Leidlmair After Cognitivism

A Reassessment of Cognitive Science and Philosophy
1. Auflage 2009
ISBN: 978-1-4020-9992-2
Verlag: Springer-Verlag
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 229 Seiten

There is a basic perplexity in our times. On the one hand, we ?nd a blind trust in technology and rationalism. In our neo-liberalistically dominated world only what can be rapidly exploited and commercialized seems to count. The only opposing reaction to this kind of rationalism is an extreme rejection of all kinds of reasoning, and sometimes attendant religious fundamentalism. But instead of re?ecting on the limits and possibilites of reasoning, dialogue is replaced by a demagogic struggle between cultures. One cause of the blind trust in technology is misunderstandings about the sign- cance and the application of theories in the reception of the so-called Enlightenment. The Enlightenment is essentially characterized by two forces: (i) the conception of society as a social contract and (ii) the new science (New- nian physics, etc.). But as a result we lost ground: Atomistic individualism nourished the illusion of a self-contained ego prior to man’s entering into a shared inter-subjective world. And in the new science, our constructions of reality became autonomous and indep- dent of our interventions. Thus we became caught in the inherent dynamism of our computational constructions of reality. Science, as it is applied today, operates with far too simple parameters and model-theoretic constructions – erroneously taking the latter (the models) as literal descriptions of reality.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Leidlmair, Karl

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Preface;5
2;Contents;13
3;Contributors;15
4;Part I The Pragmatic Dimension: A Reassessment of Scientific Theories;17
4.1;Towards a Technology- and Action-Oriented Methodology of Constructive Realism;18
4.1.1; Theory Shaping by Technology;18
4.1.2; Theory Shaping by Instrumentations as Actions;22
4.1.3; What Kind of Realism?;28
4.1.4; Conclusion;34
4.1.5;References;35
4.2;The Three Enlightenments;38
5;Part II Artificial Intelligence and the Embodiment of the Mind;51
5.1;How Representational Cognitivism Failed and is being replaced by Body/World Coupling;52
5.1.1; The Convergence of Computers and Philosophy;52
5.1.2; Symbolic AI as a Degenerating Research Program;53
5.1.3; Heideggerian AI, Stage One: Eliminating Representations by Building Behavior-Based Robots;56
5.1.4; Heideggerian AI, Stage 2: Programming the Ready-to-Hand;60
5.1.5; Pseudo Heideggerian AI: Embedded, Embodied, Extended Mind;64
5.1.6; What Motivates Embedded/Embodied Coping?;66
5.1.7; Modeling Situated Coping as a Dynamical System;67
5.1.8; Walter Freemans Merleau-Pontian Neurodynamics;71
5.1.8.1; Direct Perception of Significance and the Rejection of the Binding Problem;73
5.1.8.2; Learning and Merleau-Ponty's Intentional Arc;76
5.1.8.3; The Perception/Action Loop;78
5.1.8.4; Optimal Grip;79
5.1.8.5; Circular Causality;80
5.1.9; Freemans Model as a Basis for Heideggerian AI;80
5.1.10; How Heideggerian AI Would Dissolve Rather Than Avoid or Solve the Frame Problem;81
5.1.11; Conclusion;85
5.2;The New Orthodoxy: Humans, Animals, Heidegger and Dreyfus;87
5.2.1; Introduction: The New Orthodoxy and its Problems;87
5.2.2; Socialness;89
5.2.3; Embeddednes in Society;90
5.2.4; Language and Embodiment;91
5.2.5; Socialness, Language, and Artificial Intelligence;93
5.2.6; Conclusion;95
5.2.7;References;96
5.3;The Key to the Chinese Room;98
5.3.1; The Systems Approach;99
5.3.2; An Expanded System;102
5.3.3; The Internalist Objection to the Expanded System;103
5.3.4; Turning the Key;104
5.3.5;References;106
6;Part III Socialization in the Internet Between Dissolution and Extension of the Human Self;108
6.1;The Play of Imagination: Extending the Literary Mind;109
6.1.1; From MUDs to MMOGs;110
6.1.2; Understanding Games;113
6.1.3; Vivid Spaces of Imagination;115
6.1.4; Dispositional Stances;115
6.1.5; Ability, Agency, and Emergent Collective Action;116
6.1.6; A Theory of Transfer and Conceptual Blending;119
6.1.6.1; Learning About Each Other;120
6.1.6.1.1; Convergence, Divergence, and Triggering;121
6.1.6.2; Convergence;122
6.1.6.3; Divergence;123
6.1.6.4; Metaphor and Imagination;124
6.1.7; Games, Innovation, and Learning;125
6.1.8; Conclusion;127
6.1.9;References;128
6.2;Reading the World Upside Down: How to Deal with Frozen Knowledge;131
6.2.1; Frozen Knowledge;131
6.2.2; Dealing with Frozen Knowledge: Heideggerian Openness;135
6.2.3; Dreaming off the World;138
6.2.4;References;140
6.3;On the Significance of the Lower Senses: Touch, Smell and Taste;142
6.3.1; Introductory Remarks;142
6.3.2; Experiencing the World Through the Lower Senses: Touching, Smelling, Tasting;145
6.3.3; Emotionality, Touch and Contact;148
6.3.4; Concluding Remarks;151
6.3.5;References;152
7;Part IV New Research Strategies in Psychology and Psychotherapy;153
7.1;We Can Think with the Implicit, As Well As withFully-Formed Concepts;154
7.1.1; Comparing the Two Kinds of Patterns;158
7.1.2; Appendix: Thinking At the Edge (TAE) Steps;162
7.1.3;References;168
7.2;Embodied Knowledge in Design;169
7.2.1; Preliminary Remark;169
7.2.2; Knowledge Application and Artefacts of Work;172
7.2.2.1; Excursion: Sketches and Material Models;172
7.2.3; Knowledge-Based and Opportunistic Development of the Solution;180
7.2.4; Knowledge Retention;182
7.2.5; Conclusion;183
7.2.6;References;183
7.3;The Second Cognitive Revolution;186
7.3.1; Meaning Versus Representation;186
7.3.2; The Central Place of Discourse;188
7.3.3; The Main Principles of the Second Cognitive Revolution;192
7.3.4;References;192
8;Part V Ethical and Economic Aspects;193
8.1;The Illusion of Free Will and its Acceptance;194
8.1.1; Preliminaries on Free Will and Consciousness;194
8.1.2; Illusory Free Will;196
8.1.3; Illusions;198
8.1.4; Double Feel;200
8.1.5; Consequences of Double Feel;202
8.1.6;References;205
8.2;Three Concepts of Liberty;207
8.2.1; A Third Concept of Liberty: Development Freedom;209
8.2.2; Beyond Polarization;210
8.2.3; Wittgensteiniotskeanism;212
8.2.4;References;213
8.3;Premises and Promises of Theory Formation in Economics;215
8.3.1; Economic Model Building Why Do It At All?;215
8.3.2; The Use and Abuse of Science;217
8.3.3; From the Hidden Premises to the Economical Nonseum;219
8.3.4; What Can (Must) Scientists Do?;225
8.3.5; Some Visions, Not Too Far;226
8.3.6; Final Remarks;227
8.3.7;References;227
9;Index;228