Aviation System Risks and Safety

1. Auflage 2019
ISBN: 978-981-13-8122-5
Verlag: Springer Nature Singapore
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 186 Seiten

Reihe: Springer Aerospace Technology

This book provides a solution to 'rare event' problems without using the classical theory of reliability and theory of probability. This solution is based on the methodology of risk assessment as 'measure of danger' (in keeping with the ICS RAS) and an expert approach to determining systems' safety indications using Fuzzy Sets methods. Further, the book puts forward a new concept: 'Reliability, Risks, and Safety' (RRS).  The book's main goal is to generalize present results and underscore the need to develop an alternative approach to safety level assessment and risk management for technical (aviation) systems in terms of Fuzzy Sets objects, in addition to traditional probabilistic safety analysis (PSA). The concept it proposes incorporates ICAO recommendations regarding proactive system control and the system's responses to various internal and external disturbances. 

Kuklev E.A., Professor, Doctor of Technical Sciences, was born in 1934; and graduated from the Kazan Aviation Institute (majoring in 'aircraft construction'). He is an Honored Worker of the Higher School of Russia, Laureate of the commemorative medal of the Vietnamese People's Republic (2018) for his services in the preparation of scientific aviation personnel (candidates of Technical Sciences) and for the implementation of scientific and technical projects for civil aviation in Vietnam, Head of the Mechanics department of St. Petersburg State University, and Director of the Center for Expertise and Scientific Support of Projects in St. Petersburg State University. Earlier, he was the vice-rector for research in St. Petersburg State University of Civil Aviation. He is the author of more than 300 scientific papers and inventions in the aviation field, including those for development of air transport standards, with activity management standards for transportation of goods on the external load suspension of helicopters in the interaction of helicopter groups based on ICAO requirements.  Shapkin V.S., Professor, Doctor of Technical Sciences, graduated from Moscow Institute of Civil Aviation Engineers (1984). He is a Laureate of the Russian Federation Government Prize in Science and Technology, an Honored Transport Worker of the Russian Federation, and Director General of FSUE State Research Institute of Civil Aviation (FSUE GosNII GA). He is also an Expert of the Federal Air Transport Agency, Federal Service on supervision in the sphere of transport of the Russian Ministry of Transport, and the Interstate Aviation Committee. His area of specialisation includes air transport and aircraft strength. He is also the author of more than 200 scientific works. Filippov V.L., Acting General Director of FSUE State Research Institute of Civil Aviation, Actual State Councillor of Russian Federation, graduated from Syzran Air Force Aviation School, Gagarin Air Force Academy. He is a specialist in aeronautical activity and a Class 1 military pilot.
Shatrakov Y.G., Professor, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Honored Science Worker of Russia, RATS full member, graduated from Leningrad Institute of Aviation Instrumentation and Leningrad University (Physics and Mathematics Faculty). He defended his thesis in 1966. He published more 400 monographs and textbooks on radio navigation, radiolocation, production organization. He prepared more than 100 candidates and doctors of science as a scientific adviser and scientific consultant. Scientific directions founded under the guidance of Y.G. Shatrakov are as follows: relative radio