Wu Strategic Aspects of Oligopolistic Vertical Integration

1. Auflage 2017
ISBN: 978-1-4832-9616-6
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 242 Seiten, Web PDF

Reihe: Studies in Mathematical and Managerial Economics

In this text some fundamental issues concerning the strategic impact of vertical structures of firms are discussed in a successive oligopoly model. Vertical integration strategy has been identified as one of the key strategies which determine the success or failure of enterprises. Many studies on vertical integration are based on business experiences and interviews with managers. However, the extensive application of game theory in business economics allows this study on vertical integration to be based on sound theoretic ground. Moreover, the significance of public enterprises in some Western European economies and the trends of economic transition in Eastern Europe justify the efforts to analyse vertical integration issues in the mixed market, which is created by the participation of a public firm into an industry otherwise characterised as a successive oligopoly.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Wu, C.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Strategic Aspects of Oligopolistic Vertical Integration;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;10
5;Preface;6
6;List of Figures;14
7;List of Tables;15
8;Lists of Symbols;16
9;INTRODUCTION;18
9.1;1. The subject and objectives of the research;18
9.2;2. Refinement of concepts;21
9.3;3. The state of the art;26
9.4;4. The research outline;37
9.5;5. The methodology;40
10;PART I: OLIGOPOLISTIC VERTICAL INTEGRATION WITH SYMMETRIC OBJECTIVES;44
10.1;Chapter 1. Vertical Integration in a Successive Duopoly with Fixed Proportions of Inputs;46
10.1.1;1. Introduction;46
10.1.2;2. A basic successive duopoly model;46
10.1.3;3. The analytical framework;48
10.1.4;4. Some preliminary results;66
10.1.5;5. Conclusions;75
10.2;Chapter 2. Vertical Integration in a Cournot Successive Oligopoly;76
10.2.1;1. Introduction;76
10.2.2;2. Horizontal market structure and generic vertical industrial structures;77
10.2.3;3. The degree of vertical integration and equilibria in mixed integration games;88
10.2.4;4. Profit incentives and endogeneity of vertical industrial structure;104
10.2.5;5. Conclusions;115
10.3;Chapter 3. Vertical Integration in a Differentiated Duopoly;118
10.3.1;1. A model of successive Cournot duopoly with product differentiation;118
10.3.2;2. Equilibrium analysis;120
10.3.3;3. Product differentiation and equilibrium vertical structure;126
10.3.4;4. Conclusions;134
10.4;Chapter 4. Vertical Integration in a Successive Oligopoly with Variable Proportions of Intermediate Inputs;136
10.4.1;1. Introduction;136
10.4.2;2. A basic framework;137
10.4.3;3. Equilibrium analysis;139
10.4.4;4. Pre-integration vertical structure and the consequence of vertical integration;149
10.4.5;5. Conclusions;154
10.4.6;Appendix 4.1: Derivation of the derived demand elasticity in the supply contracts game;157
11;PART II: OLIGOPOLISTIC VERTICAL INTEGRATION WITH ASYMMETRIC OBJECTIVES;160
11.1;Chapter 5. Vertical Integration in a Successive Oligopoly with Asymmetric Objectives;162
11.1.1;1. Introduction;162
11.1.2;2. A model of mixed successive oligopoly;163
11.1.3;3. Equilibrium analysis;170
11.1.4;4. Major findings;201
11.1.5;5. Conclusions;223
11.2;GENERAL CONCLUSIONS;226
12;References;232
13;Index;242