Paradis / Prunet The Special Status of Coronals: Internal and External Evidence

Phonetics and Phonology, Vol. 2
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-1932-5
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 250 Seiten, Web PDF

Phonetics and Phonology, Volume 2: The Special Status of Coronals: Internal and External Evidence contains a phonetic survey of coronal articulations and discusses many aspects of the phonological behavior of coronals as opposed to noncoronals. This book discusses the asymmetry and visibility in consonant articulations, coronal places of articulation, and underspecification of coronals in English. The cluster condition in Attic Greek, palatalization and representation of coronal, and relationship between laterality and coronality are also elaborated. This publication likewise covers the cross-linguistic survey of consonant harmony, coronals in child phonology, and coronal transparency in vowel spreading. This volume is intended for graduate students and scholars interested in phonology, phonetics, general linguistics, psycholinguistics, or language pathology.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Paradis, Carole

Prunet, Jean-François

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;The 2011 Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident: How and Why it Happened;4
3;Copyright;5
4;Contents;6
5;List of authors;10
6;Woodhead Publishing Series in Energy;12
7;Introduction;16
8;Chapter 1: The Fukushima-1 nuclear power plant accident;20
8.1;1.1. Introduction;20
8.2;1.2. Energy production in Japan;20
8.2.1;1.2.1. The energy situation in Japan;20
8.2.2;1.2.2. The Fukushima-1 accident: an unprecedented nuclear power accident;21
8.3;1.3. The Fukushima-1 nuclear power plant;24
8.3.1;1.3.1. TEPCO and nuclear power generation;24
8.3.2;1.3.2. Overview of Fukushima-1 nuclear reactors;25
8.3.3;1.3.3. Operation of the NPP;27
8.3.4;1.3.4. Emergency operations;27
8.4;1.4. The Tohoku Area Pacific Offshore Earthquake and tsunami;28
8.4.1;1.4.1. The Tohoku Area Pacific Earthquake;28
8.4.2;1.4.2. The Tohuku Area tsunami;28
8.4.3;1.4.3. Status of the nuclear reactors before the earthquake;29
8.4.4;1.4.4. Seismic movement at Fukushima-1 NPP;29
8.4.5;1.4.5. The tsunami at Fukushima-1 NPP;30
8.5;1.5. Nuclear power safety and disaster prevention systems in Japan;31
8.5.1;1.5.1. Nuclear safety laws and regulations;31
8.5.2;1.5.2. Administration of nuclear safety;32
8.5.3;1.5.3. Organizations in charge of nuclear safety and regulation;33
8.5.4;1.5.4. Overview of the legal system for nuclear disaster management;34
8.5.5;1.5.5. Structure of the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act;35
8.5.6;1.5.6. Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act guidelines on emergency measures;37
8.6;1.6. Conclusions;38
8.7;References;38
9;Chapter 2: The Fukushima nuclear power plant accident: the main sequence of events;40
9.1;2.1. Introduction;40
9.2;2.2. Outline of primary facilities at the Fukushima plant;40
9.2.1;2.2.1. Reactor building facilities and components;40
9.2.1.1;Drywell (D/W);41
9.2.1.2;Suppression chamber (S/C);41
9.2.1.3;Safety relief valve (SRV);41
9.2.1.4;Vent valve;42
9.2.1.5;Diesel-driven fire pump (D/DFP);42
9.2.2;2.2.2. Electrical power facilities;42
9.2.2.1;Metal-clad (M/C) switch gear;42
9.2.2.2;Power center (P/C);43
9.2.2.3;Direct current (D/C);43
9.2.3;2.2.3. Cooling systems;43
9.2.3.1;Core cooling systems during normal operation;43
9.2.3.2;Core cooling systems during normal shutdown (including after emergency shutdown [SCRAM]);44
