Gilbert Multi-Market Antitrust Economics

1. Auflage 2018
ISBN: 978-3-319-69386-6
Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 151 Seiten

Reihe: Progress in Mathematics

Antitrust economics is a field that draws extensively on the economic theory of industrial organization, and the field's frontier is at the cutting edge of economic research. This book bridges the gap between introductory texts and advanced research volumes by presenting select themes in antitrust economics and modeling. All from a neoclassical perspective, the author begins by discussing classic monopoly, continues to add more markets to the mix-via spillover effects and horizontal/vertical mergers-and then explores logical ties to international trade and regulated industries. While brief and selective, the method provides a basic analytical reference point for approaching special antitrust topics not covered here, such as tying, bundling, and exclusive dealing.  Such analytics are sometimes likened to a rational defense of monopoly and related anti-competitive behavior, but are essential to explicating antitrust economics from a mainstream Western economic vantage.

Scott Gilbert is Associate Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, USA. He is the author of Business Liability and Economic Damages, Vice President of the National Association of Forensic Economics, and Board Member of the American Academy of Economic and Financial Experts.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Gilbert, Scott

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Foreword;6
1.1;Notes;10
2;Prologue;17
2.1;Notes;20
3;Contents;21
4;Part I Classical Antitrust Economics;24
4.1;1 Antitrust Law;25
4.1.1;1.1 Economic Principles of Antitrust Law;26
4.1.2;1.2 Antitrust Theme: Don't Rip Off Consumers;26
4.1.3;1.3 Studies of Antitrust Statutes;29
4.1.4;1.4 Antitrust Court Cases;31
4.1.5;1.5 Problems;33
4.1.6;Notes;34
4.1.7;References;35
4.2;2 Pure Monopoly Model;36
4.2.1;2.1 Antitrust and Economic Models;37
4.2.2;2.2 The Pure Monopoly Model;38
4.2.3;2.3 The Model's Assumptions;42
4.2.4;2.4 Applying the Model;46
4.2.5;2.5 Model's Limitations and Extensions;47
4.2.6;2.6 Problems;49
4.2.7;Notes;51
4.2.8;References;54
5;Part II Multi-Market Antitrust Economics;55
5.1;3 Monopoly Spillover Effects;56
5.1.1;3.1 Independent Goods;58
5.1.2;3.2 Substitutes;58
5.1.3;3.3 Complements;62
5.1.3.1;3.3.1 Perfect Complements;62
5.1.3.2;3.3.2 Imperfect Complements;64
5.1.4;3.4 Model Limitations;65
5.1.5;3.5 Problems;65
5.1.6;Notes;67
5.1.7;References;68
5.2;4 Mergers;69
5.2.1;4.1 Mergers in the Same Industry;70
5.2.2;4.2 Conglomerate Mergers;73
5.2.3;4.3 Mergers Across Substitute Goods;75
5.2.4;4.4 Complement Goods;80
5.2.4.1;4.4.1 Perfect Complements;80
5.2.4.2;4.4.2 Imperfect Complements;85
5.2.5;4.5 Vertical Mergers;87
5.2.6;4.6 Problems;92
5.2.7;Notes;96
5.2.8;References;97
6;Part III Antitrust and Allied Economic Fields;99
6.1;5 International Trade;100
6.1.1;5.1 One-Person Economy;101
6.1.2;5.2 Two-Good, Two-Person Economy;102
6.1.3;5.3 Monopoly and Production Efficiency;105
6.1.4;5.4 Monopoly and Consumer Happiness;110
6.1.4.1;5.4.1 Goods Distribution via Sharing;111
6.1.4.2;5.4.2 Distribution via Social Planner;116
6.1.4.3;5.4.3 Distribution via Trade;117
6.1.5;5.5 Conclusion;122
6.1.6;5.6 Problems;123
6.1.7;Notes;127
6.1.8;References;128
6.2;6 Natural Monopoly;129
6.2.1;6.1 Production and Returns to Scale;131
6.2.2;6.2 Constant Returns to Scale;132
6.2.3;6.3 Increasing Returns to Scale;136
6.2.4;6.4 Natural Monopoly;140
6.2.5;6.5 Conclusion;141
6.2.6;6.6 Problems;142
6.2.7;Notes;144
6.2.8;References;145
7;Index;146