Handbook of Market Design

Erscheinungsjahr 2013
ISBN: 978-0-19-957051-5
Verlag: Oxford University Press(UK)

Buch, Englisch, 706 Seiten, Format (B × H): 175 mm x 250 mm, Gewicht: 1377 g

Economists often look at markets as given, and try to make predictions about who will do what and what will happen in these markets Market design, by contrast, does not take markets as given; instead, it combines insights from economic and game theory together with common sense and lessons learned from empirical work and experimental analysis to aid in the design and implementation of actual markets In recent years the field has grown dramatically, partially because of the successful wave of spectrum auctions in the US and in Europe, which have been designed by a number of prominent economists, and partially because of the increase use of the Internet as the platform over which markets are designed and run There is now a large number of applications and a growing theoretical literature.

The Handbook of Market Design brings together the latest research from leading experts to provide a comprehensive description of applied market design over the last two decades In particular, it surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as medical residents and hospitals, law clerks and judges, or patients and kidney donors It also examines a number of applications related to electronic markets, e-commerce, and the effect of the Internet on competition between exchanges

Autoren/Hrsg.

Vulkan, Nir

Roth, Alvin E.

Neeman, Zvika

Fachgebiete

• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Verhaltensökonomik
• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Operations Research Spieltheorie
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Wirtschaftstheorie, Wirtschaftsphilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- Introduction

- Part I: General Principles

- 1: Alvin E. Roth: What Have We Learned From Market Design?

- 2: Gary Bolton: Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior

- 3: Paul Klemperer: Using and Abusing Auction Theory

- Part II: Cases

- Section II.A: Matching Markets

- 4: Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Unver: Market Design for Kidney Exchange

- 5: Atila Abdulkadiroglu: School Choice

- 6: Aytek Erdil and Haluk Ergin: Improving Efficiency in School Choice

- 7: Sarbartha Bandyopadhyay, Fedor Iskhakov, Terence Johnson, Soohyung Lee, David McArthur, John Rust, Joel Watson, and John Watson: Can the Job Market for Economists be Improved?

- 8: Joshua Gans and Scott Stern: Designing Markets for Ideas

- 9: Ashok Rai and Tomas Sjöström: Redesigning Microcredit

- 10: Benjamin Edelman: The Design of Online Advertising Markets

- Section II.B: Auctions

- 11: Paul Klemperer: The Product-Mix Auction: a New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods

- 12: Paul Milgrom and Robert W. Day: Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions

- 13: Peter Cramton, Samuel Dinkin, and Robert Wilson: Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton's Ekati Diamonds

- Section II.C: E Commerce

- 14: Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth: Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior

- 15: Andrew Byde and Nir Vulkan: Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents

- 16: Tuomas Sandholm: Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting 60 Billion of Sourcing

- 17: Nir Vulkan and Chris Priest: Designing Automated Markets for Communication Bandwith

- Section II.D: Law Design

- 18: Zvika Neeman and Alon Klement: A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems

- 19: Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev, and Eric Talley: Legislation with Endogenous Preferences

- Part III: Experiments

- 20: Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Nathaniel Higgins, Erkut Ozbay, and Andrew Stocking: Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction

- 21: Uri Gneezy and Martin Dufwenberg: Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment

- 22: Elena Katok: Buyer Determined Procurement Auctions Experiments

- 23: Uri Gneezy and Ernan Haruvey: The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill

- Part IV: Competing Designs

- 24: Michael Peters: Competing Mechanisms

- 25: Zvika Neeman and Nir Vulkan: Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets

Über Autor(innen)

Alvin E. Roth was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics 2012 for his work on market design. He received his B.S. from Columbia University in 1971 and Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1974. He taught at the University of Illinois from 1974-82, at the University of Pittsburgh from 1982-98, at Harvard University from 1998-2012, and he now teaches at Stanford.

Nir Vulkan is an Economics Professor at the Said Business School and a Fellow of Worcester College, Oxford University. He has written many articles on market design and is author of 'The Economics of E- Commerce' (Princeton University Press, 2003). He has worked with many software and e-commerce companies designing markets mainly on the Internet, which are used by humans and software agents. His algorithms for automated trading have been used by hedge funds to trade futures in markets all over the world.

Zvika Neeman is a microeconomic and game theorist who specializes in mechanism design. He teaches at the Berglas School of Economics at Tel Aviv University. Prior to that, he held positions at Boston University and at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.