Schmicking / Gallagher Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science

1. Auflage 2009
ISBN: 978-90-481-2646-0
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 676 Seiten

This volume explores the essential issues involved in bringing phenomenology together with the cognitive sciences, and provides some examples of research located at the intersection of these disciplines. The topics addressed here cover a lot of ground, including questions about naturalizing phenomenology, the precise methods of phenomenology and how they can be used in the empirical cognitive sciences, specific analyses of perception, attention, emotion, imagination, embodied movement, action and agency, representation and cognition, inters- jectivity, language and metaphor. In addition there are chapters that focus on empirical experiments involving psychophysics, perception, and neuro- and psychopathologies. The idea that phenomenology, understood as a philosophical approach taken by thinkers like Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others, can offer a positive contribution to the cognitive sciences is a relatively recent idea. Prior to the 1990s, phenomenology was employed in a critique of the first wave of cognitivist and computational approaches to the mind (see Dreyfus 1972). What some consider a second wave in cognitive science, with emphasis on connectionism and neuros- ence, opened up possibilities for phenomenological intervention in a more positive way, resulting in proposals like neurophenomenology (Varela 1996). Thus, bra- imaging technologies can turn to phenomenological insights to guide experimen- tion (see, e. g. , Jack and Roepstorff 2003; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008).

Autoren/Hrsg.

Schmicking, Daniel

Gallagher, Shaun

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;0001090506.pdf;2
1.1;Anchor 2;5
1.2;Anchor 3;6
2;0001090474.pdf;10
2.1;Naturalized Phenomenology;11
2.1.1;Husserl’s Anti-naturalism;12
2.1.2;Transcendental Philosophy and Philosophical Psychology;15
2.1.3;Philosophical Naturalism;22
2.1.4;References;25
3;0001090475.pdf;28
3.1;Phenomenology and Non-reductionist Cognitive Science;28
3.1.1;Introspection and Beyond;29
3.1.2;Neurophenomenology;31
3.1.3;Front-Loading Phenomenology;33
3.1.3.1;Chaminade and Decety (2002);36
3.1.3.2;Farrer and Frith (2002);37
3.1.3.3;Farrer et al. (2003);38
3.1.4;Conclusion;39
3.1.5;References;40
4;0001090476.pdf;42
4.1;A Toolbox of Phenomenological Methods;42
4.1.1;‘Phenomenology’: One Term – Many Meanings;42
4.1.2;Phenomenology – Just ‘a Way of Seeing’?;44
4.1.3;Spiegelberg’s Account of Phenomenological Method as a Series of Steps;46
4.1.4;Phenomenological Methods as a Toolbox – Complementing Spiegelberg’s Steps;51
4.1.5;Naturalization of Phenomenology – a Conciliatory Proposal;58
4.1.6;References;61
5;0001090477.pdf;63
5.1;Towards a Formalism for Expressing Structures of Consciousness;63
5.1.1;Towards a Formalism for Philosophical Phenomenology;67
5.1.2;An Application to Scientific Studies of Consciousness;79
5.1.3;References;86
6;0001090478.pdf;88
6.1;Consciousness;89
6.1.1;The Natural Attitude;89
6.1.2;The Pull of Objectivity;92
6.1.3;Consciousness as Empirical and as Transcendental;94
6.1.4;The Intentional Core of Experience;95
6.1.5;Intentionality, Body, and World;97
6.1.6;Conclusion;101
6.1.7;References;101
7;0001090479.pdf;102
7.1;Attention in Context;102
7.1.1;A Gestalt-Phenomenology of Attention;103
7.1.2;The Context Problem in Attention Research;104
7.1.3;Connecting Context to Focus;106