navigation; increased noise immunity of angle measuring systems due to suppression of correlation errors and interference; secondary radiolocation by individual numbers; reduction of labor intensity in the production of radio electronic products due to the introduction of flexible automated productions. He is the author including 30 patents for inventions in the field of radio technical systems; scientific supervisor of international projects for the creation of the MLS with Thomson-CSF (1980-1988), with US enterprises for the creation of joint LRNSs (long-range radio technical navigation systems) (Tropic-Loran) (1984), chief designer of on-board antenna-feed systems; founder of the correlation interference theory in aviation radio technical complexes and systems.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Preface;6
1.1;References;9
2;About This Book;10
3;Introduction;11
3.1;References;9
4;Contents;14
5;Abbreviations;22
6;1 Assessing the System Safety Using Reliability Theory and PSA Methods;24
6.1;1.1 Formation of Methods for Ensuring Reliability and Safety of Equipment as Quality Characteristics;24
6.2;1.2 Basic States of Facilities in the Reliability and Safety Analysis;25
6.3;1.3 Interrelationship Between the Categories of Reliability, Efficiency, and Safety of Complex Technical Systems in the Classical Reliability Theory;29
6.4;1.4 Structurally Complex Diagrams of the Technical System and Minimal Cut Sets of Failures;30
6.4.1;1.4.1 Methods for Assessing Reliability and Quality of Systems;30
6.4.2;1.4.2 Constructing a “Failure Tree”;31
6.5;1.5 Basic Principles of Ensuring Safety of Technical Systems Based on the Classical RT Methods;32
6.5.1;1.5.1 Use of Safety Barriers to Ensure Safety of Potentially Hazardous Facilities;32
6.5.2;1.5.2 Place and Role of Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) in the RT;33
6.5.3;1.5.3 Identification of Risk Factors;33
6.5.4;1.5.4 International Standards in the Field of Safety Analysis and Evaluation (PSA) and Comments on Discrepancies in Language;33
6.5.5;1.5.5 Identification of Main Tasks of Probabilistic Safety Analysis;34
6.6;1.6 Analysis of Emergency Sequences When Assessing the Safety Level of Systems Using the PSA Method in the RT;37
6.6.1;1.6.1 Construction of “Event Trees” in the RT;37
6.6.2;1.6.2 Calculation of Risks in the RT as the Probability of Occurrence of a Negative Event;37
6.6.3;1.6.3 Analysis of the Results of Risk Calculation in the PSA Method;37
6.7;1.7 Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA);38
6.7.1;1.7.1 General Provisions of Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis for System Element Failures;38
6.7.2;1.7.2 Effect of the Failure Criticality on the Safety State of the System Processes;40
6.7.3;1.7.3 Examples of Known Catastrophes;40
6.8;1.8 Conclusions;41
6.9;References;42
7;2 New Doctrine “Reliability, Risk, Safety” for System Safety (Flight Safety) Assessment on The Basis of the Fuzzy Sets Approach;44
7.1;2.1 New Doctrine for Assessing Safety of Structurally Complex Aviation Technical Systems Using Fuzzy Subsets;44
7.2;2.2 Multicriteria Estimation of the Complex Quality Index on the Tuple of Parameters;45
7.2.1;2.2.1 Multicriteria Index and Alternative Methods;45
7.2.2;2.2.2 Main RRS General Provisions;46
7.2.3;2.2.3 General Methodical RRS Recommendations on the Development of Tools for Assessing Risks in Systems as “Measure of Hazard”;47
7.2.4;2.2.4 The Main Problems of the Classical RT;49
7.2.5;2.2.5 Possible Ways of Assessing System Safety Indicators with Risk-Based Methods;49
7.2.6;2.2.6 Relation of Some Parameters from RT and SF into SST;51
7.3;2.3 Generalized RT and SST Provisions in the RRS;54
7.3.1;2.3.1 Interpretations of the Initial Concepts of Risk on the Basis of the Games Theory (Differences in the Classical RT and SST Concepts);56
