Tsebelis Veto Players

How Political Institutions Work
Course Book
ISBN: 978-1-4008-3145-6
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 344 Seiten

George Tsebelis is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is the author of Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics and coauthor of Bicameralism. The recipient of a Guggenheim Fellowship, a Hoover National Fellowship, and a Russell Sage Fellowship, he has published numerous papers on the institutions of the European Union and on comparative institutional analysis.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Tsebelis, George

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme

Inhaltsverzeichnis

List of Figures ix

List of Tables xi

Preface and Acknowledgments xiii

Introduction 1

PART I: VETO PLAYERS THEORY 17

One: Individual Veto Players 19

Two: Collective Veto Players 38

PART II: VETO PLAYERS AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 65

Three: Regimes: Nondemocratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary 67

Four: Governments and Parliaments 91

Five: Referendums 116

Six: Federalism, Bicameralism, and Qualified Majorities 136

PART III: POLICY EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS 161

Seven: Legislation 165

Eight: Macroeconomic Policies 187

PART IV: SYSTEMIC EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS 207

Nine: Government Stability 209

Ten: Judiciary and Bureaucracies 222

Eleven: Veto Players Analysis of European Union Institutions 248

Conclusion 283

Bibliography 291

Index 309

Über Autor(innen)

George Tsebelis is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is the author of Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics and coauthor of Bicameralism. The recipient of a Guggenheim Fellowship, a Hoover National Fellowship, and a Russell Sage Fellowship, he has published numerous papers on the institutions of the European Union and on comparative institutional analysis.