Wolfe / Gal The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge

Embodied Empiricism in Early Modern Science
2010
ISBN: 978-90-481-3686-5
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 25, 350 Seiten

Reihe: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

It was in 1660s England, according to the received view, in the Royal Society of London, that science acquired the form of empirical enquiry we recognize as our own: an open, collaborative experimental practice, mediated by specially-designed instruments, supported by civil discourse, stressing accuracy and replicability. Guided by the philosophy of Francis Bacon, by Protestant ideas of this worldly benevolence, by gentlemanly codes of decorum and by a dominant interest in mechanics and the mechanical structure of the universe, the members of the Royal Society created a novel experimental practice that superseded former modes of empirical inquiry, from Aristotelian observations to alchemical experimentation.

This volume focuses on the development of empiricism as an interest in the body – as both the object of research and the subject of experience. Re-embodying empiricism shifts the focus of interest to the ‘life sciences’; medicine, physiology, natural history. In fact, manyof the active members of the Royal Society were physicians, and a significant number of those, disciples of William Harvey and through him, inheritors of the empirical anatomy practices developed in Padua during the 16 century. Indeed, the primary research interests of the early Royal Society were concentrated on the body, human and animal, and its functions much more than on mechanics. Similarly, the Académie des Sciences directly contradicted its self-imposed mandate to investigate Nature in mechanistic fashion, devoting a significant portion of its Mémoires to questions concerning life, reproduction and monsters, consulting empirical botanists, apothecaries and chemists, and keeping closer to experience than to the Cartesian standards of well-founded knowledge.

These highlighted empirical studies of the body, were central in a workshop in the beginning of 2009 organized by the unit for History and Philosophy of Science in Sydney. The papers that were presented bysome of the leading figures in this area are presented in this volume.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Wolfe, Charles T.