7.3.2;2.3.2 Mathematical Basis of Risk Models as a “Risk Measure” (According to the RAS);57
7.4;2.4 Mathematical Basis for the Definition of a Risk Event and an Integral Measure of Risk in the Probability Space;58
7.5;2.5 PSA and SST Safety (“Hazard”) and “Risk” Models;60
7.6;2.6 Comparison of RT and SST Quality and Safety Indicators;62
7.6.1;2.6.1 Estimation of Errors in the Experimental Determination of the Probability;62
7.6.2;2.6.2 Two-Dimensional Estimate of Risk Significance of an “Amount of Hazard”;64
7.7;2.7 Decision-Making Regarding Risks and Chances in Monitoring and Ensuring Safety in Civil Aviation;65
7.8;2.8 Baseline of the RT to SST Transition with “Fuzzy Subsets” of RT Events Such as Functional Failures;67
7.9;2.9 Possible Ways for Assessing the Safety Performance of Systems Based on the ICAO Methodology for Calculating Risks (Annex 19);67
7.9.1;2.9.1 Area of Implementation and Standardization of the SST and RRS Provisions;70
7.9.2;2.9.2 Methodical Recommendations on the Applicability of RRS Provisions in SMSs;71
7.9.3;2.9.3 On the Applicability of the NASA (ICAO) Formula for the Definition of RMS Values for Random Variables;72
7.10;2.10 Conclusions;73
7.11;References;73
8;3 Solving the Rare Events Problem with the Fuzzy Sets Method;77
8.1;3.1 Axiomatics of Risk Models;77
8.1.1;3.1.1 Principle of a Fuzzy Implication in the Analysis of Fuzzy Statements;78
8.1.2;3.1.2 Formula and Definition of Risk Significance;79
8.2;3.2 Application of the Concept of Probability Spaces of the System Safety Theory in Fuzzy Risk Models;81
8.3;3.3 Assessing Significance of Risks in a Probability Space;82
8.4;3.4 Interpretations of Fuzziness for Subsets of Factors in Risk Analysis Procedures Based on ICAO Recommendations (from SMM-Doc 9859);83
8.4.1;3.4.1 Effects of Pdf Fuzziness on Risk Indicators;83
8.4.2;3.4.2 Processes with Type 1 Pdfs (“Hard Tails” Type);85
8.4.3;3.4.3 Type 2 Pdf with “Fuzziness” of the Pdf Function;86
8.4.4;3.4.4 Uncertainty of Pdf and Prdf in the NASA Experimental Results;87
8.5;3.5 Transition to Fuzzy Sets from the “Boolean Lattice” in the RT;89
8.5.1;3.5.1 Initial Conditions;89
8.5.2;3.5.2 Solving the Problem of the SST Transition from the Boolean Lattice to the Fuzzy Sets;90
8.6;3.6 General Scheme for Constructing Fuzzy Risk Models in ATSs;91
8.7;3.7 Analysis of the Basic RT Provisions Determined by the Hypothesis of the Existence of a “Hypercube” of Truth for Objects from Clear Sets;92
8.8;3.8 Basic Provisions of System Models in Fuzzy Sets;93
8.9;3.9 Algebra of the Events Logic in Catastrophic Scenarios;94
8.9.1;3.9.1 General Provisions Determining the Nature of Catastrophes;94
8.9.2;3.9.2 Use of Logical Algebra Functions (LAFs) for Evaluating the System Operability in the Reliability Theory (RT) and in the SST for the Construction of J. Reason Chains;95
8.10;3.10 Positions of the Classical Reliability Theory Based on the Hypercube of Truth;99
8.10.1;3.10.1 Universal Method for Formulation of the Classical Reliability Theory Fundamentals Using the Fuzzy Sets Positions;99
8.10.2;3.10.2 Initial Hypotheses of the Classical RT Defined on the Hypercube of Truth (on Boolean Lattice);100
8.11;3.11 Determination of Paths to a Catastrophe Using the “Hypercube of Truth” Model for Values of the State of Physical Elements of the System from the Universal Set;101
8.11.1;3.11.1 Nature of the RT Postulates on the Independence of the Change in the State of Physical Elements of the System;101
8.11.2;3.11.2 Logical Equation of a “Catastrophe” (According to I. Ryabinin) for Events from Clear or Fuzzy Subsets;102
8.11.3;3.11.3 Concept of Constructing J. Reason Chains in Fuzzy Subsets of States in the SST Using the FMEA and CATS Approaches;103
