E-Book, Englisch, 106 Seiten, Format (B × H): 153 mm x 227 mm
ISBN: 978-3-8452-8420-0
Verlag: Nomos
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
Das Buch ist aus dem internationalen und interdisziplinären „Enhancing Life“-Projekt der University of Chicago in Kooperation mit der Ruhr-Universität-Bochum hervorgegangen.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Cover;1
2; Governmental Paternalism: Anachronism or Future Model of Enhancing Life?;9
3; Protective Governmental Paternalism: “Data Paternalism”;15
3.1; I. What is Protective Governmental Paternalism?;18
3.1.1; 1. Governmental Paternalism;18
3.1.2; 2. Protective Governmental Paternalism;22
3.1.3; 3. Data Paternalism as an Example of Protective Paternalism;23
3.2; II. Phenomenology of Protective Paternalism in the GDPR and ePD;26
3.2.1; 1. Invasive Paternalism;26
3.2.1.1; a) Prohibition Principle and Need for Formality;26
3.2.1.2; b) “Freely Given” Consent and the Necessity Requirement;28
3.2.1.3; c) Processing of Sensitive Personal Data and “Profiling”;30
3.2.2; 2. Libertarian Paternalism;32
3.2.2.1; a) Privacy by Default;33
3.2.2.2; b) Providing Information;34
3.3; III. Data Paternalism as a Fundamental Rights Problem;36
3.3.1; 1. A Specific Fundamental Right Against Data Paternalism?;39
3.3.1.1; a) Right to Disclose Personal Data;39
3.3.1.2; b) Right to Assess the Disclosure of Personal Data;39
3.3.1.3; d) Conclusion;45
3.3.2; 2. Data Paternalism as Interference with Fundamental Rights;46
3.3.2.1; a) Invasive Paternalism;47
3.3.2.1.1; aa) Formal Consent Requirements;47
3.3.2.1.2; bb) Necessity Requirement;48
3.3.2.2; b) Libertarian Paternalism;48
3.3.2.2.1; aa) Privacy by Default;48
3.3.2.2.2; bb) Providing Information;49
3.4; IV. Justifying Data Paternalism;51
3.4.1; 1. Specific Reasons for Data Paternalism;51
3.4.1.1; a) General Systematic Deficits of Human Decision Making?;51
3.4.1.2; b) Specific and Severe Threats to Personal Autonomy;54
3.4.2; 2. Illuminating the Objective of Data Protection;55
3.4.3; 3. Balancing Personal Autonomy and Data Protection;58
3.4.3.1; a) Citizen-State-Relations;58
3.4.3.2; b) Citizen-Citizen-Relations;59
3.5; V. Conclusion;62
4; Educational Governmental Paternalism: “Buying Social Responsibility”;65
4.1; I. What is Educational Governmental Paternalism?;68
4.1.1; 1. Educational Governmental Paternalism;68
4.1.2; 2. “Buying Social” as an Example of Educational Paternalism;72
4.2; II. Phenomenology of Educational Paternalism in the PPD;74
4.2.1; 1. Strict “Must-Have” Requirements;75
4.2.1.1; a) Social Irresponsibility as a Ground for Exclusion;75
4.2.1.2; b) Social Contract Performance Conditions;76
4.2.1.3; c) Social Requirements in Technical Specifications;78
4.2.2; 2. Softer “Nice-to-Have” Requirements;79
4.2.3; 3. General Limitations of Social Requirements under the PPD;80
4.3; III. “Buying Social” – A Specific Fundamental Rights Problem?;81
4.3.1; 1. Limiting the Tenderer’s Freedom of Occupation;81
4.3.2; 2. Specific Protection Against “Expressive” Content of Law?;84
4.3.3; 3. Protection Against Indirect Effects of “Expressive” Law?;87
4.3.4; 4. Education as Justification for Interferences?;88
4.3.5; 5. Two Specific Constitutional Requirements;93
4.3.5.1; a) Relevance of a Broad-Based Consensus;94
4.3.5.2; b) Consistency Principle;95
4.4; IV. Testing the Concept of “Buying Social”;96
4.4.1; 1. More and Less Morality;96
4.4.2; 2. Requirement of a Broad-Based Consensus;97
4.4.3; 3. Consistency of “Buying Social”;99
4.5; V. Conclusion;102
5; Epilogue: The Future of Governmental Paternalism;105