9.2.3.3;Emergency cooling systems;44
9.2.3.3.1;Isolation condenser (IC);45
9.2.3.3.2;Reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC);45
9.2.3.3.3;High-pressure coolant injection system (HPCI);45
9.2.3.3.4;Fire protection;46
9.3;2.3. The sequence of events from earthquake and tsunami to station blackout (SBO);46
9.3.1;2.3.1. Events immediately after the earthquake;46
9.3.1.1;March 11, 2011, about 14:46: magnitude 6-strong earthquake hits;46
9.3.1.2;March 11, about 14:50: Unit 2 RCIC started manually;47
9.3.1.3;March 11, 2011, 14:52: Unit 1 IC started automatically;48
9.3.1.4;March 11, 15:05: Unit 3 RCIC started manually;48
9.3.1.5;March 11, about 15:27: first tsunami wave;48
9.3.1.6;March 11, about 15:35: second tsunami wave;48
9.3.1.7;March 11, about 15:39: Unit 2 RCIC started manually just before the tsunami damage;49
9.3.1.8;March 11, 15:37-42: loss of all AC power;50
9.3.2;2.3.2. Loss of electrical power;50
9.4;2.4. Possible damage caused by the earthquake;51
9.4.1;2.4.1. Primary facilities in the reactor building;51
9.4.2;2.4.2. Other facilities;54
9.5;2.5. The condition of Unit 1 after SBO;55
9.5.1;2.5.1. March 11, up to 23:50 when abnormal CV pressure was recognized;55
9.5.1.1;March 11, about 15:37: IC isolation valves closed with fail-safe function;55
9.5.1.2;March 11, 16:42: drop in water level detected;57
9.5.1.3;March 11, 17:12: use of water injection from fire engines evaluated;58
9.5.1.4;March 11, 17:30: doubts about the operation of IC;58
9.5.1.5;March 11, 17:50: first abnormal radioactivity detected;58
9.5.1.6;March 11, 18:18: IC valves 2A and 3A closed;59
9.5.1.7;March 11, 18:25: IC valve 3A remotely closed;59
9.5.1.8;March 11, 20:07: RPV pressure acknowledged;59
9.5.1.9;March 11, 21:19: water level gauges started to give misreadings;59
9.5.1.10;March 11, 21:30: IC reopened;60
9.5.1.11;March 11, 21:51: apparent rise in the radiation dosage;60
9.5.1.12;March 11, 22:00: wrong water level information;60
9.5.1.13;March 11, about 22:30: large increase in the radiation dosage;60
9.5.1.14;March 11, 23:50: IC problem finally recognized;60
9.5.2;2.5.2. Further progress;61
9.5.2.1;March 12, about 00:06: first order to prepare for venting;61
9.5.2.2;March 12, around 01:30: all parties agreed to the venting;61
9.5.2.3;March 12, 01:48: D/DFP stoppage and evaluation of the alternative fire engine;61
9.5.2.4;March 12, about 02:30: sudden rise of D/W pressure;61
9.5.2.5;March 12, 02:45: sudden RPV pressure drop;62
9.5.2.6;March 12, 03:06: press conference about the venting;62
9.5.2.7;March 12, after 04:00: freshwater injection started;63
9.5.2.8;March 12, about 04:23: rise in radiation dosage;63
9.5.2.9;March 12, 06:50: concern about not completing the vent;63
9.5.2.10;March 12, 07:11: Prime Minister Kans visit to the site;63
9.5.2.11;March 12, 9:15: preparation for opening the vent line;64
9.5.2.12;March 12, about 09:24: opening of the vent line further delayed;64
9.5.2.13;March 12, about 10:17: misconception of vent success;64
9.5.2.14;March 12, about 12:00: decision made to switch to seawater;65
9.5.2.15;March 12, about 12:30: vent preparation completed;66
9.5.2.16;March 12, 14:50: venting judged to have succeeded;66
9.5.2.17;March 12, 14:53: preparing for seawater injection;66
9.5.2.18;March 12, 15:36: hydrogen explosion;66
9.5.2.19;March 12, about 17:20: discussion about the effects of seawater injection;66
9.5.2.20;March 12, 19:04: seawater injection started;67
9.5.2.21;March 13, past 08:00: radiation increase;68
9.5.2.22;March 14, about 01:10: seawater injection halted;68
9.5.2.23;March 14, about 06:00: further radioactivity leakage;68
