Aiginger / Finsinger Applied Industrial Organization

Towards a Theory-Based Empirical Industrial Organization
1994
ISBN: 978-94-017-6395-0
Verlag: Springer Netherland
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 250 Seiten, eBook

offers a perspective on the richness of empirical industrial organization studies. Some papers derive empirical implications from theoretical models, but other papers start from empirical evidence and construct a theory. Three major topics are explored: the role of innovation, the evolution of market structure and firms, and the determinations of performance. As the central force of market economies, innovation is the essence of competition and results in changes to market structures. Other forces driving the evolution of markets and firms are also analyzed. Finally, the determinants of profitability are investigated. In particular, characteristics such as price flexibility, successful lenders and monopoly regulation are examined.
Contributors include F.M. Scherer, Paul Geroski, John Hey, David Audretsch, Manfred Neumann, among others.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Aiginger, Karl

Finsinger, Jörg

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Introduction. 1: The Role of Innovation. Lagging Productivity Growth: Measurement, Technology and Shock Effects; Innovation, Profitability and Growth over the Business Cycle; Empirical Evidence on Schumpeterian Hypotheses in Austria; New Experiments in Industrial Organisation; 2: The Evolution of Markets and Firms. Entry, Growth, and Survival: the New Learning on Firm Selection and Industry Evolution; Innovation and Evolution as a Dynamic Game with Rational Behaviour; The Division of Labour and Market Structure; The Evolution of the Vertically Integrated Firm: a Transaction Cost Analysis; 3: Determinants of Performance. Why Did UK Manufacturing Profitability Rise Over the 1980s? Collusion, Concentration and Profits; Structure-Performance in Banking: an Application to a Typical Universal Banking System; Market Structure and Pricing Behaviour in Austrian Manufacturing; Portfolio Choice, Transactions Costs and Monopoly Power; Private and Public Sector Regulation of Competitively Tendered Contracts; On the Scope of Indirect Regulation of Monopolies in the Presence of Large Entry Cost;