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E-Book, Englisch, 168 Seiten
Reihe: PublishDrive
Sigmundsdóttir The Shape of Silence
1. Auflage 2026
ISBN: 978-9935-9-3708-7
Verlag: PublishDrive
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 0 - No protection
A Meditation on Iceland's Hidden Emotional History
E-Book, Englisch, 168 Seiten
Reihe: PublishDrive
ISBN: 978-9935-9-3708-7
Verlag: PublishDrive
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 0 - No protection
A work of literary nonfiction that traces the hidden emotional history of Iceland through three generations of one maternal line.
Iceland is known for its sagas and for its remarkable reinvention after the 2008 financial collapse. Less often told is the story of the country's inner life-the emotional austerity that took root over centuries of extreme poverty and systemic control, and the silence that settled over generations of Icelandic families as a result.
In , Alda Sigmundsdóttir braids memoir with social history to tell that other story. She traces her maternal line through three women: her great-grandmother Þórdís, whose household was broken up after her husband was lost at sea in 1906; her grandmother Elínborg, who was four years old when she was sent to be raised by strangers as a , a fostered child; and her mother, who grew up in the long shadow of that separation. Around them she reconstructs the world that shaped them. Under the , landless people were required by law to live and work on a farm as laborers, and paupers, children among them, could be auctioned off to whoever would keep them most cheaply. Around 1700, 96 percent of Icelandic farmers did not own the land they worked, and most people lived in dependence on others, with almost no legal recourse and no language for their inner lives.
Icelanders found ways to survive. They told stories of hidden people and read aloud to one another through the long winter evenings. They also learned to endure without complaint and not to see what was being done to them, a response psychologists call betrayal blindness. Those habits kept a nation alive, but their effects did not vanish when prosperity finally arrived. They were passed down through behavior and through silence, and Sigmundsdóttir follows them through her own family and into modern Iceland, from the banking collapse of 2008 to the question of who owns the fish in its seas. The particulars are Icelandic, but the pattern is familiar wherever ordinary people have lived for generations under hardship and under systems that demanded silence.
Throughout the book, Sigmundsdóttir returns to the image of a glass wall that forms between people who have been through too much and learned to show too little. You can see the person on the other side, but you cannot reach them, and they cannot reach you. is an attempt to see clearly what has been passed down through one Icelandic family, and through countless others.
Readers of and Maggie O'Farrell's , and anyone with Icelandic roots, will find an exacting voice and a story of Iceland that has not yet been fully told.
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CHAPTER TWO
COMPLACENCY AND THE ICELANDIC PSYCHE
The question came from a reader named Liv on my Substack newsletter, . She had been to Iceland several times and had made friends there with whom she’d stayed in touch. What puzzled her was this: not one of the Icelanders she had talked to supported the Independence Party. Everybody was outraged over the political shenanigans, the corruption, the nepotism and cronyism … all of it. And yet the same people who caused the outrage kept getting elected, over and over again.
“Why do you think that is?” she asked. “What is happening in Icelandic society in order to change things? I know there have been a few desperate attempts to shake things up … but after a while everything seems to settle and things go back to the way they were before. Why are people drawn to vote for these people?”
It is a question many Icelanders have asked themselves, often with bewilderment or resignation.
Nota bene, Iceland’s political landscape changed in late 2024. The Independence Party, which has historically represented the interests of the wealthy elite, is not, at this moment, in power. This is significant, yet I believe it would be premature to declare victory over the patterns I am describing. We have been here before. After the 2008 economic meltdown, the Independence Party was voted out, and for the first time in the history of the republic a left-wing majority government came to power. Four years later the Independence Party was back, in a coalition with the Progressive Party. That government unraveled in 2016, when the Panama Papers revealed that the prime minister and leader of the Progressives, Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson, and his wife had an undisclosed offshore company holding claims against the failed Icelandic banks—a glaring conflict of interest, since his government was negotiating with those banks’ creditors. Confronted with the evidence in a televised interview, he walked out, and within days he had resigned.
In the municipal elections of May 2026, the Independence Party went from six to nine seats on Reykjavík’s city council and won the mayor’s office in the capital, by far the largest municipality in the country. It also won an outright majority in neighboring Kópavogur. By the autumn, although a government led by the Social Democratic Alliance held power, the Independence Party had climbed back to second place in the national polls.
In late August 2026, Icelanders voted in a referendum on whether the government should resume accession talks with the European Union. The question was not membership itself; any agreement that came out of the talks was to be put to a second vote. The No side won with 52.8 percent, on a turnout of 82.5 percent. Its campaign cast even a vote to resume talks as a step toward giving up Iceland’s independence—one of its billboards asked, “Independence for sale?”—and warned that the EU would take control of the country’s fishing grounds and other natural resources if Iceland joined. Those warnings sat comfortably with the interests of the large fishing companies, which sell their catch in euros while the rest of the country is forced to use krónur, and for whom a country outside the EU is one that keeps using the króna. It was a narrow outcome, but a familiar one: the interests of a small elite were presented as the interests of the nation, and the result was carried by the votes of people who stood to gain little from those interests.