9.5.2.24;March 14, 11:01: Unit 3 hydrogen explosion;69
9.5.2.25;The situation on and after March 15;69
9.5.2.26;Summary of damage to the reactor primary equipment;69
9.5.3;2.5.3. Reason to believe IC did not function;70
9.5.3.1;TEPCOs check of the actual IC isolation valves;70
9.5.3.2;Cooling water left in the condensate tank;71
9.5.3.3;Loss of natural convection due to hydrogen;71
9.5.4;2.5.4. Delay in venting Unit 1;71
9.6;2.6. The condition of Unit 3 after SBO;73
9.6.1;2.6.1. Up to 02:42, March 13, when an operator manually stopped the HPCI;73
9.6.1.1;March 11, about 15:38: Unit 3, SBO;73
9.6.1.2;March 11, 16:03: RCIC manually started;73
9.6.1.3;March, 12, 11:36: RCIC automatically stopped;74
9.6.1.4;March 12, 12:35: HPCI automatically started;74
9.6.1.5;March 12, 17:30: early preparation of vent line ordered;74
9.6.2;2.6.2. Further progress;75
9.6.2.1;March 13, 02:42: HPCI manually stopped;75
9.6.2.2;March 13, about 03:00: alternative water injection from D/DFP was unsuccessful;75
9.6.2.3;March 13, 04:50: serious preparation for venting;76
9.6.2.4;March 13, about 05:00: information from water level indicator became available;76
9.6.2.5;March 13, about 06:00: preparation of seawater injection from fire engines;77
9.6.2.6;March 13, 07:44: securing 12V batteries;78
9.6.2.7;March 13, 08:41: vent line complete;78
9.6.2.8;March 13, about 09:00: possible damage to the RPV;78
9.6.2.9;March 13, 09:20: the vent;79
9.6.2.10;March 13, 11:17: D/W pressure rose again, difficulty with keeping the vent valves ``open´´;80
9.6.2.11;March 13, 13:12: seawater injection started again;80
9.6.2.12;March 13, about 14:31: a number of dangerous symptoms;81
9.6.2.13;March 14, 01:10: seawater in the reverse flow cleaning valve pit was exhausted, and water injection from fire engine stopped;81
9.6.2.14;March 14, about 03:40: energizing the small A/O vent valve;81
9.6.2.15;March 14, 06:30: workers took cover;82
9.6.2.16;March 14, 10:53: self-defense force water truck arrived;82
9.6.2.17;March 14, 11:01: Unit 3 hydrogen explosion;82
9.6.2.18;March 14, after 13:00: response restarted;83
9.6.2.19;March 14, about 16:30: water injection restarted;83
9.6.2.20;March 15, 7:55;83
9.6.2.21;Later;84
9.6.2.22;Summary of damage to the reactor primary equipment;84
9.7;2.7. The condition of Unit 2 after SBO;84
9.7.1;2.7.1. Up to about 13:00 on March 14 when the RCIC stopped;84
9.7.1.1;March 11, 15:41: Unit-2 SBO;84
9.7.1.2;March 11, 20:49: temporary lighting turned on, status unknown;84
9.7.1.3;March 11, about 21:15: pessimistic conjecture of the status;84
9.7.1.4;March 11, 22:00: water level found to be in a stable condition;84
9.7.1.5;March 12, 01:00-02:55: RCIC confirmed to be operational;84
9.7.1.6;March 12 about 04:30: RCIC water source switched;85
9.7.1.7;March 12, 17:30: order to prepare the vent;85
9.7.1.8;March 13, 10:15: vent preparation;86
9.7.1.9;March 13, past 18:00: preparing a compressor;86
9.7.1.10;March 13, late in the afternoon: water injection line ready for Unit 2;86
9.7.1.11;March 14, 11:01: Unit 3 hydrogen explosion, vent line and water injection lines damaged;86
9.7.2;2.7.2. Further progress;86
9.7.2.1;March 14, 13:25: RCIC judged to have lost its function;86
9.7.2.2;March 14, 14:43: delay in seawater injection;87
9.7.2.3;March 14, about 15:00: D/W pressure dropped;87
9.7.2.4;March 14, about 16:00: vent valve did not open;87
9.7.2.5;March 14, about 16:34: SRVs did not open;88
9.7.2.6;March 14, 18:22: all fuel bundles exposed;88
9.7.2.7;March 14, 19:03: RPV depressurization with SRVs;88
9.7.2.8;March 14, about 19:20: the fire engines ran out of gas;88
