Zellentin Liberal Neutrality

Treating Citizens as Free and Equal
1. Auflage 2012
ISBN: 978-3-11-025519-5
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 192 Seiten

Reihe: Ideen & Argumente

Zielgruppe

Political and Religious Foundations and Think Tanks, Academics, Institutes, Libraries

Autoren/Hrsg.

Zellentin, Alexa

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Kultur Staatsbürgerkunde, Staatsbürgerschaft, Zivilgesellschaft
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Theorie, Politische Philosophie
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme Staats- und Regierungsformen, Staatslehre

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Acknowledgements;9
2;1 Introduction;11
2.1;1.1 The challenges of diversity;11
2.2;1.2 Leitkultur;12
2.3;1.3 Liberal neutrality;20
3;2 Defining liberal neutrality;22
3.1;2.1 Neutrality is an ill-defined term;22
3.2;2.2 Conceptions of neutrality;25
3.2.1;2.2.1 Neutrality of impact;26
3.2.2;2.2.2 Neutrality as equality of opportunity;28
3.2.3;2.2.3 Justificatory neutrality;31
3.3;2.3 Contexts of neutrality;35
3.3.1;2.3.1 Constitutional essentials;36
3.3.2;2.3.2 Political decision-making;38
3.3.2.1;2.3.2.1 Neutrality as respectful non-identification;40
3.3.2.2;2.3.2.2 Relational neutrality;41
3.3.3;2.3.3 Neutral behaviour of state officials;43
3.4;2.4 Neutrality as a two-fold concept;49
4;3 The right and the good;52
4.1;3.1 Neutrality versus toleration;52
4.2;3.2 The right versus the good;54
4.3;3.3 Theories of rights;56
4.4;3.4 Thin versus thick conceptions of the good;59
4.4.1;3.4.1 Rawls’s thin theory of the good;63
4.4.2;3.4.2 Dworkin’s thin theory of the good;66
4.5;3.5 Another complication;68
4.6;3.6 Comprehensive versus political conceptions;69
4.7;3.7 The need for a thin political theory of the good;72
5;4 Grounding neutrality;74
5.1;4.1 Society as a fair system of cooperation over time;76
5.2;4.2 Citizens as equipped with two moral powers;77
5.3;4.3 Citizens as free and equal persons;79
5.3.1;4.3.1 Citizens as free;79
5.3.2;4.3.2 Citizens as equal;84
5.4;4.4 Citizens as free and equal as thin political conception;90
5.5;4.5 The limits of the project;92
6;5 Justifying the respect element;94
6.1;5.1 Coercive power and the state;95
6.1.1;5.1.1 All state action involves coercion;96
6.1.2;5.1.2 All state action needs to be justifiable to the citizens affected;97
6.1.3;5.1.3 The state has no right to do wrong;98
6.2;5.2 Justifying coercion;101
6.2.1;5.2.1 Reasonable agreement justifies coercion;101
6.2.1.1;5.2.1.1 The addressees of justification;102
6.2.1.2;5.2.1.2 The scope ofthe need for justification;103
6.2.1.3;5.2.1.3 The criteria for reasonable acceptability;105
6.2.1.4;5.2.1.4 What citizens can be reasonably expected to agree on;107
6.2.2;5.2.2 Protecting rights justifies coercion;109
6.2.2.1;5.2.2.1 Interest theories of rights;109
6.2.2.2;5.2.2.2 Choice theories of rights;110
6.2.2.3;5.2.2.3 Common ground;111
6.2.3;5.2.3 Protecting rights is the only justification for coercion;112
6.2.3.1;5.2.3.1 The right to be left alone;112
6.2.3.2;5.2.3.2 Reasons for state action have to outweigh the right to be left alone;118
6.3;5.3 The respect element of neutrality;121
7;6 Justifying the fairness element;122
7.1;6.1 Treating people as equals;122
7.2;6.2 Rawls’s conception of citizens as equal;124
7.3;6.3 Treating citizens as equals with regard to their two moral powers;126
7.4;6.4 Respecting the two moral powers equally;127
7.4.1;6.4.1 Respecting the capacity for the right;128
7.4.2;6.4.2 Respecting the capacity for the good;131
7.5;6.5 Formal versus fair political participation;133
7.5.1;6.5.1 Cultural differences;136
7.5.2;6.5.2 The implementation of neutrally justified rules;141
7.6;6.6 The need to be aware of differences;146
8;7 Implementing liberal neutrality;148
8.1;7.1 Justificatory neutrality;149
8.1.1;7.1.1 Citizens as free;150
8.1.2;7.1.2 Citizens as equal;152
8.1.3;7.1.3 Enabling cooperation;155
8.1.4;7.1.4 Fair cooperation;156
8.1.5;7.1.5 The scope and limits of justificatory neutrality;158
8.2;7.2 Procedural neutrality;159
8.2.1;7.2.1 Equal political rights and their fair value;159
8.2.2;7.2.2 Minority representation;161
8.2.3;7.2.3 Contestatory democracy;167
8.3;7.3 Liberal neutrality in the headscarf case;171
9;8 Conclusion;176
9.1;8.1 Summary of the argument;176
9.2;8.2 The three challenges of pluralism;178
9.3;8.3 The third challenge;179
10;9 Bibliography;182
11;Index;187

Über Autor(innen)

Alexa Zellentin, Universität Graz, Austria.