E-Book, Englisch, Band 606, 135 Seiten
Widekind Evolution of Non-Expected Utility Preferences
2008
ISBN: 978-3-540-76845-6
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
E-Book, Englisch, Band 606, 135 Seiten
Reihe: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
ISBN: 978-3-540-76845-6
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
The theory on the evolution of preferences deals with the endogenous formation of preference relations in strategic situations. It is related to the field of evolutionary game theory. In this book we analyze the role and the influence of general, possibly non-expected utility preferences in such an evolutionary setup. In particular, we demonstrate that preferences which diverge from von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility may potentially prove to be successful under evolutionary pressures.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Preface;6
2;Contents;8
3;1 Introduction;10
4;2 The Model and a General Existence Result;19
4.1;2.1 Preliminaries;20
4.2;2.2 Interaction, Fitness and Individual Preferences;25
4.3;2.3 Matching Process and Evolutionary Fitness;30
4.4;2.4 Stability Concept and E.cient Strategies;33
4.5;2.5 A General Existence Result for Stable Populations;37
5;3 Examples: Properties of the Model;38
5.1;3.1 The ‘Classic’ Prisoner’s Dilemma;38
5.2;3.2 Coordination Games;40
5.3;3.3 Rank-Dependent Expected Utility Theory;41
6;4 Evolutionary Extinction of Expected Utility Preferences;44
6.1;4.1 A Disfavor Result for Expected Utility Preferences;45
6.2;4.2 Potential Stable Populations;46
6.3;4.3 An Anti-Coordination Game;48
7;5 Evolution with More Sophisticated Types;54
7.1;5.1 The Restricted Type Space;55
7.2;5.2 Existence in the 2 × 2 Case;60
8;6 A Model with Two Populations;65
8.1;6.1 Two-Population Stability;66
8.2;6.2 An Outlook with Some Illustrative Examples;69
8.3;6.3 Asymmetric Contests;78
9;7 Conclusions;80
10;A Proofs for Chapter 2;83
10.1;A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.21;83
10.2;A.2 Proof of Theorem 2.22;87
11;B Proofs for Chapter 4;90
11.1;B.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1;90
11.2;B.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2;96
12;C Proofs for Chapter 5;104
12.1;C.1 Proof of Proposition 5.11;104
12.2;C.2 Proof of Theorem 5.12;107
12.3;C.3 Proof of Lemma 5.13;108
12.4;C.4 Proof of Lemma 5.14;110
12.5;C.5 Proof of Lemma 5.16;114
13;References;130