9.7.2.9;March 14, 19:57: continuous water injection to Unit-2 started but unstable;88
9.7.2.10;March 14, about 23:35: decision made to vent the D/W;89
9.7.2.11;March 15 about 00:16-01:11: highly dangerous state with high CV pressure;89
9.7.2.12;March 15, 06:00-06:10: loud sound;91
9.7.2.13;March 15, 11:25: lifting the temporary evacuation order;92
9.7.2.14;Later;93
9.7.2.15;Summary of damage to the reactor primary equipment;93
9.7.3;2.7.3. Exploding sound at 06:10 on March 15;93
9.7.3.1;Source of the exploding sound;93
9.7.3.2;About ``zero S/C pressure´´;93
9.8;2.8. Sequence of events leading to hydrogen explosions in Units 1, 3, and 4;94
9.8.1;2.8.1. Differences between the explosions in the units;94
9.8.2;2.8.2. Investigating whether the explosions were caused by hydrogen produced from core damage;97
9.8.2.1;The only explosive material was hydrogen;97
9.8.2.2;There was enough hydrogen to cause an explosion;97
9.8.2.3;Reasons why Unit 2 didnt explode;97
9.9;2.9. The process of water injection into the spent fuel pools;99
9.9.1;2.9.1. Plant status up to March 15th;99
9.9.2;2.9.2. March 15, about 09:00: started discussion about water injection into the SFP;99
9.9.3;2.9.3. March 16, afternoon: visuals of Unit 4 SFP;99
9.9.4;2.9.4. March 17: started water spraying;100
9.9.5;2.9.5. March 20: water spray to Unit 4;101
9.9.6;2.9.6. March 22: concrete pump truck;101
9.10;2.10. How the accident might have been avoided;102
9.10.1;2.10.1. Safety measures in place in other countries;102
9.10.2;2.10.2. Measures that were feasible;103
9.10.3;2.10.3. Hypothetical scenario for accident prevention;105
9.11;2.11. Background to nuclear power generation;106
9.11.1;2.11.1. Nuclear fission and decay;106
9.11.2;2.11.2. Cooling systems;108
9.11.3;2.11.3. Safety relief valve (SRV);108
9.11.4;2.11.4. Reactor water level sensor and mechanism of malfunction;112
9.11.4.1;Principle of nuclear reactor water level sensing;112
9.11.4.2;Mechanism of malfunction;113
9.11.4.2.1;Normal state;113
9.11.4.2.2;Reference pot water level drop;113
9.11.4.2.3;Extreme water level loss in the reactor;113
9.12;2.12. Conclusions;114
10;Chapter 3: The response of central and local government agencies to the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident;116
10.1;3.1. Introduction;116
10.2;3.2. Central government: key responsibilities and preparatory measures;117
10.2.1;3.2.1. The ``defense in depth´´ strategy;117
10.2.2;3.2.2. Assessing the performance of the main government departments in safety regulation and disaster management;118
10.2.3;3.2.3. Assessing the use of severe accident measures;120
10.2.4;3.2.4. Assessing the response to extended station blackout (SBO);121
10.2.4.1;Guideline 9: design checkpoint against power outage;122
10.2.4.2;Guideline 27: design checkpoint against power outage;122
10.2.5;3.2.5. Assessing the countermeasures in the event of a tsunami;123
10.3;3.3. The response and preparedness of the central government;124
10.3.1;3.3.1. Assessment of emergency measures from the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act guidelines;124
10.3.2;3.3.2. Response of the regulatory organizations to system failures at the Fukushima NPP;125
10.3.3;3.3.3. Assessment of information management and public announcements;128
10.4;3.4. Local government: key responsibilities;129
10.4.1;3.4.1. Assessing the performance of local government in disaster management;129
10.4.1.1;The evacuation of Futaba hospital;129
10.4.1.2;Assessing the accident response by the prefecture;131
10.5;3.5. Conclusions: key lessons and improvements needed;132
