E-Book, Englisch, 284 Seiten
Etro Competition, Innovation, and Antitrust
1. Auflage 2007
ISBN: 978-3-540-49601-4
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
A Theory of Market Leaders and Its Policy Implications
E-Book, Englisch, 284 Seiten
ISBN: 978-3-540-49601-4
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
This book reviews recent progress in the theory of oligopoly and market leadership and provides new results on the theory of Stackelberg competition and Nash competition with strategic investment under endogenous entry. These theories are applied to models of competition in quantities, prices and to patent races. The results are used to propose a new approach to competition policy and issues of the abuse of dominance.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Preface;6
2;Contents;16
3;1. Competition, Leadership and Entry;20
3.1;1.1 A Simple Model of Competition in Quantities;23
3.2;1.2 Increasing Marginal Costs and Product Differentiation;34
3.3;1.3 A Simple Model of Competition in Prices;39
3.4;1.4 A Simple Model of Competition for the Market;44
3.5;1.5 Conclusions;53
3.6;1.6 Appendix;55
4;2. Strategic Commitments and Endogenous Entry;59
4.1;2.1 Market Structure;62
4.2;2.2 Nash Equilibrium;66
4.3;2.3 Marshall Equilibrium;67
4.4;2.4 Competition in Quantities, in Prices and for the Market;68
4.5;2.5 Strategic Investments;77
4.6;2.6 Cost Reductions and Signaling;84
4.7;2.7 Advertising and Demand Enhancing Investments;88
4.8;2.8 Debt and the Optimal Financial Structure;90
4.9;2.9 Network Externalities and Two-Sided Markets;94
4.10;2.10 Bundling;97
4.11;2.11 Vertical Restraints;100
4.12;2.12 Price Discrimination;102
4.13;2.13 Antitrust and Horizontal Mergers;105
4.14;2.14 Conclusions;107
5;3. Stackelberg Competition and Endogenous Entry;108
5.1;3.1 Stackelberg Equilibrium;111
5.2;3.2 Stackelberg Equilibrium with Endogenous Entry;114
5.3;3.3 Competition in Quantities, in Prices and for the Market;117
5.4;3.4 Asymmetries, Multiple Leaders and Multiple Strategies;126
5.5;3.5 Antitrust and Collusion;135
5.6;3.6 State-Aids and Strategic Export Promotion;137
5.7;3.7 Privatizations;140
5.8;3.8 Conclusions;141
5.9;3.9 Appendix;142
6;4. Dynamic Competition and Endogenous Entry;147
6.1;4.1 A Simple Patent Race with Contractual Costs of R& D;151
6.2;4.2 Dynamic Competition for the Market;158
6.3;4.3 Sequential Innovations;167
6.4;4.4 Competition in the Market and Competition for the Market;175
6.5;4.5 Conclusions;178
6.6;4.6 Appendix;181
7;5. Antitrust and Abuse of Dominance;186
7.1;5.1 The Traditional Approaches to Abuse of Dominance;189
7.2;5.2 The Theory of Market Leaders and Endogenous Entry;193
7.3;5.3 A Digression on IPRs Protection;204
7.4;5.4 Reforming Antitrust;210
7.5;5.5 Conclusions;219
8;6. Microsoft Economics;222
8.1;6.1 The Software Market;223
8.2;6.2 The Antitrust Cases;233
8.3;6.3 Is Microsoft a Monopolist?;238
8.4;6.4 Bundling;245
8.5;6.5 Intellectual Property Rights;250
8.6;6.6 Conclusions;255
9;7. Epilogue;257
9.1;7.1 Empirical Predictions of the Theory of Market Leaders;257
9.2;7.2 Implications for Business Administration;266
9.3;7.3 Implications for Economic Theory;266
9.4;7.4 Conclusions;269
10;8. References;270
11;Index;288
