Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning

Towards a Social Conception of Mind
1. Auflage 2002
ISBN: 978-0-415-28756-2
Verlag: Taylor & Francis Ltd (Sales)

Buch, Englisch, 334 Seiten, Format (B × H): 139 mm x 215 mm, Gewicht: 435 g

Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning offers a provocative re-reading of Wittgenstein's later writings on language and mind, and explores the tensions between Wittgenstein's ideas and contemporary cognitivist conceptions of the mental. This book addresses both Wittgenstein's later works as well as contemporary issues in philosophy of mind. It provides fresh insight into the later Wittgenstein and raises vital questions about the foundations of cognitivism and its wider implications for psychology and cognitive science.

Zielgruppe

Postgraduate

Autoren/Hrsg.

Williams, Meredith

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Analytische Philosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Introduction. Part 1. Against the philosophic tradition 1. Wittgenstein on representations, privileged objects, and private languages 2. Private states and public practices: Wittgenstein and Schutz on intentionalty 3. Wittgenstein, Kant, and the "metaphysics of experience" 4. Language learning and the representational theory of mind Postscript to Chapter 4 5.Social norms and narrow content Part 2. A new direction 6. Rules, community, and the individual 7. The philosophical significance of learning in the later Wittgenstein 8. The etiology of the obvious:Wittgenstein and the elimination of indeterminacy 9.Wittgenstein's rejection of scientific psychology 10. Vygotsky's social theory of mind notes bibliography index of quotations index

Über Autor(innen)

Meredith Williams is Professor of Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University.