Schelling Knowledge - Genetic Foundations and Epistemic Coherence

1. Auflage 2013
ISBN: 978-3-11-032266-8
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 278 Seiten

Reihe: ISSN

Since the 1960s there is a controversial discussion about the correct explication of the concept of knowledge in epistemology, but until today no generally accepted solution to the problem of defining this concept has been found. This book contributes to the discussion in epistemology by proposing a new explication of the concept of knowledge which is spelled out in terms of coherence. The main thesis of this book is that a belief can be considered knowledge only if first, it is true and second, it coheres with the rest of the beliefs of the person holding the belief in an appropriate manner. The explication draws on the ideas of Donald Davidson, Laurence BonJour and Keith Lehrer and offers a new perspective on the old project of analyzing the concept of knowledge.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Schelling, Birte

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Preface;9
2;The Epistemologist's Dilemma: A Reasonable Quest for Truth;19
2.1;Truth-Conducivity;20
2.1.1;Truth-Conducivity and Likelihood;22
2.1.2;Truth-Conducivity - an Amendment;45
2.2;Externalism and Internalism;48
2.2.1;Internalism;52
2.2.2;Externalism;58
2.2.3;In Defense of Internalism;66
2.2.3.1;Arguing against Externalism by Counterexamples;66
2.2.3.2;The Children-and-Animals-Objection;70
2.2.3.3;The Skepticism Objection;73
2.2.3.4;The Externalist Confusion;85
2.3;Against Justification;89
2.3.1;The Relativity of Justification;90
2.3.2;Knowledge without Justification;97
3;Coherence and the World Connection;103
3.1;Coherence and Truth-Conducivity;104
3.1.1;What is Coherence?;105
3.1.2;The Problem of the World Connection;110
3.2;The First Attempt: BonJour's Observation Requirement;114
3.2.1;BonJour's Characterization of Coherence;115
3.2.2;The Role of Observation in BonJour's Coherence Theory;120
3.2.3;BonJour's Answers to the Three Objections;127
3.2.4;Two Arguments against BonJour's Solution;134
3.3;The Second Attempt: Davidson's Appeal to Language;137
3.3.1;Davidson on Coherence and Truth;138
3.3.2;Meaning and Interpretation;142
3.3.3;Causality and Meaning;152
3.3.4;An Epistemological Dilemma;158
4;Perception, Coherence and Knowledge;169
4.1;The Role of Perception;171
4.1.1;Sensation and Perception;172
4.1.2;Conceptual versus Nonconceptual Content;185
4.1.2.1;In Defense of Nonconceptuality of Perceptual Content;186
4.1.2.2;Against Nonconceptuality of Perceptual Content;197
4.1.3;Triangulation and Perception;203
4.1.4;Perception without Empiricism;215
4.2;Genetic Foundations and Epistemic Coherence;223
4.2.1;Objective Truth-Conducivity and Genetic Foundations;223
4.2.2;Subjective Truth-Conducivity and Epistemic Coherence;234
4.2.2.1;Laurence BonJour: Inferential Coherence;241
4.2.2.2;Keith Lehrer: Coherence in Terms of Meeting Objections;243
4.2.2.3;A Two-Level Account of Coherence;247
4.2.3;Knowledge as Coherent True Belief;250
5;Bibliography;250