7.1.4;Achieving the Bigger Picture in Cognitive Science of Attention: Attention-in-Context-with-Margin;110
7.1.5;Dynamic Attention: Context Transformations, Theme Replacements, Attentional Capture;112
7.1.5.1;Context Transformations;112
7.1.5.2;Theme Replacements;114
7.1.5.3;Attentional Capture;116
7.1.6;Conclusion;117
7.1.7;References;119
8;0001090480.pdf;125
8.1;The Phenomenology and Neurobiology of Moods and Emotions;125
8.1.1;Introduction;125
8.1.2;Damasio and Solomon on Emotion;125
8.1.3;Heidegger on Moods and Emotions;129
8.1.4;The Phenomenology of Feeling;131
8.1.5;Horizons and Bodily Dispositions;137
8.1.6;Conclusion;140
8.1.7;References;141
9;0001090481.pdf;143
9.1;Phenomenology, Imagination and Interdisciplinary Research;143
9.1.1;Introduction: Staking Out the Field;143
9.1.2;Imagination in Phenomenology;144
9.1.3;Imagination in Interdisciplinary Research;148
9.1.4;Conclusion;155
9.1.5;References;155
10;0001090482.pdf;161
10.1;The Function of Weak Phantasy in Perception and Thinking;161
10.1.1;Weak Phantasmata in Perception;163
10.1.2;Phantasmatic, Non-linguistic Modes of Thinking in Humans and Animals;170
10.1.3;References;178
11;0001090483.pdf;180
11.1;Myself with No Body? Body, Bodily-Consciousness and Self-consciousness;181
11.1.1;A Certain Unity;181
11.1.2;Four Irreducible Bodily Dimensions;182
11.1.3;The Body-As-Object;187
11.1.4;The Body-As-Subject;188
11.1.5;Being a Bodily Subject Out of One’s Body;191
11.1.6;(De)constructing One’s Bodily-Self;194
11.1.7;Conclusion;197
11.1.8;References;198
12;0001090484.pdf;201
12.1;A Husserlian, Neurophenomenologic Approach to Embodiment;201
12.1.1;A Description of Lived Experience;201
12.1.2;One’s Own Body;203
12.1.3;Multi-sensorial Integration Through the Act;206
12.1.4;Transforming the Subjective into the Objective;208
12.1.5;The Hand Touching and Touched;210
12.1.6;Summary;213
12.1.7;References;214
13;0001090485.pdf;217
13.1;Body and Movement: Basic Dynamic Principles;217
13.1.1;Introduction;217
13.1.2;Embodiment;219
13.1.3;Kinesthesia and Fundamental Human Concepts;221
13.1.4;Coordination Dynamics: Learning One’s Body and Learning to Move Oneself;225
13.1.5;Evolutionary Biology and the Existential Fit of Leib and Körper;227
13.1.6;References;231
14;0001090486.pdf;235
14.1;Empirical and Phenomenological Studies of Embodied Cognition;235
14.1.1;Empirical Studies of Embodied Cognition and the Spectres of Crypto-Cartesianism;236
14.1.2;Mind Is Body: Movement, Time and the Prejudice of Presence;242
14.1.3;Body Is Mind: Bringing the Zombie to Leib;247
14.1.4;Conclusion;248
14.1.5;References;249
15;0001090487.pdf;253
15.1;The Problem of Other Minds;254
15.1.1;Introduction;254
15.1.2;The Reality of the Problem of Other Minds;255
15.1.3;Conservative Responses to the Problem;256
15.1.4;Reductive Responses to the Problem;260
15.1.5;Phenomenological Responses to the Problem;261
15.1.6;Concluding Remarks;266
15.1.7;References;266
16;0001090488.pdf;268
16.1;Mutual Gaze and Intersubjectivity1;268
16.1.1;Mindsight;268
16.1.2;Double Sight;273
16.1.3;Concluding Remarks;279
16.1.4;References;280
17;0001090489.pdf;282
17.1;Knowing Other People’s Mental States as if They Were One’s Own;282
17.1.1;First-Person Perspective;283
17.1.2;The Limits of Empathy;286
17.1.2.1;Reconstructive and Mirror Empathy;287
17.1.2.2;Condition of Isomorphism;288
17.1.2.3;Condition of Immediacy;290
17.1.3;The Limits of Motor Resonance;292
17.1.3.1;Condition of Isomorphism;293
17.1.3.2;Condition of Immediacy;294
17.1.4;Conclusion;296
17.1.5;References;296
18;0001090490.pdf;299
18.1;Intersubjectivity, Cognition, and Language;299
