Brams / Fishburn Approval Voting

2. Auflage 2007
ISBN: 978-0-387-49896-6
Verlag: Springer US
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 200 Seiten

This book presents a simple and logical potential electoral reform. Under this system, voters may vote for, or approve of, as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections. Among the many benefits of approval voting are its propensity to elect the majority candidate, its relative invulnerability to insincere or strategic voting, and a probable increase in voter turnout.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Brams, Steven

Fishburn, Peter C.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Preface to the First Edition;11
1.1;Footnotes to Preface;13
2;List of Tables;16
3;List of Figures;17
4;Chapter 1 Introduction: Overview of the Problem and Its Solution;18
4.1;1.1. The Multicandidate Problem;18
4.2;1.2. A Solution: Approval Voting;20
4.3;1.3. What's Wrong with Approval Voting?;27
4.4;1.4. An Illustration of the Effects of Different Rules: The 1980 New Hampshire Primaries under Approval Voting;28
4.5;1.5. Prospects for Adoption;29
4.6;Footnotes to Chapter 1;30
5;Chapter 2 Sincerity and Strategy- Proofness: Which System Is Most Honest?;32
5.1;2.1. Introduction;32
5.2;2.2. Voter Preferences and Dominance;33
5.3;2.3. Dominance between Strategies;36
5.4;2.4. Admissible Strategies;39
5.5;2.5. Sincere Voting and Strategy- Proofness;45
5.6;2.6. Conclusions;49
5.7;Footnotes to Chapter 2;50
6;Chapter 3 The Condorcet Criterion: Which System Best Finds the Majority Candidate?;52
6.1;3.1. Introduction;52
6.2;3.2. Dichotomous Preferences;54
6.3;3.3. Runoff Systems;57
6.4;3.4. Dominance, Admissibility, Sincerity, and Strategy- Proofness of Runoff Systems;59
6.5;3.5. Condorcet Possibility Theorems;64
6.6;3.6. Condorcet Election Guarantees;69
6.7;3.7. Conclusions;71
6.8;Footnotes to Chapter 3;73
7;Chapter 4 The Reconstruction of an Election under Alternative Rules ;76
7.1;4.1. Introduction;76
7.2;4.2. Background on the 1976 House Majority Leader Election;77
7.3;4.3. Best/ Worst Analysis: A Preliminary Appraisal;78
7.4;4.4. Single- Peaked Preferences;80
7.5;4.5. Different Voting Systems;83
7.6;4.6. Conclusions;86
7.7;Footnotes to Chapter 4;88
8;Chapter 5 Power and Equity: Which System Is Fairest?;90
8.1;5.1. Introduction;90
8.2;5.2. Efficacy;91
8.3;5.3. Situation- Specific Effects and Power;95
8.4;5.4. Power and Equity for Dichotomous Voters;98
8.5;5.5. Optimal Voting Strategies;101
8.6;5.6. An Asymmetric Example;105
8.7;5.7. Conclusions;107
8.8;Footnotes to Chapter 5;107
9;Chapter 6 Deducing Condorcet Candidates from Election Data;110
9.1;6.1. Introduction;110
9.2;6.2. Deductions from Election Totals;111
9.3;6.3. Results for Three and Four Candidates;112
9.4;6.4. Modified Assumptions and Disaggregated Data;115
9.5;6.5. Analysis of Approval Voting Ballot Data^;116
9.6;6.6. An Empirical Example and Probabilistic Analysis;120
9.7;6.7. Conclusions;123
9.8;Footnotes to Chapter 6;124
10;Chapter 7 Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections;125
10.1;7.1. Introduction;125
10.2;7.2. Concerns about Public Opinion Polling;126
10.3;7.3. Plurality Voting;128
10.4;7.4. Approval Voting;131
10.5;7.5. Runoff Systems and an Empirical Example;137
10.6;7.6. Conclusions;139
10.7;Footnotes to Chapter 7;140
11;Chapter 8 Recent Empirical Examples and Theoretical Extensions;142
11.1;8.1. Introduction;142
11.2;8.2. The 1980 New York Senate Race: A Reprise of 1970?;142
11.3;8.3. Approval Voting and Presidential Elections;144
11.4;8.4. The Sensitivity of Voting Systems to Numbers of Candidates;150
11.5;8.5, Approval Voting and Game Theory;153
11.6;8.6. The Monotonicity Paradox;156
11.7;8.7. Conclusions;160
11.8;Footnotes to Chapter 8;161
12;Chapter 9 Deducing Preferences and Choices in the 1980 Presidential Election;165
12.1;9.1. Introduction;165
12.2;9.2. Preferences and Voter Behavior;167
12.3;9.3. Analysis of Anderson Supporters ( but Not Voters);171
12.4;9.4. Inferences from Voter Percentages;177
12.5;9.5. Conclusions;181
12.6;Footnotes to Chapter 9;182
13;Chapter 10 Epilogue;184
14;Glossary;187
15;Bibliography;191
16;Index;201