Gal, Ofer

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge;2
1.1;Title Page;4
1.2;Copyright Page;5
1.3;Contents;6
1.4;Contributors;8
1.5;Embodied Empiricism;12
1.5.1;Introduction;12
1.5.2;References;16
1.5.3.1.1;Victories for Empiricism, Failures for Theory: Medicine and Science in the Seventeenth Century;18
1.5.3.1.1.1;References;37
1.5.3.1.2;Practical Experience in Anatomy;42
1.5.3.1.2.1;1 Introduction;42
1.5.3.1.2.2;2 Natural Philosophical Anatomy, Practical Anatomy ;47
1.5.3.1.2.3;3 Learned Surgery Returns from Exile?;53
1.5.3.1.2.4;4 ‘Class-Consciousness’ and the Venues of Anatomical Inquiry;59
1.5.3.1.2.5;5 Conclusion;62
1.5.3.1.2.6;References;64
1.5.3.1.3;Early Modern Empiricism and the Discourse of the Senses;67
1.5.3.1.3.1;1 Introduction;67
1.5.3.1.3.2;2 Five Texts;68
1.5.3.1.3.2.1;2.1 On Experience: Eden’s A Treatise of the New India (1553);68
1.5.3.1.3.2.2;2.2 On Observation: William Cuningham’s The Cosmographical Glasse (1559);69
1.5.3.1.3.2.3;2.3 On the Senses: George Chapman’s Ovids Banquet of Sence (1595);71
1.5.3.1.3.2.4;2.4 On the Senses: Middleton’s The Triumphs of Truth (1613);73
1.5.3.1.3.2.5;2.5 On Language, Reason and the Senses: Thomas Tomkis’ Lingua (1607);76
1.5.3.1.3.3;3 The Discourse of the Senses and William Harvey’s Idea of Empiricism;79
1.5.3.1.3.4;References;82
1.5.3.1.4;Alkahest and Fire: Debating Matter, Chymistry, and Natural History at the Early Parisian Academy of Sciences;83
1.5.3.1.4.1;1 Introduction;83
1.5.3.1.4.2;2 Duclos’ Chymical Natural History of Plants;86
1.5.3.1.4.3;3 Dodart Enters the Arena: Natural History by Fire;92
1.5.3.1.4.4;4 “We Must Stay Within These Limits”: Empiricism ;95
1.5.3.1.4.5;References;98
1.5.3.1.5;John Locke and Helmontian Medicine;101
1.5.3.1.5.1;1 Introduction;101
1.5.3.1.5.2;2 Medicine in England in the 1660s;102
1.5.3.1.5.3;3 Methodology;104
1.5.3.1.5.4;4 Chymistry;106
1.5.3.1.5.4.1;4.1 Locke and Mercurialist Chymistry;106
1.5.3.1.5.4.2;4.2 Locke and Helmontian Chymistry;113
1.5.3.1.5.5;5 Nosology and Therapeutics;116
1.5.3.1.5.6;6 Physiology;118
1.5.3.1.5.7;7 Conclusion;121
1.5.3.1.5.8;References;123
1.5.4;Part II;126
1.5.4.1;The Body as Instrument;126
1.5.4.1.1;Empiricism Without the Senses: How the Instrument Replaced the Eye;127
1.5.4.1.1.1;1 Introduction;127
1.5.4.1.1.2;2 Galileo: An Instrument for an Eye;128
1.5.4.1.1.3;3 Looking at the Sun;136
1.5.4.1.1.4;4 Kepler: the Eye as an Instrument;140
1.5.4.1.1.5;5 Epistemological Considerations;144
1.5.4.1.1.6;6 The Eye of the Mind;147
1.5.4.1.1.7;7 Conclusion: The Price;149
1.5.4.1.1.8;References;151
1.5.4.1.2;Mastering the Appetites of Matter. Francis Bacon’s Sylva Sylvarum;154
1.5.4.1.2.1;1 Introduction;155
1.5.4.1.2.2;2 A Physics of Material Appetites;156
1.5.4.1.2.3;3 Experimental Practice and Discipline of the Appetites;162
1.5.4.1.2.4;4 Conclusion;168
1.5.4.1.2.5;References;172
1.5.4.1.3;‘A Corporall Philosophy’: Language and ‘Body-Making’ in the Work of John Bulwer (1606-1656);173
1.5.4.1.3.1;1 Introduction;174
1.5.4.1.3.2;2 ‘The Hand’ as Extended Mind;175
1.5.4.1.3.3;3 Foolish Bravery;178
1.5.4.1.3.4;4 Bulwer’s Stoic Anthropopoeia;183
1.5.4.1.3.5;5 Conclusion;186
1.5.4.1.3.6;References;187
1.5.4.1.4;Memory and Empirical Information: Samuel Hartlib, John Beale and Robert Boyle;188
1.5.4.1.4.1;1 Introduction;189
1.5.4.1.4.2;2 Samuel Hartlib and His Circle;191
1.5.4.1.4.3;3 Improving Memory, Enlarging Experience: Boyle’s Early Writings;197
1.5.4.1.4.4;4 Advice to Boyle;201
1.5.4.1.4.5;5 Conclusion;208
1.5.4.1.4.6;References;210
1.5.4.1.5;Lamarck on Feelings: From Worms to Humans;214
1.5.4.1.5.1;1 Introduction;215
1.5.4.1.5.2;2 Sentimens;218
1.5.4.1.5.3;3 “Sentiment Intérieur”;231
1.5.4.1.5.4;References;238
1.5.5;Part III;243
1.5.5.1;Embodied Minds;243
1.5.5.2;Carelessness and Inattention: Mind-Wandering and the Physiology of Fantasy from Locke to Hume;244
1.5.5.2.1;1 The Restless Mind;244
1.5.5.2.2;2 Carelessness and In-Attention;249
1.5.5.2.3;3 Pinnioning the Imagination;251
1.5.5.2.4;4 Conveying the Mischief: Body Fluids and Openness to Influence;254
1.5.5.2.5;5 Surpriz’d by Habit: Control and Error in Moral Physiology;257
1.5.5.2.6;6 Remedies for Reveries;259
1.5.5.2.7;References;261
1.5.5.3;Instrumental or Immersed Experience: Pleasure, Pain and Object Perception in Locke;265
1.5.5.3.1;1 Introduction;265
1.5.5.3.2;2 Locke’s Account of Sensation as Fitted to our Surroundings;266
1.5.5.3.3;3 Pleasure and Pain in Locke’s Account of Our Simple Ideas of Sensation;270
1.5.5.3.4;4 Pleasure and Pain and Our Ideas of Particular Substances;274
1.5.5.3.5;5 Resolving the Tensions in Locke: a Brief Overview of Empiricist Responses;278
1.5.5.3.5.1;5.1 Berkeley;278
1.5.5.3.5.2;5.2 Condillac;280
1.5.5.3.6;6 Locke’s Mixed Mind: Possible Explanations;283
1.5.5.3.7;References;284
3.1;Empiricism and Its Roots in the Ancient Medical Tradition;286
3.1.1;1 Introduction;286
3.1.2;2 The Kantian Turn;288
3.1.3;3 Empiricism à la Galen;290
3.1.4;4 Empiricism cum Scepticism;296
3.1.5;5 Perception of Empiricism and Scepticism;299
3.1.6;6 Kant’s Concept of Empiricism Revised;304
3.1.7;References;306
4.1;Embodied Stimuli: Bonnet’s Statue of a Sensitive Agent;308
4.1.1;1 Introduction;308
4.1.2;2 Bonnet’s Œconomy of Fibres of Organized Bodies;310
4.1.3;3 Organized Fibre Bodies and the Soul-Body-Interface;316
4.1.4;4 Concluding Remarks;326
4.1.5;References;328
5.1;Empiricist Heresies in Early Modern Medical Thought;331
5.1.1;References;340