18.1.1;Conditions for Description of Mental or Internal States;301
18.1.2;The Intersubjectivity of Public and Personal Knowledge and Experiences;304
18.1.3;Conditions for Distinguishing What Is Publicly Observable from What Is Not;307
18.1.4;Implications of the Logical Relation Between the Notion of “Truth” and “Others”: the Impossibility of Private Cognition and La;310
18.1.5;What It Means That Our Notion of “Truth” Is Fundamentally Social;311
18.1.6;Consequences for Developmental Psychology: Conclusion;312
18.1.7;References;314
19;0001090491.pdf;315
19.1;The Problem of Representation;316
19.1.1;How Things Look;316
19.1.2;Encountering Entities;318
19.1.3;Agents and Their Parts;320
19.1.4;Action-Oriented Representation;322
19.1.5;The Frame Problem;325
19.1.6;Concluding Remarks;331
19.1.7;References;332
20;0001090492.pdf;334
20.1;Action and Agency;334
20.1.1;Action and Agency;334
20.1.2;Notions of Agency;336
20.1.3;Experience of Agency;338
20.1.3.1;The Primitivist Conception;339
20.1.3.2;The Complex Conception;341
20.1.4;Vision and Agency;345
20.1.5;Concluding Remarks: The Illusion of Agency;347
20.1.6;References;348
21;0001090493.pdf;352
21.1;Meaning, World and the Second Person1;352
21.1.1;The “Conscious Brain”;353
21.1.2;The Consciousness-World Correlation;356
21.1.3;The Sensorimotor Emergence of the World;359
21.1.4;The Shared World;361
21.1.5;References;363
22;0001090494.pdf;364
22.1;Husserl and Language;365
22.1.1;Preamble: Language and Husserl;365
22.1.2;Structure in Language and Function of Language;366
22.1.3;First Logical Investigation: the Ontology of Language Use;369
22.1.3.1;Intimation;369
22.1.3.2;The Meaning Conferring Acts;370
22.1.3.3;The Meaning-Fulfilling Acts;374
22.1.3.4;Partial Conclusion;375
22.1.4;The Semantic-Syntactical Duality of the Fourth Logical Investigation;377
22.1.4.1;The Syntactic A Priori;378
22.1.4.2;The Semantic-Mereological A Priori: What Governs the Configuration of Partial Meanings into Signifying Wholes?;382
22.1.5;Language and Conceptual Structure – Evidence from Cognitive Linguistics;388
22.1.5.1;Len Talmy’s Closed Class Semantics;388
22.1.5.2;Fillmore’s Frame Semantics;390
22.1.5.3;Grammatical Specification of Perceptual Intentionality;391
22.1.6;Conclusion;393
22.1.7;References;394
23;0001090495.pdf;396
23.1;Metaphor and Cognition;396
23.1.1;The Traditional View of Metaphor;396
23.1.2;Metaphor as Irreducible Cognitive Process;397
23.1.3;Challenges to Metaphorical Meaning;400
23.1.4;Metaphor as Conceptual and Conventional;401
23.1.5;The Moving Times Metaphor;402
23.1.6;Metaphor and Cognitive Neuroscience;406
23.1.7;References;408
24;0001090496.pdf;410
24.1;Phenomenology and Cognitive Linguistics;410
24.1.1;Introduction;410
24.1.2;Fundamental Issues: “Experientialism” Versus Phenomenology;412
24.1.2.1;Metaphysics;413
24.1.2.2;Methodology: Phenomenological and “Empirical” Methods;416
24.1.2.3;Intersubjectivity;420
24.1.2.4;Embodiment;422
24.1.2.5;Summary;426
24.1.3;Phenomenological Influences;427
24.1.3.1;Representation and Sign;427
24.1.3.2;Image Schemas;429
24.1.3.3;Construal;431
24.1.4;Conclusion;433
24.1.5;References;434
25;0001090497.pdf;439
25.1;The Role of Phenomenology in Psychophysics1;440
25.1.1;Fechner and the Birth of Psychophysics;441
25.1.2;Developments Since Fechner;444
25.1.3;What Does Outer Psychophysics Measure?;445
25.1.4;Not Just Intensities Anymore;449
25.1.5;A More Radical Concern: Laming’s Challenge;451
25.1.6;Philosophical Assessment of Laming’s Challenge;459
25.1.7;References;461
26;0001090498.pdf;463
26.1;A Neurophenomenological Study of Epileptic Seizure Anticipation;463
26.1.1;Introduction;463