And so, the question I now wish to explore probes deeper than merely why Icelanders choose to vote for the Independence Party and its allies. What psychological mechanisms, rooted in centuries of historical trauma, have made Icelanders so willing to leave power in the hands of the elite? And have those mechanisms truly been dismantled, or only temporarily disrupted?
To an outside observer, the pattern is indeed baffling. Icelanders appear politically engaged and well informed about what is happening in their country. Iceland consistently ranks near the top of international indexes on democracy and equality. There is no shortage of activists and commentators calling out corruption when they see it.
And yet for most of Iceland’s post-independence history, the Independence Party has held power, either leading the government or as part of a coalition. It is the party that has presided over the privatization of national resources, the deregulation that led to the 2008 collapse, and a long run of scandals involving offshore holdings and conflicts of interest.
I want to be clear that my concern goes beyond the Independence Party, and beyond left versus right. The pattern I am trying to understand is one in which ordinary Icelanders repeatedly elect people who act against their interests and help themselves to common resources, often with apparent impunity. What I want to know is why it happens, and why it has persisted for so long.
After the 2008 collapse and all its calamities, there was a brief period when it seemed like things might change. People took to the streets, demanding accountability—and we did get some. Around two dozen bankers were eventually convicted and sent to prison, far more than in other countries hit by the financial crisis. A national assembly was convened, bringing together nearly a thousand Icelanders chosen at random from the national registry to set out the values on which they wanted the nation to be built. In the wake of this, a new constitution was drafted through an unprecedented democratic process. There was enthusiastic talk of reshaping the entire political and economic system.
But then, slowly, things settled back into place. The Independence Party returned to government. The new constitution, which among other things would have declared Iceland’s natural resources the property of the nation, was never ratified. In a 2012 referendum, two-thirds of those who voted endorsed it as the basis for a new constitution, yet it stalled in parliament—blocked, unsurprisingly, by those whose interests it would have curtailed.
Some would say that systems are rigged the world over, that the elite have too much power and money influences politics everywhere. All true. Yet if any country were in a position to change course, it would be Iceland. We are a nation the size of a modest city, and the people who make decisions are within easy reach—you may well find yourself sharing a hot tub with a cabinet minister at the local swimming pool. The global explanation does not account for why ordinary Icelanders, with so much in their favor, continue to participate in a system that works against them. Why we return, again and again, to familiar patterns. I believe something else is at work, something rooted deep in the national psyche.
There is a concept in psychology called betrayal blindness. It describes what happens when you are so dependent on someone who is harming you that, in order to survive, you make yourself blind to it. You minimize, rationalize, or simply cease to see it. What is more, instead of confronting the betrayal, you may even align yourself with the person responsible.
This mechanism typically develops in situations where the victim has no recourse and no means of escape: a child dependent on an abusive parent, for example, or a hostage dependent on a captor. Or an entire population dependent on an oppressive system.
When I first encountered this concept in my own therapy, it opened my eyes to my relationship with my mother—how I had been unable to see, for so many years, the way it was harming me. To me, my mother could do no wrong. She was flawless. I would have gone to battle with anyone who criticized or challenged her. And this despite the fact that years earlier, when I still had a support system around me, I had tried my best to rebel against her in order to hold on to my own sense of agency and identity. But once I moved abroad with her and depended on her entirely for my survival, I aligned myself with her so completely that it was as if we had merged. I was a little carbon copy: her opinions were my opinions, her thoughts were my thoughts. I could no longer afford to see the truth, so I dissociated from myself and began to perform someone else.
That was my personal experience of betrayal blindness. Yet the same mechanism can take hold of an entire population.
For roughly four centuries—from the late 1400s until the late 1800s—a significant proportion of Icelanders passed through the , the bond of service, at some point in their lives. They could not live independently and could not move freely; leaving the district required written permission. Marriage was not formally forbidden them, but the system was arranged so that only the head of a household could realistically support a family, which meant that most people in service did not marry at all. Those who managed to start their own farms—no small feat in itself, as I will discuss later—were almost always tenants on land owned by others. They could lose their tenancy at a landowner’s discretion and were bound by obligations that left them perpetually vulnerable. Between these two conditions—compulsory service for the landless, precarious tenancy for most of the rest—only a small elite held true autonomy.
Iceland was under the Danish crown at the time, yet the system was homegrown. It was created and maintained by what was in effect a landowner oligarchy, a small elite that controlled Alþingi, Iceland’s parliament, and used it to pass laws that served their own interests. They needed cheap labor, so they created a system that provided it and made escape from that system virtually impossible.
In 1651 Alþingi passed a law making it both the right and...




