Buch, Englisch, 336 Seiten, Format (B × H): 166 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 585 g
ISBN: 978-0-691-13146-7
Verlag: Princeton University Press
Almost every country in the world has sophisticated systems to prevent banking crises. Yet such crises--and the massive financial and social damage they can cause--remain common throughout the world. Does deposit insurance encourage depositors and bankers to take excessive risks? Are banking regulations poorly designed? Or are banking regulators incompetent? Jean-Charles Rochet, one of the world's leading authorities on banking regulation, argues that the answer in each case is "no." In Why Are There So Many Banking Crises?, he makes the case that, although many banking crises are precipitated by financial deregulation and globalization, political interference often causes--and almost always exacerbates--banking crises. If, for example, political authorities are allowed to pressure banking regulators into bailing out banks that should be allowed to fail, then regulation will lack credibility and market discipline won't work. Only by insuring the independence of banking regulators, Rochet says, can market forces work and banking crises be prevented and minimized. In this important collection of essays, Rochet examines the causes of banking crises around the world in recent decades, focusing on the lender of last resort; prudential regulation and the management of risk; and solvency regulations. His proposals for reforms that could limit the frequency and severity of banking crises should interest a wide range of academic economists and those working for central and private banks and financial services authorities.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften Finanzsektor & Finanzdienstleistungen Finanzkrisen
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften Finanzsektor & Finanzdienstleistungen Finanzsektor & Finanzdienstleistungen: Allgemeines
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Finanzkrisen, Wirtschaftskrisen
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften Finanzsektor & Finanzdienstleistungen Bankwirtschaft
Weitere Infos & Material
Preface and Acknowledgments ix
General Introduction and Outline of the Book 1
References 14
PART 1. WHY ARE THERE SO MANY BANKING CRISES? 19
Chapter 1: Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? by Jean-Charles Rochet 21
1.1 Introduction 21
1.2 The Sources of Banking Fragility 23
1.3 The Lender of Last Resort 24
1.4 Deposit Insurance and Solvency Regulations 27
1.5 Lessons from Recent Crises 28
1.6 The Future of Banking Supervision 30
References 33
PART 2. THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT 35
Chapter 2: Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All? by Jean-Charles Rochet and Xavier Vives 37
2.1 Introduction 37
2.2 The Model 41
2.3 Runs and Solvency 44
2.4 Equilibrium of the Investors' Game 47
2.5 Coordination Failure and Prudential Regulation 53
2.6 Coordination Failure and LLR Policy 55
2.7 Endogenizing the Liability Structure and Crisis Resolution 58
2.8 An International LLR 63
2.9 Concluding Remarks 66
References 67
Chapter 3: The Lender of Last Resort: A Twenty-First-Century Approach by Xavier Freixas, Bruno M. Parigi, and Jean-Charles Rochet 71
3.1 Introduction 71
3.2 The Model 75
3.3 Efficient Supervision: Detection and Closure of Insolvent Banks 81
3.4 Efficient Closure 85
3.5 Central Bank Lending 89
3.6 Efficient Allocation in the Presence of Gambling for Resurrection 95
3.7 Policy Implications and Conclusions 97
3.8 Appendix 98
References 101
PART 3. PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND THE MANAGEMENT OF SYSTEMIC RISK 103
Chapter 4: Macroeconomic Shocks and Banking Supervision by Jean-Charles Rochet 105
4.1 Introduction 105
4.2 A Brief Survey of the Literature 106
4.3 A Simple Model of Prudential Regulation without Macroeconomic Shocks 108
4.4 How to Deal with Macroeconomic Shocks? 112
4.5 Is Market Discipline Useful? 118
4.6 Policy Recommendations for Macroprudential Regulation 121
References 123
Chapter 5: Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk by Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole 126
5.1 Benchmark: No Interbank Lending 132
5.2 Date-0 Monitoring and Optimal Interbank Loans 139
5.3 Date-1 Monitoring, Too Big to Fail, and Bank Failure Propagations 148
5.4 Conclusion 153
5.5 Appendix: Solution of Program (P) 155
References 157
Chapter 6: Controlling Risk in Payment Systems by Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole 159
6.1 Taxonomy of Payment Systems 161
6.2 Three Illustrations 166
6.3 An Economic Approach to Payment Systems 173
6.4 Centralization versus Decentralization 181
6.5 An Analytical Framework 184
6.6 Conclusion 191
References 192
Chapter 7: Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and the Central Bank by Xavier Freixas, Bruno M. Parigi, and Jean-Charles Rochet 195
7.1 The Model 199
7.2 Pure Coordination Problems 205
7.3 Resiliency and Market Discipline in the Interbank System 207
7.4 Closure-Triggered Contagion Risk 210
7.5 Too-Big-to-Fail and Money Center Banks 213
7.6 Discussions and Conclusions 215
7.7 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 7.1 217
References 222
PART 4. SOLVENCY REGULATIONS 225
Chapter 8: Capital Requirements and the Behavior of Commercial Banks by Jean-Charles Rochet 227
8.1 Introduction 227
8.2 The Model 230
8.3 The Behavior of Banks in the Complete Markets Setup 231
8.4 The Portfolio Model 238
8.5 The Behavior of Banks in the Portfolio Model without Capital Requirements 240
8.6 Introducing Capital Requirements into the Portfolio Model 244
8.7 Introducing Limited Liability into the Portfolio Model 246
8.8 Conclusion 249
8.9 Appendix 250
8.10 An Example of an Increase in the Default Probability Consecutive to the Adoption of the Capital Requirement 256
References 257
Chapter 9: Rebalancing the Three Pillars of Basel II by Jean-Charles Rochet 258
9.1 Introduction 258
9.2 The Three Pillars in the Academic Literatur
