E-Book, Englisch, 320 Seiten
Skelton The New Snobbery
1. Auflage 2021
ISBN: 978-1-78590-658-9
Verlag: Biteback Publishing
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 6 - ePub Watermark
E-Book, Englisch, 320 Seiten
ISBN: 978-1-78590-658-9
Verlag: Biteback Publishing
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 6 - ePub Watermark
David Skelton's book Little Platoons set the template for the Tories' successful attempt to take Red Wall seats in the north and the Midlands, which built upon a decade of work and campaigning, making the case for an increased emphasis on the needs of working-class voters in England's towns. Skelton has written regularly for a number of publications, including The Guardian, the New Statesman, the Daily Telegraph, Prospect, ConservativeHome and The Spectator, as well as appearing regularly on BBC Radio and TV, ITN and Sky News.
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The 2016 referendum on EU membership marked the first time in generations that the once industrial working class flexed its political muscles and helped to change the direction of the country – against the almost universal advice of the ruling political, business and cultural class. Three years later, the same voters proved pivotal to the result of the 2019 general election, with the so-called Red Wall crumbling and 120 years of class-based partisan loyalties melting away as dyed-in-the-wool Labour voters abandoned the party, handing the Conservatives their biggest majority since Margaret Thatcher’s heyday. After decades of being ignored and left behind, working-class voters seemed to be central to politics again. And this resurgence came not a moment too soon; working-class voters have continued to face the prospect of being economically marginalised, minimised in cultural life and abandoned educationally.
Sadly, for too many this new-found working-class voice is a source of regret rather than celebration. A new and insidious snobbery, aimed squarely at these voters, has taken root in part of elite society. For too many people, these election results didn’t just mark a political disagreement, they also represented an unacceptable displacement of the natural order of things.
All of a sudden the ‘wrong people’, apparently uninformed and driven by bigotry, had proven decisive in electoral events. As a particularly angry editorial in Foreign Policy magazine put it, the divide was seen as ‘between the sane and the mindlessly angry’.1 To disagree with the status quo was to display a level of ignorance that shouldn’t just be disagreed with but blatantly disregarded as ‘insane’ or based on mindless stupidity. This effortless superiority, writing off much of the country as barely worthy of being taken seriously, has become the calling card for much of contemporary progressive Britain.
Large parts of the often liberal, professional elite seem to believe that working-class views are not of the same worth as professional views; working-class jobs are not as valuable as middle-class jobs; and working-class places are less desirable to live in than middle-class places. This has created a new snobbery, through which it has become socially acceptable for the economically successful to look down on working people.
What actually constitutes working class is obviously a discussion that has raged for centuries. For the purposes of this book, we’ll largely define working class based on education (not in receipt of a degree) and occupation, although it is also worth noting that the majority of people still define themselves as working class, despite decades of commentary suggesting the opposite. The British Social Attitudes Survey indicates that 60 per cent of people regard themselves as working class, and notes that ‘the proportion who consider themselves working class has not changed since 1983’.2 Only around 35 per cent of the country had a degree when that was measured in 2012, but because of the expansion of higher education this figure could well be higher now.
TWO TIERS
For too much of elite Britain, a tone of disdain against the traditional working class represents the only socially acceptable form of prejudice. This is particularly, but not exclusively, on the liberal left, where the disdain is based sometimes on pity, sometimes on rage.
Words like ignorant and racist are thrown around freely and unfairly. Despite polling evidence that levels of racism in the UK are declining and are lower than in most of Europe, critics are keen to stereotype Brexit Britain as a dystopia of bigotry. The response to political changes driven by working-class voters isn’t to accept that such alterations were based on considered choices and legitimate grievances but instead to insist that views that the managerial elite personally disagree with must be based on poor education, parochialism or a lack of sufficient enlightenment. For many politicians of the left, which is now a largely middle-class, city-based movement, the working-class vote now represents a reactionary obstacle to their progressive worldview.