8.11.4;3.11.4 CATS Concept (ICAO—“Netherlands”);104
8.12;3.12 Formalized Models for Assessing Reliability and Safety of Systems with Discrete States;104
8.12.1;3.12.1 Initial Definitions of the S System;105
8.12.2;3.12.2 Functional Worthiness and Risks of Accident Occurrence in ATSs;106
8.12.3;3.12.3 Classification of Risk Events in the Space of Discrete States;107
8.13;3.13 Classifier of Risk Event Uncertainty Types;108
8.13.1;3.13.1 Definitions in the Uncertainty of Risk Events;108
8.13.2;3.13.2 Types of Information Uncertainty in SMSs;109
8.13.3;3.13.3 New Principles of Constructing SMSs in the Fuzzy Sets Class;111
8.13.4;3.13.4 General Scheme of Risk Identification in SMSs (with Fuzzy Sets);112
8.13.5;3.13.5 Weighting Risks and Chances;112
8.13.6;3.13.6 Classifier of Information Uncertainty Types;114
8.13.7;3.13.7 Definitions and Principles of Constructing SMSs Based on Risk Calculation Models;116
8.14;3.14 Conclusions;118
8.15;References;119
9;4 Structure and Principles of Constructing the SMSs to Provide and Monitor System Safety Based on the RRS Risk Management Doctrine;122
9.1;4.1 Standard International Requirements to the SMS Structure;122
9.1.1;4.1.1 Key Definitions and Purpose of the SMS;122
9.1.2;4.1.2 Integrated “SMS–QMS” Modules (“Blue Folder”);123
9.1.3;4.1.3 Main SMS Functions Recommended in Annex 19;124
9.2;4.2 Prediction of the Safety Level in the SMS for Complex Aviation Systems Using Risk Models for Critical Functional Failures;125
9.2.1;4.2.1 Triad of Management Actions in the SMS;125
9.2.2;4.2.2 Definition of Threats and Risks in SMSs;128
9.2.3;4.2.3 Use of Risk Analysis Matrices in Threats Analysis;128
9.2.4;4.2.4 Algorithm of the NASA Scenario for the Triad of Proactive and Predictive Safety Management for Aviation Activities by Means of SMSs (FO SMS–AA SMS);130
9.2.5;4.2.5 ICAO and ISO Hazard Models in SMSs;130
9.3;4.3 Construction of a Generalized Safety Management System (SMS);131
9.3.1;4.3.1 SMS Functions Based on the NASA Principles (for ICAO);131
9.3.2;4.3.2 Principle of Constructing and Determining the Composition of the AA SMS (Type 2) Core;132
9.3.3;4.3.3 SMS Subsystems and Modules;133
9.3.4;4.3.4 Functional SMS Diagram and Computer Support of Procedures for Assessing Risks of Occurrence of Adverse Events on the Basis of the ICAO Methodology (SMM);134
9.4;4.4 Methodological Basis for Solving the Problem of Estimating Residual Risk Taking into Account ILS Chains;135
9.4.1;4.4.1 State Regulation of AA Safety in Civil Aviation of Russia;135
9.4.2;4.4.2 Determination of Acceptable Risk Levels;136
9.5;4.5 Conclusions;138
9.6;References;138
10;5 Algorithms and Methods for ATS Safety Monitoring and Assurance Using Methods for Calculating Risks in the RRS Doctrine;140
10.1;5.1 Methodical Provisions for Assessing Aircraft Operation Safety;140
10.1.1;5.1.1 Definitions of Risk Varieties;140
10.1.2;5.1.2 Characteristics of Hazardous States of Systems;141
10.1.3;5.1.3 Methodical Provisions of “Preventive” (Proactive) Hazard Prediction in Order to Improve Flight Safety Based on Risk Management Through ATS Parameters Taking into Account Risk Factors;141
10.1.4;5.1.4 Methodological Provisions on the Relationship Between the Characteristics of Proactive and Active Methods for Assessing the Significance of Hazards and Risks for the Factors Database and the List of Hazards of a Particular Airline;142
10.2;5.2 Tools for Identifying and Estimating Risks in Solving the Rare Events Problem Within the New Doctrine “Reliability, Risks, Safety”;142
10.2.1;5.2.1 SST Tools. The List of Tools Includes the Following;142
10.2.2;5.2.2 Basic Principles of Flight Safety Management;143
10.2.3;5.2.3 Concept of Constructing J. Reason Chains in Fuzzy Subsets of ATS States;143
