Tännsjö From Reasons to Norms

On the Basic Question in Ethics
1. Auflage 2009
ISBN: 978-90-481-3285-0
Verlag: Springer-Verlag
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 168 Seiten

Metaethics is the inquiry into the nature of morality (or ethics, I use the words ‘morality’, ‘morals’, and ‘ethics’ as synonyms). When we pass moral judgements, what kind of claims are we then making? I speak of this as the semantic metaethical question. a re there moral facts, to be discovered by us and existing independently of our thoughts and conceptualisation? I speak of this as the ontological or me- physical metaethical question. a nd, if there are, can we know about them; and, if we can, how do we get this kind of knowledge? I speak of this as the epistemic metaethical question. a ll these metaethical questions, the semantic, the ontological, and the epistemic ones, are raised and discussed in this book, but they are not the core questions raised. I have been more concerned with another kind of questions, which deserve to be called metaethical as well: what are the problems of morality? a re there many different moral questions, or, do they all, in the final analysis, reduce to only a few, or perhaps just one? t his question is of special importance to a non-naturalist objectivist and realist like the present author, who believes that we do make truth-claims when we pass moral judgements and who believes that there is a truth in these matters so that we must face the possibility that even our most cherished moral judgements may be false.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Tännsjö, Torbjörn

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;190635_1_En_BookFrontmatter_OnlinePDF.pdf;1
1.1;From Reasons to NormsOn the Basic Question in EthicsbyTorbjörn TännsjöUniversity of Stockholm, Sweden;3
1.1.1;Acknowledgements;5
1.1.2;Preface;7
2;190635_1_En_1_Chapter_OnlinePDF.pdf;15
2.1;Chapter 1;15
2.1.1;Introduction;15
2.1.1.1;1.1 A War Tribunal;15
2.1.1.2;1.2 Reasons for Action;17
2.1.1.3;1.3 Two Notions of Practical Reasons;17
2.1.1.4;1.4 The State of the Art;19
2.1.1.5;1.5 Plan of the Book;21
3;190635_1_En_2_Chapter_OnlinePDF.pdf;24
3.1;Chapter 2;24
3.1.1;The Humean Notion of Practical Reasons;24
3.1.1.1;2.1 Introduction;24
3.1.1.2;2.2 Humean Reasons Are Concrete Entities;25
3.1.1.3;2.3 A Requirement of Rationality;27
3.1.1.4;2.4 Are Humean Reasons Something We Argue from?;29
3.1.1.5;2.5 Non-Humean Explanation of Action;30
3.1.1.6;2.6 Mistaken Beliefs as Reasons;31
3.1.1.7;2.7 Are Humean Reasons Always Instrumental?;35
3.1.1.8;2.8 The Temptation to Idealise;36
3.1.1.9;2.9 Conclusion;38
4;190635_1_En_3_Chapter_OnlinePDF.pdf;39
4.1;Chapter 3;39
4.1.1;The Moral Notion of Practical Reason;39
4.1.1.1;3.1 Introduction;39
4.1.1.2;3.2 Prima Facie Reasons;41
4.1.1.3;3.3 Are There Moral Reasons That We Cannot Know About?;44
4.1.1.4;3.4 Are Moral Reasons Always a Part of Humean Reasons?;46
4.1.1.5;3.5 On the Existence of Objective Moral Reasons;47
4.1.1.6;3.6 The Principle of Charity;48