26.1.2;Context of the Project;464
26.1.2.1;The Neurophenomenological Program;464
26.1.2.2;The Anticipation of Epileptic Seizures;464
26.1.2.2.1;Neuro-Dynamic Analysis of Seizure Anticipation;465
26.1.3;Pheno-Dynamic Analysis of Seizure Anticipation;467
26.1.3.1;Context;467
26.1.3.2;Collecting Descriptions of the Preictal Period;469
26.1.3.2.1;Initializing the Interview;469
26.1.3.2.2;Main Difficulties;470
26.1.3.2.3;Choosing a Singular Seizure and the Start of the Description;470
26.1.3.2.4;Evoking the Preictal Period;471
26.1.3.2.5;Describing the Various Dimensions of the Preictal Experience;472
26.1.3.3;Analysing and Comparing the Descriptions;475
26.1.4;An Example of Neurophenomenological Circulation;476
26.1.4.1;Pheno-Dynamic Structure of Preictal Experience;476
26.1.4.1.1;Countermeasures;478
26.1.4.2;Articulating Pheno-Dynamic and Neuro-Dynamic Structures;478
26.1.4.2.1;Search for a Temporal Coincidence;478
26.1.4.2.2;Search for a Structural Correspondence and Working Hypothesis;479
26.1.5;Consequences and Lines of Research;479
26.1.5.1;Therapeutic Consequence: A Cognitive Therapy of Epilepsy;479
26.1.5.2;Epistemological Implications: The Question of the “Gap”;481
26.1.5.2.1;Searching for Homeomorphisms;482
26.1.5.2.2;The Rythmic and Transmodal Dimension of Lived Experience;484
26.1.5.2.3;Questions of Co-Constitution;486
26.1.5.2.4;Towards the Origins of the Gap;488
26.1.6;Conclusion;488
26.1.7;References;489
27;0001090499.pdf;492
27.1;How Unconscious is Subliminal Perception?;492
27.1.1;Short Biographical Sketch of Subliminal Perception;493
27.1.1.1;The First Subliminal Wave – Perception is Not Just Stimulus-Related;493
27.1.1.2;Discredit of Subjective Methods – Towards Objective Measures;495
27.1.1.2.1;Exhaustiveness of Subjective Methods;495
27.1.1.2.2;Exclusiveness of Subjective Methods;496
27.1.1.3;Discredit of Subjective and Objective Methods – Focus on Processing;497
27.1.1.3.1;Absence of Evidence;497
27.1.1.3.2;The Development of the Definition of Subliminal Perception;499
27.1.1.4;The Second Subliminal Wave – What About Subjective Reports?;499
27.1.2;Objective and Subjective Measures, and What TheyCan Tell Us About Subliminal;502
27.1.2.1;Why We Need More Than Objective Measures;502
27.1.2.2;Why We Need a Continuous Subjective Measure – The Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS);504
27.1.3;The Status of Subliminal Perception;506
28;0001090500.pdf;510
28.1;IW – “The Man Who Lost His Body”1;510
28.1.1;Introduction;510
28.1.2;The Study of Gesture and Its Implications;512
28.1.2.1;The Gesture Continuum;512
28.1.2.2;Gestures and Speech – Two Simultaneous Modes of Semiosis;513
28.1.2.3;The Binding of Speech and Gesture;514
28.1.3;IW’s gestures;515
28.1.3.1;Significant Variables in Assessing IW’s Gesture Performance;516
28.1.3.2;IW’s Gestures With and Without Vision (1997);516
28.1.3.3;Topokinetic Versus Morphokinetic Accuracy;518
28.1.3.4;Instrumental Actions;519
28.1.3.5;Significance of the IW Results So Far;520
28.1.3.6;IW Can Control Speech and Gesture in Tandem (1997);520
28.1.3.7;Summary of IW’s Gestures Without Vision;523
28.1.3.8;Phantom Limb Gestures;523
28.1.3.9;Overall Significance of the IW Case;524
28.1.4;Conclusion: Growth Points, Material Carriers, and Inhabitance;524
28.1.4.1;The Growth Point;524
28.1.4.2;Material Carriers;526
28.1.4.3;Phenomenology and the Scientific Study of Gesture;528
28.1.5;To Sum Up;532
28.1.6;References;533
29;0001090501.pdf;535
29.1;Phenomenology and Psychopathology;536
29.1.1;Introduction;536
29.1.2;Dimensions of Self-experience;538
29.1.3;Disturbances of Embodiment;540
