The Positivist and the Ontologist

Bergmann, Carnap and Logical Realism
Erscheinungsjahr 2001
ISBN: 978-90-420-1434-3
Verlag: Brill | Rodopi

Buch, Englisch, Band 32, 400 Seiten, Format (B × H): 150 mm x 220 mm, Gewicht: 689 g

Reihe: Studien zur Österreichischen Philosophie

The book contains the first systematic study of the ontology and metaphysics of Gustav Bergmann, tracing their development from early (1940s) criticisms of Carnap’s semantical theories in Introduction to Semantics, to their culmination in his 1992 New Foundations of Ontology. This involves a detailed study of the implicit metaphysical doctrines in Carnap’s important, but long neglected, 1942 book and their connection to his influential views on reference, truth and modality, (including, contrary to current opinion, Carnap’s initiating the development of predicate modal logic) that culminated in Meaning and Necessity. In dealing with various fundamental issues in ontology and metaphysics, the book discusses relevant views of major philosophers, such as Russell, Moore, Bradley, Wittgenstein, Meinong, Brentano, Husserl, Broad, McTaggart, and Quine, and of contemporary and recent figures, including D. M. Armstrong, D. Lewis, S. Kripke, J. Searle, W. Sellars, D. Davidson, J. J. C. Smart, and H. Feigl. Building on the critical studies of Bergmann, Carnap and such other philosophers, the author argues for a form of Logical Realism derived from important, but long misunderstood and ignored, aspects of Russell’s theories of descriptions, reference and truth.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Hochberg, Herbert

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Analytische Philosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Sprachwissenschaft Sprachwissenschaften Sprachphilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Metaphysik, Ontologie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sprachphilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

From Positivism to Metaphysics: Bergmann's Critique of Carnap's Semantics
Reism, Ontological Types and Aufbau-type Ontological Constructions
Bergmann's REALISM and the Critique of Bundle and Trope Ontologies
Carnapian Consequences: Realism and Semantic Refutations of Realism
Bergmann's Reism: Brentano's and Carnap's Revenge
Relational Order, the Russell-Wittgenstein Dispute and Meinongian Realism
Negation, Quantification and Intensional Isomorphism
The Phenomenology and Ontology of Logic, Classes and Modality
Dispositions and Laws: Hume, Husserl and Causal Realism
Avoiding Absurdity: Physical Realism, Phenomenalism and Mindless Materialism
Extensions, Intensions and Carnap's Critique of Reference
Reference Reconsidered
Logical Truth, Logical Paradoxes and Logical Realism