Dale / Anderson Making Systems Safer

Proceedings of the Eighteenth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK, 9-11th February 2010
1. Auflage 2009
ISBN: 978-1-84996-086-1
Verlag: Springer
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 273 Seiten

Making Systems Safer contains the papers presented at the eighteenth annual Safety-critical Systems Symposium, held at Bristol, UK, in February 2010. The Symposium is for engineers, managers and academics in the field of system safety, across all industry sectors, so the papers making up this volume offer a wide-ranging coverage of current safety topics, and a blend of academic research and industrial experience. They include both recent developments in the field and discussion of open issues that will shape future progress. The first paper reflects a tutorial - on Formalization in Safety Cases - held on the first day of the Symposium. The subsequent 15 papers are presented under the headings of the Symposium's sessions: Perspectives on Systems Safety, Managing Safety-Related Projects, Transport Safety, Safety Standards, Safety Competencies and Safety Methods. The book will be of interest to both academics and practitioners working in the safety-critical systems arena.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Anderson, Tom

Dale, Chris

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Preface;5
2;Contents;9
3;Formalism in Safety Cases;12
3.1;1 Introduction;12
3.2;2 The Top-Level Argument;14
3.3;3 Lower-Level Arguments;19
3.4;4 Probabilistic Arguments;21
3.5;5 Summary, and Suggestions for Future Work;23
4;Bureaucracy, Safety and Software: a Potentially Lethal Cocktail;28
4.1;1 Overview;28
4.2;2 Safety Standards and Software Development;36
4.3;3 Conclusions – What is to be done?;41
5;Cost-Efficient Methods and Processes for Safety Relevant Embedded Systems ( CESAR) – An Objective Overview;44
5.1;1 Introduction;44
5.2;2 Concept and Objectives;45
5.3;3 Creating the RTP;47
5.4;4 Safety-Diagnosability Task Force;49
5.5;5 CESAR Challenges;55
5.6;6 Conclusion;56
6;Safety and Assurance Cases: Past, Present and Possible Future – an Adelard Perspective;58
6.1;1 History of Computer System Safety and Related Standards;58
6.2;2 Current Practice in Software Safety and Regulation;61
6.3;3 Uptake and Development of the Safety Case Approach;63
6.4;4 Current Practice in Safety Cases;64
6.4.1;4.1 Safety Case Structures;65
6.4.2;4.2 Confidence, Challenge and Meta-Cases;67
6.4.3;4.3 Other Research;68
6.4.4;4.4 Specific Tool Support;69
6.5;5 Future Directions;70
6.5.1;5.1 Safety Case Methodology Enhancement;70
6.5.2;5.2 Extension to Other Areas;70
6.5.3;5.3 Safety Case Structuring;71
6.5.4;5.4 Confidence and Challenge;71
6.6;6 Concluding Remarks;71
7;An Integrated Project Management Life Cycle Supporting System Safety;76
7.1;1 Introduction;76
7.2;2 Integrated Project Management Life Cycle;84
7.3;3 Conclusion;87
8;Patterns in Safety-Related Projects;89
8.1;1 Background;89
8.2;2 The Project Patterns;92
8.3;3 The Decision Tool;101
8.4;4 Current Status;101
8.5;5 Conclusions and Further Work;103
9;Applying IEC 61508 to Air Traffic Management Systems;106
9.1;1 Introduction;106
9.2;2 The IEC 61508 Model of the World;107
9.3;3 Air Traffic as the EUC;108
9.4;4 Deriving Safety Requirements for ATM Systems;110
9.5;5 Unusual Aspects of ATC;113
9.6;6 Increased Need for Automation;114
9.7;7 Applying Parts 2 and 3 of IEC 61508;115
9.8;8 Conclusions;115
10;Phileas, a Safety Critical Trip around the World;117
10.1;1 Introduction;117
10.2;2 Guidance System Overview;118
10.2.1;2.1 Navigation;118
10.2.2;2.2 Control;119
10.3;3 Safety Engineering;119
