E-Book, Englisch, Band 41, 191 Seiten
Monaghan Property Possession as Identity
1. Auflage 2013
ISBN: 978-3-11-032574-4
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
An Essay in Metaphysics
E-Book, Englisch, Band 41, 191 Seiten
Reihe: Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis
ISBN: 978-3-11-032574-4
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
In this essay, Monaghan argues for an account of property possession as strict, numerical identity. According to this account, for an entity to possess a property is for that entity and that property to be numerically identical to each other. To defend this view, he argues against two views he call Externalism and Internalism about property possession. Monaghan argues that it is impossible for one entity to possess a second entity as a property. He provides replies to variety of objections one might raise against his account.
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Weitere Infos & Material
1;CHAPTER I;11
2;INTRODUCTION;11
3;1. A long-neglected dispute between Plato and Aristotle.1;11
4;2. The account to be defended.;14
5;3. Some potential misconceptions about my account.;20
6;4. The highly metaphorical nature of other accounts.;24
7;5. An historical precedent for my account.;27
8;6. The plan.;29
9;7. Some methodological points about my account.;31
10;8. Some methodological points about the problem my account solves.;38
11;9. A theory of properties.;44
11.1;9.1. What is it for something to be a property?;47
11.2;9.2. What are the existence-conditions for properties?;51
11.3;9.3. What are the individuation-conditions for properties?;70
12;AGAINST INTERNALISM;71
13;1. Introduction.;71
14;2. Against Paul’s view.;73
15;3. Against Denkel’s view.;78
16;4. The view of Aristotle.;80
17;5. Against Internalism in general.;84
18;CHAPTER III;85
19;AGAINST EXTERNALISM;85
20;1. Introduction.;85
21;2. Against Predicate Nominalism.;85
22;3. Against Concept Nominalism.;89
23;4. Against Class Nominalism.;91
24;5. Against Resemblance Nominalism.;93
24.1;CHAPTER II;71
24.2;5.1. Rodriguez-Pereyra’s version of the view.;94
24.3;5.2. The mind-dependence of resemblance.;96
24.4;5.3. The argument.;101
25;6. Against Traditional Externalism.;103
26;7. Against Externalism in general.;104
27;CHAPTER IV;105
28;THE VIEW OF PLATO;105
29;1. Introduction.;105
30;2. Plato’s view for sensible things.;105
31;3. A novel interpretation of Plato’s theory of forms.;115
32;4. Plato on the self predication of the forms.;120
33;5. Plato and the third man.;129
34;6. Evaluation of Plato’s view.;134
35;CHAPTER V;137
36;AGAINST HYBRID VIEWS;137
37;1. Introduction.;137
38;2. Against the view of Armstrong.;137
39;3. Against the view of Zalta.;148
40;4. Against hybrid views in general.;149
41;5. Against Baxter’s view.;149
42;CHAPTER VI;155
43;PROPERTY POSSESSION AS IDENTITY;155
44;1. Introduction.;155
45;2. Premise one:;155
46;3. Premise two:;158
47;4. Premise three:;158
48;5. Premise four:;158
49;CHAPTER VII;175
50;OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES;175
51;1. Introduction.;175
52;2. The nature of an entity.;175
53;3. N and its truth.;178
54;4. Objections and replies.;178
54.1;4.1. The many over the one.;178
54.2;4.2. The one over the many.;179
54.3;4.3. Property possession and predication.;180
54.4;4.4. The ‘is’ of predication and the ‘is’ of identity.;183
54.5;4.5. My account and change.;184
54.6;4.6. My account and modality.;185
54.7;4.7. A world of properties alone.;186
55;5. The substratum versus the bundle theories.;188
56;6. The problem of property-unification.;189
57;7. The problem of the principle of individuation.;192
58;BIBLIOGRAPHY;197
