Operations representative;48
13.2.5;2.5 Loss prevention or safety representative;48
13.2.6;2.6 Security officer or representative (for SVAs);48
13.2.7;2.7 Supplemental team member;48
13.3;3. Team Responsibilities;49
13.3.1;3.1 Team leader;49
13.3.2;3.2 Scribe;50
13.3.3;3.3 Project manager (project, process, manufacturing, or facility engineer);50
13.3.4;3.4 Operations representative;51
13.3.5;3.5 Loss prevention or safety representative;51
13.3.6;3.6 Security officer or representative (for SVAs);51
13.3.7;3.7 Supplemental team member(s);52
13.4;4. Team Dynamics;52
13.4.1;4.1 Leadership influences;52
13.4.2;4.2 Lines of communication;52
13.4.3;4.3 Efficiency factors;53
13.4.3.1;4.3.1 The number of nodes or areas in the review;53
13.4.3.2;4.3.2 The completeness of the design versus level of safety review desired;53
13.4.3.3;4.3.3 The experience of the review team;53
13.4.3.4;4.3.4 The effectiveness of the team leader;54
13.4.3.5;4.3.5 The language background of the review team;54
13.4.3.6;4.3.6 The number of review team members;54
13.4.3.7;4.3.7 The number of similar or duplicate process vessels or support equipment;54
13.5;5. Use of Consultants;54
13.5.1;5.1 Qualifications;55
13.5.2;5.2 Advantages;55
13.5.3;5.3 Disadvantages;56
13.6;6. Record of Employee Experience;56
14;7. Management Support and Responsibilities;58
15;8. Review Applications for Typical Facilities;60
15.1;1. PHA Review Applications;62
15.2;2. What-If Review Applications;62
15.3;3. HAZOP Review Applications;62
15.4;4. SVA Review Applications;64
15.5;5. Application During Changes at a Facility;65
16;9. Review Procedures;66
16.1;1. Review Preparation and Setup;67
16.1.1;1.1 Location;67
16.1.2;1.2 Administrative support;67
16.1.3;1.3 Facility documentation;68
16.1.4;1.4 PHA consequence and likelihood data resources;71
16.1.5;1.5 SVA Threat Analysis data resources;72
16.1.6;1.6 Computer hardware and software support;72
16.1.7;1.7 Node identification;73
16.1.8;1.8 SVA area identification;74
16.2;2. Review Methodology;74
16.3;3. Review Procedure;76
16.3.1;3.1 Review steps;76
16.3.1.1;3.1.1 PHA and What-If review steps;76
16.3.1.2;3.1.2 HAZOP review steps;77
16.3.1.3;3.1.3 SVA review steps;78
16.3.1.4;3.1.4 Threat Analysis;80
16.4;4. Credible Scenarios and Causes;82
16.5;5. Possible Causes;84
16.6;6. Safeguards;84
16.7;7. Likelihood (Probabilities);85
16.8;8. Consequences;85
16.9;9. Notetaking;85
16.10;10. Helpful Review Suggestions;86
16.11;11. Helpful Technical Suggestions;87
16.11.1;11.1 General;87
16.11.2;11.2 HAZOP suggestions;88
16.11.3;11.3 General PHA, What-If, HAZOP, and SVA review suggestions;89
16.12;12. Assumptions for the Review Process;91
16.13;13. Providing Recommendations;92
16.13.1;13.1 Examples of inadequate versus adequate recommendations;94
16.13.2;13.2 How to rank recommendations;94
16.14;14. Quality Audit;95
17;10. Review Worksheets;98
17.1;1. PHA Worksheet;98
17.2;2. What-If Worksheet;101
17.3;3. HAZOP Worksheet;101
17.4;4. SVA Worksheets;105
17.5;5. Worksheet Identification;105
18;11. Report Preparation and Distribution;106
18.1;1. Report Stages and Purpose;106
18.2;2. Report Preparation and Organization;107
18.3;3. Report Distribution;107
18.3.1;3.1 Preliminary reports;108
18.3.2;3.2 Draft reports;109
18.3.3;3.3 Final reports;110
18.3.4;3.4 Addendum reports;110
19;12. Handling and Resolution of Recommendations;112
19.1;1. Ranking and Classifying Recommendations;112