29.1.3.1;Disturbances of the Subject-Body;541
29.1.3.1.1;Schizophrenia as a Disembodiment;541
29.1.3.1.2;Melancholic Depression as “Hyperembodiment”;543
29.1.3.2;Disturbances of the Body-Image (Object-Body);544
29.1.3.2.1;Body Dysmorphic Disorder;545
29.1.3.2.2;Anorexia Nervosa;545
29.1.4;Disturbances of Temporality;547
29.1.4.1;Disturbances of Basic Temporality;548
29.1.4.2;Disturbances of Autobiographical (Explicit) Temporality;549
29.1.5;Disturbances of Intersubjectivity;550
29.1.5.1;Disturbances of Primary Intersubjectivity in Autism;552
29.1.5.2;Disturbances of Secondary Intersubjectivity in Schizophrenia;553
29.1.6;Conclusion;555
29.1.7;References;557
30;0001090502.pdf;563
30.1;Delusional Atmosphere and Delusional Belief;563
30.1.1;Introduction;563
30.1.2;The Capgras and Cotard Delusions;564
30.1.3;Affect and Experience;566
30.1.4;Delusional Atmosphere;568
30.1.5;Nothingness;574
30.1.6;Conclusion;575
30.1.7;References;577
31;0001090503.pdf;579
31.1;Autoscopy: Disrupted Self in Neuropsychiatric Disorders and Anomalous Conscious States;579
31.1.1;Background: Self and Neuropsychiatric Disorders;579
31.1.2;Classification of Autoscopy;580
31.1.2.1;The Four Types;580
31.1.2.1.1;Type I Autoscopy: The Other Is Like Me;581
31.1.2.1.2;Type II Autoscopy: I Am Like the Other;582
31.1.2.1.3;Out of Body Experience (OBE): The Splitting of “I” and Me;586
31.1.2.1.4;Feeling of a Shadowy Presence (FOP): I am Confronted by Another “I”;589
31.1.3;Phenomenological Approaches to Autoscopy;594
31.1.3.1;The Other Is Like Me, I Am Like the Other(s);597
31.1.3.2;Mirroring as Self-alienation;599
31.1.3.3;Turn-Taking with Others and with Myself;600
31.1.3.4;Body Schema/Body Image: Reversible Reference Frames Mediate Self-other Relationship;602
31.1.3.5;The Illusion of Self-Movement in OBEs: A Comparison of Theories;604
31.1.3.6;Perception-Action Cycle and Self-Other Relationship;607
31.1.3.7;Dissociating Mind and Subjectivity;608
31.1.3.8;Metaphor as Symbolic Self-transcendence in Autoscopy;610
31.1.3.9;Do the Neuroanatomical Correlates of Autoscopy Support the Phenomenological Theory?;611
31.1.4;Conclusions;615
31.1.5;References;617
32;0001090504.pdf;623
32.1;Phenomenology as Description and as Explanation: The Case of Schizophrenia;623
32.1.1;Introduction;623
32.1.2;Description and Explanation, Motivation and Causation;624
32.1.3;Disturbed Ipseity: A Phenomenolgical Account of Schizophrenia;627
32.1.4;Explanatory Relevance of the Mental or Subjective Domain: Preliminary Considerations;629
32.1.5;Synchronic Relationships;632
32.1.5.1;Equiprimordial Relationships16;632
32.1.5.2;Constitutive Relationships;633
32.1.5.3;Expressive Relationships;634
32.1.5.4;Conclusion: Phenomenological Implication;635
32.1.6;The Diachronic Dimension;635
32.1.6.1;Primary Hyperreflexivity;636
32.1.6.2;Consequential Hyperreflexivity;636
32.1.6.3;Compensatory Hyperreflexivity;637
32.1.6.4;Conclusion: Phenomenological Causality;638
32.1.7;Conclusion;640
32.1.8;References;640
33;0001090505.pdf;643
33.1;Agency with Impairments of Movement;643
33.1.1;Beginnings;643
33.1.2;Empirical Observations on Will and Action Awareness;644
33.1.3;Immediate Perceptions of Paralysis and Inaction;646
33.1.4;Agency After Pure Sensory Loss;647
33.1.5;Forgetting How To;649
33.1.6;Agency in Paralysis;650
33.1.7;Effort After the Loss of Automatic Action;652
33.1.8;Agency with Altered or Reduced Embodiment;652
33.1.9;Affect and Inaction;653
33.1.10;The Communicative and Emotional Self in Action and Inaction;654
33.1.11;Conclusions;656
33.1.12;References;657
34;Schmicking_Index.pdf;659