von Mouche / Quartieri Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games

Essays in Honour of Koji Okuguchi
1. Auflage 2016
ISBN: 978-3-319-29254-0
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 298 Seiten, eBook

Reihe: Springer Series in Game Theory

This state-of-the-art collection of papers on the theory of Cournotian competition focuses on two main subjects: oligopolistic Cournot competition and contests. The contributors present various applications of the Cournotian Equilibrium Theory, addressing topics such as equilibrium existence and uniqueness, equilibrium structure, dynamic processes, coalitional behavior and welfare. Special emphasis is placed on the aggregative nature of the games that are relevant to such theory. This contributed volume was written to celebrate the 80th birthday of Prof. Koji Okuguchi, a pioneer in oligopoly theory.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

von Mouche, Pierre

Quartieri, Federico

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Introduction.- On the Works of Professor Koji Okuguchi.- Cournot, a
Non-strategic Economist.-Cournot Tatonnement in Aggregative Games with Monotone
Best Responses.- Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Aggregative
Games: an Expository Treatment.- On the Geometric Structure of the Cournot
Equilibrium Set: the Case of Concave Industry Revenue and Convex Costs.- Pure
Strategy Equilibria in Finite Symmetric Concave Games and an Application to
Symmetric Discrete Cournot Games.- On a Discontinuous Cournot Oligopoly.-
Interpreting Markups in Spanish Manufacturing: the Exponential Model.-
Privatization Neutrality Theorem and Discriminatory Subsidy Policy.- Cournot
Oligopoly Theory for Simple Electricity Markets.- Kant-Nash Equilibria in a Quantity-Setting Oligopoly.-
Evolutionary
Oligopoly Models of Commercial Fishing with Heterogeneities.- Existence,
Uniqueness, and Comparative Statics in Contests.- Two-Group Contests with
Communication Within and Between Groups.- On the Nash Equilibrium of Asymmetric
Public-Good Contests.- Heterogeneity and Number of Players in Rent-Seeking,
Innovation, and Patent-Race Games.

Über Autor(innen)

Pierre von Mouche (1959) studied theoretical physics, mathematics and astronomy at the University of Nijmegen. He received his PhD in mathematics from the University of Utrecht under the supervision of Hans Duistermaat. Since 1989 he holds a position in economics at Wageningen University. His scientific interest include mathematical economics and in particular the equilibrium structure of games in strategic form.Federico Quartieri (1979) studied economics at the University of Florence. He received his PhD in economics from the University of Siena. Since 2014 he holds a position in mathematical economics at the University Federico II of Naples. His scientific interest include mathematical economics and game theory.