10.6;Appendix. Government offices and organizations;134
11;Chapter 4: The response of the plant owner/operator (TEPCO) to the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident;138
11.1;4.1. Introduction;138
11.2;4.2. Accident management by Fukushima's nuclear plant owner and operator, TEPCO;138
11.2.1;4.2.1. TEPCO's use of accident management guidelines;138
11.2.2;4.2.2. TEPCO's measures for accident management;140
11.2.2.1;Measures against loss of power;140
11.2.2.2;Preparation of fresh- and seawater injection from fire engines;140
11.2.2.3;Failure of the emergency communication system to function;141
11.3;4.3. TEPCO's risk assessment and safety planning documentation at the Fukushima plant;141
11.4;4.4. Assessing the postaccident responses of TEPCO;143
11.4.1;4.4.1. Division of roles between the central headquarters and plant;143
11.4.2;4.4.2. Misjudgment of Unit 1 isolation condenser (IC) status;144
11.4.3;4.4.3. Mishandling of Unit 3 alternative water injection;146
11.4.4;4.4.4. Consequences of the inaccurate assessment of Units 1 and 3;147
11.4.5;4.4.5. Faults by the local response headquarters and main office response headquarters;147
11.5;4.5. Why procedures were inadequate: organizational problems within TEPCO;148
11.5.1;4.5.1. Weaknesses in emergency response capacity;148
11.5.2;4.5.2. Problems with specialty-based sectionalism;149
11.5.3;4.5.3. Lack of education or training for severe situations;150
11.5.4;4.5.4. Excessive reliance on contractors;151
11.5.5;4.5.5. Insufficient safety culture within TEPCO;151
11.6;4.6. Conclusions;152
11.7;References;153
12;Chapter 5: Evacuation and decontamination in response to the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident;154
12.1;5.1. Introduction;154
12.2;5.2. Evacuation of local residents;155
12.2.1;5.2.1. Flaws in evacuation procedure;155
12.2.2;5.2.2. The process of evacuation in response to the accident;155
12.3;5.3. Predicting and monitoring the leak of radioactive material after the Fukushima accident;157
12.3.1;5.3.1. Release and spread of radioactive material during evacuation;157
12.3.2;5.3.2. Speed of radiation spread;159
12.3.3;5.3.3. System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI) simulation of radioactive spread;160
12.4;5.4. The impact of nuclear radiation on the human body;160
12.4.1;5.4.1. Risk factors of nuclear radiation;160
12.4.2;5.4.2. The impact of nuclear radiation on human health;163
12.4.3;5.4.3. Physical and mental effects from nuclear radiation;164
12.4.4;5.4.4. Effects of internal exposure to nuclear radiation;164
12.4.5;5.4.5. Effects of external exposure to nuclear radiation;165
12.5;5.5. Assessing the evacuation process in response to the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident;166
12.5.1;5.5.1. Stable iodine tablet distribution and its administration;166
12.5.2;5.5.2. Inadequate evacuation process;167
12.5.3;5.5.3. Evacuation routes within each county;168
12.6;5.6. Radioactivity, radioactive material, and radiation;169
12.6.1;5.6.1. Common misconceptions on radioactivity;169
12.6.2;5.6.2. Radioactive half-life;169
12.7;5.7. Benefits and challenges of evacuation;170
12.8;5.8. Effectiveness of methods to decontaminate the site and local area;170
12.8.1;5.8.1. Radioactive material cannot be erased;170
12.8.2;5.8.2. Local storage of radioactive material;173
12.8.3;5.8.3. Looking for a practical solution;175
12.9;5.9. Conclusions: key lessons learned in the evacuation, return, and decontamination at Fukushima's nuclear power plant;176
12.10;References;177
13;Chapter 6: Learning from the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident;178