Some Labour politicians in working-class areas have long regarded many of their constituents as some kind of embarrassing elderly relative, to be humoured come election time but otherwise largely ignored. As part of an explosive post-election argument, the former MP for Doncaster claimed that a Labour frontbencher and Islington MP told an MP from a Leave-voting constituency that she was ‘glad my constituents aren’t as stupid as yours’. Although Emily Thornberry has strongly denied making the comment, the fact that such stories are believable says much about the resurgence of snobbery. As former Home Secretary Alan Johnson reminded a leading Corbynista on election night: ‘The working classes have always been a disappointment’ for the left.3 Another Labour MP, Dawn Butler, said, ‘If anyone doesn’t hate Brexit … then there is something wrong with you.’4 The political decisions that have been galvanised by working-class towns have led commentators and politicians to lament a crisis of democracy, otherwise defined as democracy producing the wrong results.
Comedians, who are first to loudly claim to be offended in most circumstances, are the first to savage so-called ‘crap towns’ within the UK and ridicule narrow-minded, proletarian values. The likes of the BBC’s The Mash Report and Radio 4’s The News Quiz had a regular habit of punching down. Now popular theories allege that white working-class voters are the arch representatives of the newly popular concept of ‘white privilege’ or ‘white fragility’. Working-class men are either caricatured as football hooligans or ‘gammons’. Working-class patriotism is condemned and belittled, with book titles such as 52 Times Britain Was a Bellend causing a stir amongst the anti-patriotic new snobs. Parts of the professional middle class have shown themselves unwilling or unable to treat many working-class views, attitudes and cultures with anything other than contempt. A left-wing radio DJ commented on a poll giving the Conservatives a lead in the Hartlepool by-election with the musing that the town’s voters backing Tories was down to ‘forelock-tugging stupidity’, adding that the voters were ‘thick as pigshit or pig ignorant’.5
Once the scale of the Hartlepool defeat for Labour had become clear, elements of the left indulged in another round of electorate blaming. One claimed that the problem for the left was that ‘a huge number of the general public are racists and bigots’ and asked, ‘How do you begin to tackle entrenched idiocy like that?’ Another claimed, ‘We don’t have an opposition problem. We have an electorate problem.’ Hartlepool was yet more proof that the electorate don’t take particularly kindly to being sneered at and being told repeatedly that they are wrong, stupid or both. Results like the Hartlepool by-election and Labour losing control of Durham Council, the first it had gained as a party in 2019, was further evidence that a realignment, accelerated by left-wing snobbery towards working people, was continuing apace.6
THE PERMANENT CITADELS
OF THE NEW SNOBBERY
Whilst working-class voters have been making their voices heard at the ballot box for the first time in decades, the new snobbery has strengthened its hold over other important institutions in British life, including the judiciary, upper echelons of the media and government agencies. Despite an obsession with diversity, decision-making bodies in culture, business and broadcasting have little or no real representation of working-class life nor provincial towns. This results in decisions that often seem made in defiance of the majority of UK citizens. Activist judges and power-sucking quangos have gradually increased their power over the years. These bodies have become permanent institutions of minoritarian dominance, the embodiment of the managerial elite, very much separate from the democratic sphere and using their power to entrench norms and values anathema to many working-class voters.
Universities, despite conscious efforts to broaden their social bases, have remained resolutely middle class (only 13 per cent of white working-class boys on free school meals attend). Indeed, attending university has almost become an inherited right amongst the professional middle class, building up borders and boundaries between them and the so-called uneducated majority. Vocational education is routinely mentioned as ‘a good idea’ by politicians and commentators, but for the professional middle class it is only a good idea for other people’s children.
Underpinning this new snobbery has been an all-embracing cult of meritocracy: the belief that success is always and everywhere down to hard work and talent, whilst lack of success is based on individual failure. Hence the snobbery of the successful towards the views of the less successful is seen as being justified by merit and...




