Thorsteinson Flight Path

The Fifth Plane and the Threat to Air Force One
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-0-692-28455-1
Verlag: Rannsokn Books
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 134 Seiten

Identifies the fifth plane used on 9/11, reveals the nature of the threat to Air Force One that morning and explains why the United States intelligence services concentrated their espionage activities in Germany shortly after the attacks.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Thorsteinson, Kristjan

Leseproben

Chapter 1

"I Want To Go To Germany!"

"They saw where we reacted, and presumably also where we didn't react."

Were they casing American airports to see if extra precautions went into effect?

"They not only know how to plan, but they know how to test," said this source," and they know, obviously, where the gaps are."

- Michael Hirsh interview with anonymous U.S. Investigator, "We've Hit The Targets, "Newsweek, September 13, 2001.1

The National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was formed in late 2002 with the mission to provide a complete account of the events of September 11, 2001. During its investigative phase, the commission appointed specific teams to concentrate research on different aspects of the attacks. According to the United States National Archives, "Team 7 was created to investigate commercial aviation and transportation security, including an investigation into the circumstances of the four hijackings."2 Team 7 notes include, "documents received by the commission from agencies including the FBI and airlines."3 Many of Team 7's notes are now available to the public on sites such as Scribd.com.* These notes include FBI interviews that were not made public in the final 9/11 Commission report.

An FD-302 is a form used by the FBI to encapsulate interviews, summarizing information of investigative significance that may later be used in a court of law. One particularly unsettling document with this designation can be found in declassified Team 7 files.4 It is the account of a Continental Airlines pilot to FBI agents in the week following the attacks of September 11, 2001. After flying for Continental Airlines out of Newark, New Jersey, the pilot was laid over in Birmingham, UK for three days due to the attacks. Sometime during these three days he talked with a female Continental Airlines flight attendant, who informed him of her own experience a few weeks earlier that eerily prefigured the attacks.

On August 20, 2001, the flight attendant was working on Continental Airlines Flight 50, a transatlantic flight from Newark, New Jersey to Frankfurt, Germany. After working the mid-galley position of the plane for approximately one to two hours of flight time, the flight attendant observed a "Middle Eastern man" get up from his seat, cover his face with his hands and run up the aisle. At first the she thought the man was ill, but he ran past the bathroom and began pounding on the cabin door. He was "screaming that he wanted to go to Germany." He did this "2-3 times," "once trying to open the cabin door." The man was finally restrained and seated next to a United States Marine.

Since there was no precedent for the man's behavior, he was most likely perceived as being psychologically disturbed. His repeated demands to go to Germany, unless they referenced a desire for asylum, were easily met.

5

The unknown man punched the United States Marine and climbed over him. He produced a box cutter and advanced toward the flight attendant. At this point a Continental Airlines captain travelling in civilian clothes got up and "put a full nelson on the middle eastern man." After being disarmed by another passenger, the man's hands were bound with flex cuffs.

The flight attendant of Flight 50 recalled that two "New York police officers identified themselves and said they did not want to get involved." The two "stated that they were available if the flight crew needed any more help." With the immediate situation under control, the man's carry-on back pack was searched. It was found to contain "bunches" of box cutters.

The "vacationing Continental Airlines captain" talked to the pilot of Flight 50 and, "tried to persuade him to land and take the Middle Eastern man off the flight". The pilot "refused", and "continued on to Frankfurt". The vacationing pilot's advice was sound enough. If the man had begun his bizarre behavior two hours into the flight, there were many hours left until the plane was scheduled to land in Germany. Until then, no one could guarantee the planes' safety.

Laid over in the UK, the Continental Airlines captain advised the flight attendant to report the incident to Continental Airlines corporate security immediately. The flight attendant did as he advised but, "the next day the person to whom she reported the incident, could not remember the facts and that prompted (the captain) to call the FBI."

Unfortunately, the facts are few concerning the landing of the plane in Frankfurt. It could be easily imagined that assault charges would be filed on behalf of the people who were directly threatened on the flight; German police would conduct interviews to determine the course of events and the man would be detained.

However, it appears the captain was not given any further information, and the flight attendant seems to have left out of her narrative to him any mention of the Frankfurt police interviewing her about her assault, advising her to contact Continental Airlines corporate security, or that the German authorities would contact their US counterparts.

It is unclear whether German officials failed to notify their US colleagues of this event, but the evidence is not reassuring. As the record will show, there is no indication that security officials in Newark were ever notified of this incident before or after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Since United Flight 93 originated out of Newark International Airport, it became an obvious focal point for investigators. Everyone responsible for security at the airport was interviewed thoroughly the same week of the attacks. On September 13th, the FBI interviewed Reggie Baumgardner, Continental Airline's then Director of Security at Newark Airport. His interview is preserved in another FD-302 where he informed investigators "that security regulation for the carrying of items such as box cutters was not considered to be a flight risk and therefore would be allowed to pass by security."6

7

There were no FAA regulations prohibiting box cutters prior to September 11, 2001. James C. May, the President of the Air Transport Association of America, spoke to the 9/11 Commission regarding this issue. The system that was in place during the time of the attacks "was not designed to detect or prohibit" this item:

Let me be completely candid with regard to the reported role of box cutting devices in the attack. Under pre-9/11 FAA regulations only "knives with blades four inches long or longer and/or knives considered illegal under local law" were prohibited. Under a non-regulatory Checkpoint Operations Guide, developed by the FAA, the Regional Airline Association and the ATA, with FAA approval interpreting the FAA regulations, box cutting devices were considered a restricted item posing a potential danger. This meant that if such a device was identified, it could be kept off the aircraft. The FAA mandated metal-detection walk-through systems, however, were designed and tested to detect metallic items about the size of a small handgun or larger. The pre-9/11 screening system was not designed to detect or prohibit these types of small items, and we have no information indicating they were identified in the actual 9/11 screening of the terrorists.8

What is most important from this interview is what is not said. Although the subject of box cutters was broached by investigators, Mr. Baumgardner gave no indication that he had received information regarding a violent passenger taking off from Newark on a Continental Airlines flight, making use of a box-cutter prior to the hijackings. He was not alone.

In one of the 9/11 Commission's "MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD" documents, team members collected information from Robert "Bob" Coda, the Security Director at Newark International Airport during the time of the attacks.9 Mr. Coda, "was not aware of any pre-9/11 suspicious incidents…" Any FAA security related data that was provided to Mr. Coda, in the form of Security Directives (SDs) and Information Circulars (ICs) before the attacks, never mentioned that a man tried to gain access to a Continental Airlines cockpit, initiated violence when he was subdued, eventually threatening a flight attendant with a box cutter.

10

The 9/11 Commission received copies of Security Directives and Information Circulars that were in effect up until September 11, 2001, none of which mention the incident on Continental Airlines Flight 50.11

Peter Schurott, then FAA Supervisor of the Newark Civil Aviation Security Field Unit, had "direct contact" with Mr. Coda. In another "MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD" document he informed Commission investigators that there was no indication terrorists were active at Newark International Airport prior to the attacks.12

13

The FAA had not been notified of this event prior to attacks, since none of their Security Directives or Information Circulars mentioned anything "specific." Mr. Baumgardner, Continental Airlines' then Director of Security, was not made aware of any suspicious activity involving the use of box cutters; likewise for Mr. Coda, the Security Director for the airport. Mr. Schurott, the FAA Supervisor of the Newark Civil Aviation Security Field Unit, had not been notified of anything out of the ordinary.

If the people in charge of security for Newark International Airport had been properly notified of the events that transpired on Continental...