Walton Argumentation Methods for Artificial Intelligence in Law

1. Auflage 2005
ISBN: 978-3-540-27881-8
Verlag: Springer-Verlag
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 270 Seiten

During a recent visit to China to give an invited lecture on legal argumentation I was asked a question about conventional opinion in western countries. If legal r- soning is thought to be important by those both inside and outside the legal prof- sion, why does there appear to be so little attention given to the study of legal logic? This was a hard question to answer. I had to admit there were no large or well-established centers of legal logic in North America that I could recommend as places to study. Going through customs in Vancouver, the customs officer asked what I had been doing in China. I told him I had been a speaker at a conf- ence. He asked what the conference was on. I told him legal logic. He asked 1 whether there was such a thing. He was trying to be funny, but I thought he had a good point. People will question whether there is such a thing as “legal logic”, and some recent very prominent trials give the question some backing in the common opinion. But having thought over the question of why so little attention appears to be given to legal logic as a mainstream subject in western countries, I think I now have an answer. The answer is that we have been looking in the wrong place.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Walton, Douglas

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Contents;6
2;Introduction;9
3;Acknowledgements;14
4;Chapter 1: Informal Logic Methods for Law;16
4.1;1. Basics of Argument Diagramming;17
4.2;2. Araucaria;20
4.3;3. Legal Origins of Argument Diagramming;23
4.4;4. Argumentation Schemes;25
4.5;5. Enthymemes;29
4.6;6. Burden of Proof;31
4.7;7. Types of Dialogue;36
4.8;8. Commitment Operations in Dialogues;43
4.9;9. Legal and Everyday Argumentation;45
4.10;10. The Level of Difficulty of the Problems;46
5;Chapter 2: Generalizations in Legal Reasoning;50
5.1;1. The Necessity and Danger of Generalizations;51
5.2;2. The Fallacy of Hasty Generalization;54
5.3;3. Generalizations in Evidence Law;57
5.4;4. Argumentation Schemes;59
5.5;5. Analysis of the Cranberry Cask Case;63
5.6;6. Deductive and Inductive Generalizations;69
5.7;7. The Third Type of Generalization;71
5.8;8. Defeasible Generalizations and Arguments from Ignorance;78
5.9;9. Abstraction and the Defeasible Quantifier;82
5.10;10. Evaluating Argumentation Based on Generalizations;86
6;Chapter 3: Defeasible Reasoning in Dialogue Systems;90
6.1;1. Common Argumentation Schemes in Legal Evidence;91
6.2;2. Defeasible Arguments;93
6.3;3. Arguments Based on Case Comparison;98
6.4;4. Theories of Defeasible Reasoning;101
6.5;5. Computational Dialectics for Legal Argumentation;104
6.6;6. Formal Dialogue Systems;107
6.7;7. Lack of Knowledge Inferences;111
6.8;8. Other Argumentation Schemes in Evidence Law;118
6.9;9. Dialogue Conditions for Defeasible Arguments;123
6.10;10. The Dialectical Approach to Defeasible Arguments;125
7;Chapter 4: Relevance Determinations of Legal Evidence;130
7.1;1. Logical Relevance;131
7.2;2. Legal Relevance;132
7.3;3. Examples of Relevance Determinations;135
7.4;4. Determination of Relevance by Argument Extrapolation;140
7.5;5. Probative Weight and Enthymemes;144
7.6;6. Conditional Relevance;147
7.7;7. Summary of the Method;152
7.8;8. The Problem of Diagnosing Fallacies of Relevance;153
7.9;9. Legal Relevance as a Procedural Concept;156
8;Chapter 5: Methods Applied to Problems of Evidence;158
8.1;1. Case-Based Reasoning;159
8.2;2. Argument Diagramming and Case-Based Reasoning;162
8.3;3. Witness Testimony as Evidence;165
8.4;4. Examination;167
8.5;5. Circumstantial Evidence;172
8.6;6. Abductive Reasoning;174
8.7;7. Forensic Evidence;177
8.8;8. Character Evidence;182
8.9;9. Evaluation of Evidence;184
9;Chapter 6: Dialectical Explanation in AI;187
9.1;1. Systems for Explanation in Computing;188
9.2;2. Philosophical Views of Explanation;192
9.3;3. A Review of the Logic of Generalizations;197
9.4;4. Logical and Pragmatic Aspects of an Explanation;200
9.5;5. Explanation and Argument;206
9.6;6. The Pragmatics of Explanation;209
9.7;7. Evaluating Explanations as Better or Best;213
9.8;8. Different Kinds of Understanding;216
9.9;9. Understanding and the Clarifying Function;219
9.10;10. Main Features of the New Dialectical Model;222
10;Chapter 7: Argument Invention for Proof Preparation;227
10.1;1. Argument Invention as a Search Process;228
10.2;2. An Easy Case of Argument Invention;232
10.3;3. The Breach of Contract Case;236
10.4;4. Relevance and Invention;239
10.5;5. Building a Method of Argument Invention;244
10.6;6. Classifying and Formalizing Schemes;247
10.7;7. Studying Causal Schemes;250
10.8;8. Ten Components of Legal Argumentation;254
10.9;9. Future Problems for Research;256
10.10;10. A Procedural Model of Legal Argumentation;258
11;References;263
12;Index;274