13.1;6.1. Introduction;178
13.2;6.2. Learning from accidents: key findings from the official investigation;178
13.2.1;6.2.1. Turning information into knowledge;178
13.2.2;6.2.2. Building a total picture with hypotheses;179
13.2.3;6.2.3. Thinking after the accident is too late;181
13.3;6.3. Recommendations for improving the safe design and operation of NPPs;181
13.3.1;6.3.1. Properly understanding the accident phenomena: the hydrogen explosion did not spread the radioactive material;181
13.3.2;6.3.2. Proper understanding requires knowing the history;182
13.3.3;6.3.3. No one planned for a huge tsunami;184
13.3.4;6.3.4. Japanese NPP safety measures had fallen behind those of other countries;185
13.3.5;6.3.5. Attitudes to nuclear safety in Japan;187
13.3.6;6.3.6. Safety cannot be assured when promoters regulate themselves;187
13.3.7;6.3.7. Practicing inverse operation or hypothesis exercise;188
13.3.8;6.3.8. Assuming the worst-case scenario;189
13.3.9;6.3.9. Focusing attention on the wrong aspects;190
13.3.10;6.3.10. Emergency situations require special measures;191
13.3.11;6.3.11. Learning from other industries;192
13.4;6.4. Comparing the Fukushima accident with other nuclear incidents;194
13.4.1;6.4.1. Three Mile Island (TMI) NPP, USA, accident;194
13.4.2;6.4.2. Chernobyl NPP, former Ukrainian SSR, Soviet Union, accident;195
13.4.3;6.4.3. JCO, Japan: criticality and exposure accident;196
13.4.4;6.4.4. Le Blayais NPP, France: water submergence event;196
13.4.5;6.4.5. Maanshan NPP, Taiwan: loss of all AC power event;197
13.4.6;6.4.6. Multiple simultaneous terror attacks in the USA;197
13.4.7;6.4.7. Kalpakkam NPP, India: effect of Sumatra-Andaman earthquake and tsunami;197
13.4.8;6.4.8. Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, Japan: emergency shutdown during the Chuetsu offshore earthquake;198
13.5;6.5. Reflections from the Chairman of the official Investigation Committee on the accident at the Fukushima NPP;199
13.5.1;6.5.1. How to see things and think;200
13.5.1.1;What could happen happens, and what we think could not happen happens as well (a);200
13.5.1.2;We do not see what we do not want to and only see what we want to (b);201
13.5.1.3;Expect to the extent possible and make the fullest preparation (c);201
13.5.1.4;Everything changes over time. We have to stay flexible against changes (e);202
13.5.2;6.5.2. Lessons for organizations;203
13.5.2.1;Forms alone do not function. They may provide mechanisms but do not share the purpose (d);203
13.5.3;6.5.3. Cultivating the right culture;205
13.5.3.1;Cultivate a culture that recognizes risks and squarely faces them to discuss their management (f);205
13.5.4;6.5.4. Thinking as individuals;206
13.5.4.1;Admit the importance of seeing for oneself, thinking for oneself, making ones own judgments, and acting accordingly. We nee...;206
13.6;6.6. Conclusions;207
13.7;Reference;207
14;Chapter 7: The future of nuclear power generation after the Fukushima accident;208
14.1;7.1. Introduction;208
14.2;7.2. Restarting the Fukushima plant;208
14.2.1;7.2.1. The acceptance of nuclear power generation will change;208
14.2.2;7.2.2. The cost of nuclear energy compared with other sources of energy;209
14.2.3;7.2.3. Alternative sources of power;209
14.2.4;7.2.4. Coping with nuclear power generation;210
14.2.5;7.2.5. Considerations in restarting nuclear power plants;211
14.2.6;7.2.6. Damage reduction measures required for restarting nuclear power plants;211
14.3;7.3. Conclusions: the future of nuclear power in Japan;212
15;Postscript;214
16;Index;216

