E-Book, Englisch, 288 Seiten
Searcy / Nowicki The Evolution of Animal Communication
Course Book
ISBN: 978-1-4008-3572-0
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
Reliability and Deception in Signaling Systems
E-Book, Englisch, 288 Seiten
Reihe: Monographs in Behavior and Ecology
ISBN: 978-1-4008-3572-0
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
William A. Searcy is the Robert E. Maytag Professor of Ornithology at the University of Miami. He is the author, with Ken Yasukawa, of Polygyny and Sexual Selection in Red-Winged Blackbirds (Princeton). Stephen Nowicki is Bass Fellow and Professor of Biology, Psychological and Brain Sciences, and Neurobiology at Duke University, where he currently serves as Dean of the Natural Sciences. He has published more than 65 scientific papers on animal communication and behavior, including work on birds, insects, spiders, and mammals.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
Figures, Boxes, and Table ix
Acknowledgments xiii
Introduction 1
Chapter 1: Definitions 2
Some History 6
Categories of Signal Costs 13
Alternative Explanations for Reliability 16
Deception Redux 17
Evolutionary Interests of Signalers and Receivers 20
Chapter 2: Signaling When Interests Overlap 24
Signaling Between Relatives: Theory 24
Begging 36
Alarms 53
Food Calls 68
Individually Directed Skepticism 73
Conclusions 77
Chapter 3: Signaling When Interests Diverge 78
Mating Signals: Theory 78
Carotenoid Pigmentation 86
Songs in Oscine Birds 97
Tail Length in Birds 123
Conclusions 131
Chapter 4: Signaling When Interests Oppose 134
Signaling in Aggressive Contexts: Theory 134
Postural Displays of Aggression in Birds 141
Badges of Status 147
Weapon Displays in Crustaceans 160
Dominant Frequency in Calls of Frogs and Toads 169
Conclusions 178
Chapter 5: Honesty and Deception in Communication Networks 181
Third-Party Receivers 182
"Eavesdropping" versus "Interception" 183
Eavesdropping in Signaling Interactions 185
Third-Party Receivers and Reliability 203
Conclusions 206
Chapter 6: Conclusions 207
Reliability 208
Alternatives to the Handicap Mechanism 214
Deceit 218
The Balance of Reliability and Deceit 223
References 225
Author Index 257
Subject Index 263




