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E-Book

E-Book, Englisch, 259 Seiten

Schulting / Verburgt Kant's Idealism

New Interpretations of a Controversial Doctrine
1. Auflage 2010
ISBN: 978-90-481-9719-4
Verlag: Springer-Verlag
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

New Interpretations of a Controversial Doctrine

E-Book, Englisch, 259 Seiten

ISBN: 978-90-481-9719-4
Verlag: Springer-Verlag
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)



This key collection of essays sheds new light on long-debated controversies surrounding Kant's doctrine of idealism and is the first book in the English language that is exclusively dedicated to the subject. Well-known Kantians Karl Ameriks and Manfred Baum present their considered views on this most topical aspect of Kant's thought. Several essays by acclaimed Kant scholars broach a vastly neglected problem in discussions of Kant's idealism, namely the relation between his conception of logic and idealism: The standard view that Kant's logic and idealism are wholly separable comes under scrutiny in these essays. A further set of articles addresses multiple facets of the notorious notion of the thing in itself, which continues to hold the attention of Kant scholars. The volume also contains an extensive discussion of the often overlooked chapter in the Critique of Pure Reason on the Transcendental Ideal. Together, the essays provide a whole new outlook on Kantian idealism. No one with a serious interest in Kant's idealism can afford to ignore this important book.

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Weitere Infos & Material


1;Preface;6
2;Editorial Notes;11
3;Contents;12
4;Contributors;14
5;About the Contributors;15
6;1 Kants Idealism: The Current Debate;17
6.1;1 The Epistemological Reading Reconsidered: Allison Meets His Critics Again;19
6.2;2 Novel Two-Aspect Readings;23
6.2.1;2.1 The Bold Metaphysical Two-Aspect View;24
6.2.2;2.2 Allais' Middle Course;25
6.2.3;2.3 Two-Aspect Readings and Cross-Boundary Identity;29
6.3;3 Continuing Issues with the Ontological Approach to Idealism;32
6.3.1;3.1 Phenomenalism Revisited;32
6.3.2;3.2 Metaphysical Short Arguments to Idealism;35
6.4;4 Concluding Remarks;39
6.5;References;40
7;Part I Interpreting Transcendental Idealism;42
7.1;2 Kants Idealism on a Moderate Interpretation;43
7.1.1;1 The Idea of a Moderate Interpretation;43
7.1.2;2 Transcendental and Idealism;46
7.1.3;3 Idealism in Context;49
7.1.4;4 The Ideal As Fundamentally Conditioned;52
7.1.5;5 On Another Kind of Moderate Alternative;54
7.1.6;6 Further Versions of Moderation;56
7.1.7;7 Further Alternatives to Hannas Alternative;58
7.1.8;8 Theoretical Difficulties;60
7.1.9;9 Practical Difficulties;63
7.1.10;References;66
7.2;3 Objects and Objectivity in Kant's First Critique;68
7.2.1;1 Objects in Transcendental Idealism;68
7.2.2;2 Kantian Objectivity;75
7.2.3;References;83
7.3;4 Transcendental Idealism in the Third Critique ;84
7.3.1;1 The Question of the Conditions of Empirical Knowledge;86
7.3.2;2 The Aesthetic and Logical Purposiveness of Nature;87
7.3.3;3 Transcendental Idealism in the Third Critique ;94
7.3.4;4 Conclusion;100
7.3.5;References;100
8;Part II Transcendental Idealism Logic;102
8.1;5 Transcendental Idealism and the Transcendental Deduction;103
8.1.1;1 ;103
8.1.2;2 ;104
8.1.3;3 ;107
8.1.3.1;3.1;107
8.1.3.2;3.2 ;114
8.1.3.3;References;119
8.2;6 Transcendental Idealism and Transcendental Apperception;120
8.2.1;1 Kants Criticism of the Cogito in the Paralogisms;120
8.2.2;2 Transcendental Apperception and the Argument of the B-Deduction;123
8.2.3;3 Allison, Objectivity and the First Part of the Argument of the B-Deduction;126
8.2.4;4 Perception, Judgment and Experience in the Prolegomena ;127
8.2.5;5 Allisons Objections to the Discussion of Judgments of Perception;130
8.2.6;6 Transcendental Idealism and the Second Part of the B-Deduction;132
8.2.7;7 Conclusion;135
8.2.8;References;136
8.3;7 Marks, Images, and Rules: Concepts and Transcendental Idealism;137
8.3.1;1 Concepts as Marks or Images;138
8.3.2;2 Kant on Concepts;142
8.3.3;3 Kant on Concepts as Images;142
8.3.4;4 Kant on Concepts as Marks;143
8.3.5;5 Concepts as Rules;145
8.3.6;6 Concepts and Transcendental Idealism;147
8.3.7;7 Summary;151
8.3.8;References;151
8.4;8 Discursivity and Transcendental Idealism;153
8.4.1;1 The Non-Discursive Understanding;154
8.4.2;2 Discursivity and Transcendental Idealism;162
8.4.3;3 Conclusion;166
8.4.4;References;167
8.5;9 Limitation and Idealism: Kants Long Argument from the Categories;169
8.5.1;1 Introduction: Thinking the Thing in Itself and Idealism;169
8.5.2;2 Do the Categories Have Meaning Beyond the Bounds of Sensible Experience;174
8.5.3;3 Woods Identity Interpretation;182
8.5.4;4 Objective Determination in the Transcendental Deduction;188
8.5.5;5 The Transcendental Ideal and Limitation;191
8.5.6;6 Conclusion;198
8.5.7;References;199
9;Part III Transcendental Idealism The Thing in Itself;202
9.1;10 Appearance, Thing-in-Itself, and the Problem of the Skeptical Hypothesis;203
9.1.1;1 Introduction;203
9.1.2;2 Appearance and Thing-in-Itself;205
9.1.3;3 Empirical Dualism and Transcendental Dualism;209
9.1.3.1;3.1 Empirical Dualism;210
9.1.3.2;3.2 Transcendental Dualism;213
9.1.4;4 Three Objections;216
9.1.5;References;217
9.2;11 Thinking the In-itself and Its Relation to Appearances;219
9.2.1;1 The Metaphysical Content of the Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism;220
9.2.2;2 Issues of Dogmatism and Irrelevance;223
9.2.3;3 Revisiting the Text from the Beginning of the Aesthetic;226
9.2.4;4 Beyond the Bounds of Possible Knowledge;229
9.2.5;5 Saying More About Affection and the In-itself;230
9.2.6;6 What Does the Conceptual Indeterminacy of the In-itself Mean;234
9.2.7;7 Some Thoughts on Transcendental Idealism;238
9.2.8;8 Conclusion;242
9.2.9;References;242
9.3;12 How to Account for Reasonx2019;s Interest in an Ultimate Prototypex003F; A Note on Kantx2019;s DoctrineINTnl; of the Transcendental Ideal;244
9.3.1;1 Introduction;244
9.3.2;2 Revisiting Kants Theory of Pure Reason;246
9.3.3;3 On Longuenesses Interpretation;251
9.3.4;4 Conclusion;259
9.3.5;References;260



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