19.1.1;1.1 Recommendation resolution summary;114
19.2;2. Objectives of a Safe and Secure Facility Design;114
19.3;3. Recommendation Action Plans;115
19.4;4. Risk Assessment Studies;115
19.5;5. Risk Acceptance Criteria;116
19.6;6. Cost–Benefit Analysis;116
20;13. Schedule and Cost Estimates;118
20.1;1. Schedule;118
20.1.1;1.1 Formula to estimate review scheduling;119
20.1.2;1.2 Time bar scheduling and integration with project schedule;120
20.2;2. Cost Estimate;121
20.3;3. Estimating Formula;121
20.3.1;3.1 Cost of preparation;121
20.3.2;3.2 Cost of review sessions;123
20.3.3;3.3 Cost of report preparations and review;123
20.3.4;3.4 Documentation costs;123
20.3.5;3.5 Hardware, software, and incidental costs;123
20.4;4. Example calculation for schedule and cost;124
21;Appendix A. Typical Company Policy Statement;126
21.1;A Safely Managed Company;126
22;Appendix B. Quality Assurance Audit Checklist;128
23;Appendix C. Probability, Severity, Risk, and Risk-Acceptance Tables;130
24;Appendix D. PHA and What-If Checklist Questions;134
24.1;Part 1 Piping;134
24.1.1;What-If checklist;134
24.2;Part 2 Valves;135
24.2.1;What-If checklist;135
24.3;Part 3 Processing Vessels;136
24.3.1;What-If checklist;136
24.3.1.1;Feed;136
24.3.1.2;Vessel;136
24.3.1.3;Vessel piping;136
24.3.1.4;Fired vessels;137
24.3.1.5;Vessel external factors;138
24.4;Part 4 Tanks;138
24.4.1;What-If checklist;138
24.4.1.1;Feed;138
24.4.1.2;Tank;138
24.4.1.3;Tank piping;139
24.4.1.4;Tank external factors;139
24.5;Part 5 Pumps;139
24.5.1;What-If checklist;139
24.6;Part 6 Compressors;140
24.6.1;What-If checklist;140
24.7;Part 7 Heat Exchangers;141
24.7.1;What-If checklist;141
24.7.1.1;Exchanger feed;141
24.7.1.2;Exchanger;141
24.7.1.3;Exchanger piping;141
24.7.1.4;Exchanger external factors;142
24.8;Part 8 Reactors;142
24.8.1;What-If checklist;142
24.9;Part 9 Columns (Towers);143
24.9.1;What-If checklist;143
24.10;Part 10 Flares;144
24.10.1;What-If checklist;144
24.10.1.1;Flare piping;144
24.10.1.2;External factors;144
24.11;Part 11 Electrical Equipment;145
24.11.1;What-If checklist;145
24.11.1.1;Generators;145
24.11.1.2;Motors;145
24.11.1.3;Motor control center;145
24.11.1.4;Switchgear;145
24.12;Part 12 Cooling Towers;146
24.12.1;What-If checklist;146
24.13;Part 13 Utility Systems;146
24.13.1;What-If checklist;146
24.14;Part 14 Human Factors;147
24.14.1;What-If checklist;147
24.14.1.1;General;147
24.14.1.2;Operators;148
24.14.1.3;Equipment;148
24.15;Part 15 Global Events;149
24.15.1;What-If checklist;149
24.15.1.1;Maintenance;149
24.15.1.2;Sampling;149
24.15.1.3;Testing;149
24.15.1.4;Weather;149
24.15.1.5;Geological events;150
24.15.1.6;Transportation;150
24.15.1.7;Human induced;150
24.15.1.8;Human civil;151
25;Appendix E. HAZOP Parameters, Deviations, and Possible Causes;152
25.1;Parameters, Deviation, and Possible Causes;152
25.1.1;Flow;152
25.1.2;Level;153
25.1.3;Pressure;154
25.1.4;Temperature;155
25.1.5;Part of;156
25.1.6;As well as;156
25.1.7;Other than;157
25.1.8;Viscosity;157
25.1.9;Relief system;157
25.1.10;Corrosion/erosion;157
25.1.11;Service failures;157
25.1.12;Abnormal operation;158
25.1.13;Maintenance/procedures;158
25.1.14;Static;158
25.1.15;Spare equipment;159
25.1.16;Sampling/procedures;159
25.1.17;Time;159
25.1.18;Action;159
25.1.19;Information;159
25.1.20;Sequence;160
25.1.21;Safety systems;160
25.1.22;Global;160
26;List of Acronyms;162
27;Glossary;164
28;Bibliography;170
29;Index;172