Leseproben

" (S. 1-2)

Charles T. Wolfe and Ofer Gal

Introduction

It was in 1660s England, according to the received view, in the meetings of the Royal Society of London, that science acquired the form of empirical enquiry that we recognize as our own: an open, collaborative experimental practice, mediated by specially-designed instruments, supported by civil, critical discourse, stressing accuracy and replicability.

Guided by the philosophy of Francis Bacon, by Protestant ideas of this-worldly benevolence, by gentlemanly codes of decorum and integrity and by a dominant interest in mechanics and a conviction in the mechanical structure of the universe, the members of the Royal Society created a novel experimental practice that superseded all former modes of empirical inquiry – from Aristotelian observations to alchemical experimentation. It is enlightening to consider that this view is imparted by both the gentlemen of the Royal Society, in their official self-presentations, and by much of the most iconoclastic historiography of our time.

Lines like “Boyle’s example … was mobilized to give legitimacy to the experimental philosophy,”1 are strongly reminiscent of Bishop Sprat’s 1667 eulogy of the “Lord Bacon in whose Books there are everywhere scattered the best arguments for the defence of experimental philosophy; and the best directions, needful to promote it.”2 One reason for the surprising agreement is that this picture of openness, benevolence and civility does capture some of the moral-epistemological mores of the empiricism of the New Science, but this very agreement of historians and apologists also harbors a paradox. In interpreting the emergence and modi operandi of early modern empiricism through the writings of its public champions, we are attending to the rhetoric which supported the new empirical practices – practices that aspired and promised to replace rhetoric.

This paradox in the way historians of science approached empiricism is compounded by a similar paradox in the way it is studied by historians of philosophy. Here, it was a theory that received the title ‘empiricism’ – a particular speculative account of the way human individuals acquire their knowledge of the surrounding world. It is yet more obvious in the modern interpretation of this theory, which is completely disinterested in empirical practices. This interpretation of empiricism put at its center an ahistorical, disembodied, isolated ‘mind’ – quite the opposite of what the savants of the New Science were experiencing or advocating.

Recent scholarship has done much to undo these paradoxes. We know much more about the array of practices of producing and marshalling experience that the New Science benefited from and was instrumental in developing: sophisticated experimentation, instrument-supported observation, astronomical navigation, surveying and mapping, collection and taxonomy. We are also much more familiar with the cultural context in which these were developed: commerce and seafaring, court and city, counter-reformation and education reform.

Yet we are still far from a comprehensive view of the arena in which practitioners of various empirical traditions were learning from and competing with those of other traditions for epistemological primacy; in which new empirical practices were being formed as reliable ways of creating and validating knowledge; and in which philosophical reflection and public argumentation sought to legitimize and institutionalize new and reformed empirical habits."