4.1.1.7;3.7 The Normative Constraint;49
4.1.1.8;3.8 The Meaning of Moral Realism;50
5;190635_1_En_4_Chapter_OnlinePDF.pdf;53
5.1;Chapter 4;53
5.1.1;In Defence of Moral Realism;53
5.1.1.1;4.1 Introduction;53
5.1.1.2;4.2 The Argument from Queerness;55
5.1.1.3;4.3 The Argument from Relativity;62
5.1.1.4;4.4 Harman’s Empiricist Argument;64
5.1.1.5;4.5 Moral Knowledge;67
5.1.1.6;4.6 Conclusion;70
6;190635_1_En_5_Chapter_OnlinePDF.pdf;71
6.1;Chapter 5;71
6.1.1;Some Consequences of Moral Realism;71
6.1.1.1;5.1 Introduction;71
6.1.1.2;5.2 Moral Explanation;71
6.1.1.3;5.3 Nihilism and Moral Explanation;72
6.1.1.4;5.4 Quasi-realism;74
6.1.1.5;5.5 Cornell Realism and Moral Explanation;76
6.1.1.6;5.6 The Normative Question;79
6.1.1.7;5.7 Broome’s Answers;80
6.1.1.8;5.8 Korsgaard’s Answer;82
6.1.1.9;5.9 Conclusion;86
7;190635_1_En_6_Chapter_OnlinePDF.pdf;87
7.1;Chapter 6;87
7.1.1;Reasons from Prudence and Rationality;87
7.1.1.1;6.1 Introduction;87
7.1.1.2;6.2 Rationality and Prudence;88
7.1.1.3;6.3 Person-Relative Practical Reasons;92
7.1.1.4;6.4 Indeterminate Cases;94
7.1.1.5;6.5 Different Sense of ‘Ought’;96
7.1.1.6;6.6 Taking Relativism Seriously;97
7.1.1.7;6.7 A Further Stretch of Our Moral Ontological Imagination;100
7.1.1.8;6.8 Phronesis;102
7.1.1.9;6.9 Conclusion;106
8;190635_1_En_7_Chapter_OnlinePDF.pdf;107
8.1;Chapter 7;107
8.1.1;Reasons from Justice and Aesthetics;107
8.1.1.1;7.1 Introduction;107
8.1.1.2;7.2 Theories of Justice;107
8.1.1.3;7.3 Aesthetics;112
8.1.1.4;7.4 Suppose I am Wrong;114
8.1.1.5;7.5 Conclusion;115
9;190635_1_En_8_Chapter_OnlinePDF.pdf;116
9.1;Chapter 8;116
9.1.1;Reasons to Believe;116
9.1.1.1;8.1 Introduction;116
9.1.1.2;8.2 The Epistemic Goal;120
9.1.1.3;8.3 Coherence and Justification;125
9.1.1.4;8.4 Is Epistemic Justification a Feasible Goal?;127
9.1.1.5;8.5 The Sui Generis Approach22;129
9.1.1.6;8.6 Is Justification a Blessing?;132
9.1.1.7;8.7 Conclusion;133
10;190635_1_En_9_Chapter_OnlinePDF.pdf;135
10.1;Chapter 9;135
10.1.1;Reasons to Desire;135
10.1.1.1;9.1 Introduction;135
10.1.1.2;9.2 Fittingness;135
10.1.1.3;9.3 Morality Without Values;138
10.1.1.4;9.4 Values Without Normative Import;139
10.1.1.5;9.5 The Meaning of ‘Good’;141
10.1.1.6;9.6 Recent Attempts to Defend the Idea That There Are Reasons to Prefer or Desire;143
10.1.1.7;9.7 The Simple View;145
10.1.1.8;9.8 Must We Will the Means to Our Ends;147
10.1.1.9;9.9 Broome on Practical Reasoning;148
10.1.1.10;9.10 The Value of Prospects;153
10.1.1.11;9.11 Ought We to Avoid Cyclical Preferences?;155
10.1.1.12;9.12 Is There a Common Emotional Goal?;156
10.1.1.13;9.13 Conclusion;159
11;190635_1_En_10_Chapter_OnlinePDF.pdf;160
11.1;Chapter 10;160
11.1.1;Conclusion;160
11.1.1.1;10.1 Introduction;160
11.1.1.2;10.2 Prudence, Rationality;161
11.1.1.3;10.3 Justice and Aesthetics;162
11.1.1.4;10.4 Epistemology;163
11.1.1.5;10.5 What Are We to Believe?;163
11.1.1.6;10.6 Reasons to Feel and Desire;164
11.1.1.7;10.7 The War Tribunal – The True Story;165
12;190635_1_En_BookBackmatter_OnlinePDF.pdf;168
12.1;Bibliography;168
12.1.1;Anchor 2;168