10.4;4 Development Process;121
10.4.1;4.1 System Definition;122
10.4.2;4.2 System Design;122
10.4.3;4.3 System Qualification;124
10.5;5 Safety Concept;124
10.6;6 Certification Process;126
10.6.1;6.1 Safety Case;126
10.6.2;6.2 Homologation;127
10.7;7 Conclusions;128
11;An Overview of the SoBP for Software in the Context of DS 00- 56 Issue 4;130
11.1;1 Introduction;130
11.2;2 Structure of the SoBP;131
11.2.1;2.1 Requirements of DS 00-56: Safety Cases;132
11.3;3 Managerial Issues;133
11.3.1;3.1 Software Safety Management Phases;134
11.3.2;3.2 Swim-lane Diagram;134
11.3.3;3.3 Managerial Summary;142
11.4;4 Technical Issues;142
11.4.1;4.1 Pattern Catalogue;143
11.4.2;4.2 Assurance-based Argument Development Method;144
11.5;5 Conclusions;147
12;IEC80001 and Future Ramifications for Health Systems not currently classed as Medical Devices;149
12.1;1 Introduction;150
12.2;2 Current Medical Device Regulation;151
12.3;3 Dilemmas in the Health Software Sector;154
12.4;4 IEC 80001;155
12.5;5 Pressures created for Health Organisations;161
12.6;6 Creating a Framework for the Challenges;163
12.7;7 Implications for Health Informaticians;167
12.8;8 What will the Future see?;169
13;Competence, The Why? The How? and ‘A Practical Approach’;173
13.1;1 Competence – The Why?;173
13.2;2 Competence – The How ;176
13.3;3 A Practical Approach;178
13.3.1;3.1 The IRSE Licensing Scheme Implementation;179
13.3.2;3.2 The Invensys Rail (UK) CMS;180
13.3.3;3.3 Authority to Work;182
13.4;4 Conclusions;184
14;The new IET Guide – how to do EMC to help achieve Functional Safety;185
14.1;1 Introduction to the IET’s new Guide;185
14.2;2 Relationship with IEC 61508;190
14.3;3 Learning Curves;190
14.4;4 Why we can’t rely on EMC Testing alone;192
14.4.1;4.1 Foreseeable Faults are Ignored;192
14.4.2;4.2 Foreseeable Use and Misuse are Ignored;192
14.4.3;4.3 Test Chambers are Not Realistic;193
14.4.4;4.4 RF Modulation Types and Frequencies are Not Realistic;193
14.4.5;4.5 Simultaneous Disturbances are Not Tested;193
14.4.6;4.6 Only One Port is Tested at a Time;195
14.4.7;4.7 The Physical Environment is Ignored;195
14.4.8;4.8 Quality of EM Design Ignored;196
14.4.9;4.9 Assembly Errors Ignored;196
14.4.10;4.10 Systematic Effects Ignored;196
14.4.11;4.11 The Maximum Test Level is Not Necessarily the Worst;197
14.4.12;4.12 Conclusion: EMC Testing can Never be Sufficient;197
14.5;5 Going through the Steps in the IET’s Guide;198
14.6;6 Helpful Annexes and Checklists;206
15;Code of Practice and Competencies for ISAs;209
15.1;1 Introduction;209
15.2;2 What is an ISA?;210
15.3;3 ISA Working Group;211
15.4;4 Code of Practice for ISAs;212
15.5;5 Competency Framework for ISAs ;217
15.6;6 Putting it into Practice;223
15.7;7 Conclusions;227
16;Evaluation and Integration of COTS in Evidence based Assurance Frameworks;230
16.1;1 Introduction;230
16.2;2 Integration of the CertPack in the Safety Case;231
16.3;3 COTS Focused Safety Analysis;235
16.4;4 Evaluating CertPack Evidence;237
16.4.1;4.1 Evaluation Process;238
16.4.2;4.2 CertPack Issues;242
16.5;5 Conclusions;250
17;A Way to Successful Hazard Management;252
17.1;1 Introduction;252
17.1.1;1.1 Hazard Definition;253
17.1.2;1.2 Core System Safety Process;253
17.2;1.3 Practical Problems;254
17.3;2 Principles of the Organization Wide Hazard Log;255
17.3.1;2.1 Main Goal;255
17.3.2;2.2 Main Input;256
17.3.3;2.3 Management Responsibilities;256
17.4;3 Tools and Templates used in the Hazard Process ;257
17.5;4 Hazard Processing;258
17.5.1;4.1 Hazard Definition Phase;259
17.5.2;4.2 Solution Finding Phase;264
17.5.3;4.3 Hazard Closing Phase;267
17.6;5 Conclusion;268
18;Author Index;269