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Edited by John D. Sørensen and Jens N. Sørensen

11 Solid oxide fuel cell technology: Principles, performance and operations
Kevin Huang and John Bannister Goodenough

12 Handbook of advanced radioactive waste conditioning technologies
Edited by Michael I. Ojovan

13 Membranes for clean and renewable power applications
Edited by Annarosa Gugliuzza and Angelo Basile

14 Materials for energy efficiency and thermal comfort in buildings
Edited by Matthew R. Hall

15 Handbook of biofuels production: Processes and technologies
Edited by Rafael Luque, Juan Campelo and James Clark

16 Developments and innovation in carbon dioxide (CO2) capture and storage technology Volume 2: Carbon dioxide (CO2) storage and utilisation
Edited by M. Mercedes Maroto-Valer

17 Oxy-fuel combustion for power generation and carbon dioxide (CO2) capture
Edited by Ligang Zheng

18 Small and micro combined heat and power (CHP) systems: Advanced design, performance, materials and applications
Edited by Robert Beith

19 Advances in clean hydrocarbon fuel processing: Science and technology
Edited by M. Rashid Khan

20 Modern gas turbine systems: High efficiency, low emission, fuel flexible power generation
Edited by Peter Jansohn

21 Concentrating solar power technology: Principles, developments and applications
Edited by Keith Lovegrove and Wes Stein

22 Nuclear corrosion science and engineering
Edited by Damien Féron

23 Power plant life management and performance improvement
Edited by John E. Oakey

24 Electrical drives for direct drive renewable energy systems
Edited by Markus Mueller and Henk Polinder

25 Advanced membrane science and technology for sustainable energy and environmental applications
Edited by Angelo Basile and Suzana Pereira Nunes

26 Irradiation embrittlement of reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) in nuclear power plants
Edited by Naoki Soneda

27 High temperature superconductors (HTS) for energy applications
Edited by Ziad Melhem

28 Infrastructure and methodologies for the justification of nuclear power programmes
Edited by Agustín Alonso

29 Waste to energy conversion technology
Edited by Naomi B. Klinghoffer and Marco J. Castaldi

30 Polymer electrolyte membrane and direct methanol fuel cell technology Volume 1: Fundamentals and performance of low temperature fuel cells
Edited by Christoph Hartnig and Christina Roth

31 Polymer electrolyte membrane and direct methanol fuel cell technology Volume 2: In situ characterization techniques for low temperature fuel cells
Edited by Christoph Hartnig and Christina Roth

32 Combined cycle systems for near-zero emission power generation
Edited by Ashok D. Rao

33 Modern earth buildings: Materials, engineering, construction and applications
Edited by Matthew R. Hall, Rick Lindsay and Meror Krayenhoff

34 Metropolitan sustainability: Understanding and improving the urban environment
Edited by Frank Zeman

35 Functional materials for sustainable energy applications
Edited by John A. Kilner, Stephen J. Skinner, Stuart J. C. Irvine and Peter P. Edwards

36 Nuclear decommissioning: Planning, execution and international experience
Edited by Michele Laraia

37 Nuclear fuel cycle science and engineering
Edited by Ian Crossland

38 Electricity transmission, distribution and storage systems
Edited by Ziad Melhem

39 Advances in biodiesel production: Processes and technologies
Edited by Rafael Luque and Juan A. Melero

40 Biomass combustion science, technology and engineering
Edited by Lasse Rosendahl

41 Ultra-supercritical coal power plants: Materials, technologies and optimisation
Edited by Dongke Zhang

42 Radionuclide behaviour in the natural environment: Science, implications and lessons for the nuclear industry
Edited by Christophe Poinssot and Horst Geckeis

43 Calcium and chemical looping technology for power generation and carbon dioxide (CO2) capture: Solid oxygen- and CO2-carriers
Paul Fennell and E. J. Anthony

44 Materials’ ageing and degradation in light water reactors: Mechanisms, and management
Edited by K. L. Murty

45 Structural alloys for power plants: Operational challenges and high-temperature materials
Edited by Amir Shirzadi and Susan Jackson

46 Biolubricants: Science and technology
Jan C. J. Bart, Emanuele Gucciardi and Stefano Cavallaro

47 Advances in wind turbine blade design and materials
Edited by Povl Brøndsted and Rogier P. L. Nijssen

48 Radioactive waste management and contaminated site clean-up: Processes, technologies and international experience
Edited by William E. Lee, Michael I. Ojovan, Carol M. Jantzen

49 Probabilistic safety assessment for optimum nuclear power plant life management (PLiM): Theory and application of reliability analysis methods for major power...