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E-Book

E-Book, Englisch, 290 Seiten

Orilia Singular Reference: A Descriptivist Perspective


1. Auflage 2009
ISBN: 978-90-481-3312-3
Verlag: Springer-Verlag
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 290 Seiten

ISBN: 978-90-481-3312-3
Verlag: Springer-Verlag
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)



Singular reference to ourselves and the ordinary objects surrounding us is a most crucial philosophical topic, for it looms large in any attempt to understand how language and mind connect to the world. This book explains in detail why in the past philosophers such as Frege, Russell and Reichenbach have favoured a descriptivist approach to this matter and why in more recent times Donnellan, Kripke, Kaplan and others have rather favoured a referentialist standpoint. The now dominant referentialist theories however still have a hard time in addressing propositional attitudes and empty singular terms. Here a way out of this difficulty emerges in an approach that incorporates aspects of the old-fashioned descriptivist views of Frege, Russell and Reichenbach without succumbing to the anti-descriptivist arguments that back up the current referentialist trend. The resulting theory features a novel approach to the semantics and pragmatics of determiner phrases, definite descriptions, propernames and indexicals, all treated in uniform fashion in both their anaphoric and non-anaphoric uses.

This work will be of interest to researchers in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and theoretical linguistics. The wealth of background information and detailed explanations that it provides makes it also accessible to graduate and upper level undergraduates and suitable as a reference book.



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Weitere Infos & Material


1;Preface;6
2;Contents;10
3;1 Introduction: Referentialism vs. Descriptivism;13
3.1;1.1 The Topic;13
3.2;1.2 Plan of the Book;18
3.3;1.3 Some Conventions;20
3.4;1.4 Referentialism;24
3.5;1.5 Descriptivism;27
3.6;1.6 Propositions, Singular and Otherwise;29
3.7;1.7 Active and Non-active Denoting Concepts;31
3.8;1.8 Contents and Meanings;38
3.9;1.9 Tense;41
3.10;1.10 Linguistic vs. Pragmatic Meaning;45
3.11;1.11 Subjective vs. Official Meaning;48
4;2 Background Notions;50
4.1;2.1 Linguistic and Pragmatic Meaning Further Characterized;50
4.2;2.2 Contextualized Linguistic Meaning vs. Pragmatic Meaning;52
4.3;2.3 Conversational Implicatures and Implicitures Conversational impliciture ;55
4.4;2.4 Genuine vs. Non-genuine Determiner Phrases;61
4.5;2.5 Singular Terms Used as Singular Terms;64
4.6;2.6 Anaphoras;69
4.7;2.7 The Contextualized Linguistic Meaning of Anaphoric Determiner Phrases;74
4.8;2.8 Quasi-Indicators;81
4.9;2.9 Reference;82
4.10;2.10 Contextual Parameters;84
5;3 Why Descriptivism Was So Successful;90
5.1;3.1 Premise;90
5.2;3.2 The Co-reference Problem I;90
5.3;3.3 The Co-reference Problem II;93
5.4;3.4 Coherent and Incoherent Assent;100
5.5;3.5 The No-reference Problem and Negative existential ;102
5.6;3.6 Cognitive Significance;106
5.7;3.7 The Classical Descriptivist Theory of Proper Names;107
5.8;3.8 Frege, G., Russell B. and Reichenbach, H.on Indexicals;109
5.9;3.9 Linguistic Descriptivism;113
6;4 Why Referentialism Is So Successful;118
6.1;4.1 Premise;118
6.2;4.2 The Indispensability of Indexicals;118
6.3;4.3 The Wide Scope/Narrow Scope Objection;122
6.4;4.4 The Modal, Epistemic and Semantic Arguments;125
6.5;4.5 The Modal Argument About Indexicals;126
6.6;4.6 Necessary A Posteriori and Contingent Contingent A Priori Statements;128
6.7;4.7 Kaplan, D.s Semantics for Indexicals;131
6.8;4.8 Self-Supporting and Self-Defeating Sentences;135
6.9;4.9 Kaplans Twin Argument Against Freges Theory of Indexicals;139
6.10;4.10 Misdescription and Pronominal Contradiction ;141
6.11;4.11 The Problems of Choice, Ignorance and Error;143
6.12;4.12 Kripke, S. Pierre and Paderewski, I. J.Puzzles;145
7;5 Definite Descriptions and Proper Names;148
7.1;5.1 Premise;148
7.2;5.2 The Relation PRAG;149
7.3;5.3 The Pragmatic Meaning of Basic Determiner Phrases;152
7.4;5.4 The Relation ;153
7.5;5.5 Genuine Singular Terms;155
7.6;5.6 Definite Descriptions;157
7.7;5.7 Proper Names in General;161
7.8;5.8 Nominal Properties;163
7.9;5.9 Causal Descriptivism;167
7.10;5.10 Objections to the Causal Theory of Names;169
7.11;5.11 The Pragmatic Meaning of Anaphoric Determiner Phrases and Singular Terms;173
8;6 Indexicals;179
8.1;6.1 Indexicals in General;179
8.2;6.2 Indexical Properties Indexical ;181
8.3;6.3 The First-Person and Second-Person Pronouns;184
8.4;6.4 Saliency and the Interdoxastic Domain;187
8.5;6.5 Demonstrative Indexicals;190
8.6;6.6 The Locative Pronouns;194
8.7;6.7 Anaphoric Anaphora Indexicals;197
9;7 Tense, Temporal Indexicals and Other Miscellaneous Issues;202
9.1;7.1 The Eternalism Version of CD;202
9.2;7.2 The Temporalist Version of CD;205
9.3;7.3 The Temporal Pronouns;208
9.4;7.4 The Relation on, temporal relation ;211
9.5;7.5 Quasi-indicators and the De Dicto/De Re Distinction;213
9.6;7.6 Knowing Who the Referent Is;217
9.7;7.7 Phenomenal Entities and Thinking Individuation ;220
9.8;7.8 Self-Consciousness Self-consciousness and Self-knowledge ;226
9.9;7.9 Extra-Meanings;230
9.10;7.10 Metonymical and Metaphorical Uses of Indexicals Metaphor Metonymy ;234
10;8 Conclusion: Accounting for the Referentialist Data ;240
10.1;8.1 Premise;240
10.2;8.2 The Indispensability of Indexicals Revisited;240
10.3;8.3 Indexicals with Narrow Scope Narrow ;241
10.4;8.4 An Attempt to Reapply the Modal, Epistemic and Semantic Arguments;246
10.5;8.5 The Modal Arguments About Indexicals Reconsidered;250
10.6;8.6 Another Look at Necessary a posteriori and Contingent a Propositions;251
10.7;8.7 Logical Truth, Validity and Indexicals;252
10.8;8.8 An Account of Self-Supporting Sentences;258
10.9;8.9 Kaplan, D.Twins and the Need for Impure Descriptive Contents;259
10.10;8.10 Misdescription, Pronominal contradiction and Collateral Propositions;261
10.11;8.11 Taming the Problems of Choice, Ignorance and Error;264
10.12;8.12 A Solution for the Pierre and Paderewski, I. J. Puzzles;266
10.13;8.13 Referentialism and the Co-reference and No-reference Problems;268
10.14;8.14 Concluding Remarks;277
11;Appendix;278
12;Bibliography;280
13;Analytical Index;291



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