10.3;5.3 Determining and Assessing the Significance of Risk for Events from the Space of Binary Outcomes Using Risk Analysis Matrices;144
10.3.1;5.3.1 Types of Risk Matrices Per ICAO;144
10.3.2;5.3.2 Binary Partitions of the Outcome Space in the Risk Analysis Matrix;145
10.4;5.4 Methodology for Assessing the Degree of Risk in Comparison with the Level of Acceptable Risk;147
10.4.1;5.4.1 Initial Provisions of the Adopted Methodical Approach;147
10.4.2;5.4.2 Graded Classes of Fuzzy Risk Boundaries (“Granules”);148
10.5;5.5 SST Application for Assessing ATS Safety Levels in the Class of Rare Events Using Classical RT and PSA Methods;149
10.6;5.6 Steps to Ensure the System Safety Level for ATSs and Dual-Purpose Equipment in Terms of “Risk” During the Life Cycle of the Product;149
10.6.1;5.6.1 Step 1. Creation of a Highly Reliable Technical System;150
10.6.2;5.6.2 Step 2. Identification of Paths Leading to a Catastrophe on the Basis of the Adopted Structural Connections of Reliability Elements;151
10.6.3;5.6.3 Formalized Models of System Structures Taking into Account Possible Failures Based on Models of the “Hypercube of Truth”;153
10.7;5.7 Model of Estimation of the Counterfeit Influence on ATS Safety in Fuzzy Sets;156
10.8;5.8 Analysis of the Combinatorics of HF Characteristics with the SHEL Interface;158
10.8.1;5.8.1 Statement of the Problem and the Solution Scheme;158
10.8.2;5.8.2 Coding of SHEL States;159
10.8.3;5.8.3 Risk Assessment Based on the SST (RRS) Algorithms;161
10.9;5.9 Layers of J. Reason Chains for Proactive Determination of the Preconditions for Aircraft Accidents in Flights;162
10.10;5.10 “Risk and Vulnerability Points, Vulnerability Intervals on ATC Trajectories with the “Vectoring” Method” (ICAO and Annex 19);163
10.11;5.11 Conclusions—5;166
10.12;References;167
11;6 Assessing Safety of Dual-Purpose Systems;169
11.1;6.1 Recommendations of ICAO Amendment No. 101 Regarding the Requirements for the Development of SMSs (AA SMSs) for Industrial Production;169
11.1.1;6.1.1 Classifier of Industrial Safety Types in the System Safety Theory;170
11.2;6.2 Methodological Basis for Implementing the Recommendations of Amendment No. 101 on the Basis of ILS Principles;171
11.2.1;6.2.1 IS Monitoring Subsystems;171
11.2.2;6.2.2 Functions in the ILS System for Airbus Aircraft;173
11.3;6.3 Evaluation of the Prospects for Transition of Civil Aviation of the Russian Federation to the New IS Standards and Provision of After-Sales Services for Industrial Production (F1 Factor) and Operation of Equipment (F2 Factor);174
11.3.1;6.3.1 Status of Development;174
11.3.2;6.3.2 Structure of the Set of Standards;175
11.4;6.4 MSG Strategy for the Development of a Maintenance and Repair Program (Reliability) for Western-Made Aircraft;175
11.4.1;6.4.1 Maintenance Program Structure;175
11.4.2;6.4.2 Aircraft Maintenance and Reliability Assurance Programs in MSG-1, MSG-3;176
11.5;6.5 Design Requirements for Ensuring Flight Safety of Helicopters with an External Cargo Sling Load System;178
11.5.1;6.5.1 Methodical Approach to the Formation of the Logistic Support System for the After-Sales Service of Ka-32 Helicopters;178
11.5.2;6.5.2 Recommendations for Helicopter SMS Development Strategy;179
11.6;6.6 Importance of the New RSS Ideology (Adopted in the SST for Flight Safety Evaluation) for Science and Practice in Comparison with Russian and Foreign Approaches to the Construction of Safety Management Systems Based on the Calculation of Risks;180
11.6.1;6.6.1 Assessment of the Significance of RRS Methods for Evaluation of ATS Operation Safety;180
11.6.2;6.6.2 List of Projects of Scientific and Technical Research on the Implementation of the SST Provisions in Flight Safety Management Systems;180
11.7;6.7 Conclusions;182
11.8;References;182
12;Conclusion;184