Schmid Plural Action

Essays in Philosophy and Social Science
2009
ISBN: 978-90-481-2437-4
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 58, 260 Seiten

Reihe: Contributions to Phenomenology

Collective Intentionality is a relatively new label for a basic social fact: the sharing of attitudes such as intentions, beliefs and emotions. This volume contributes to current research on collective intentionality by pursuing three aims. First, some of the main conceptual problems in the received literature are introduced, and a number of new insights into basic questions in the philosophy of collective intentionality are developed (part 1). Second, examples are given for the use of the analysis of collective intentionality in the theory and philosophy of the social sciences (part 2). Third, it is shown that this line of research opens up new perspectives on classical topics in the history of social philosophy and social science, and that, conversely, an inquiry into the history of ideas can lead to further refinement of our conceptual tools in the analysis of collective intentionality (part 3).

Autoren/Hrsg.

Schmid, Hans Bernhard

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Acknowledgements;6
2;Contents;8
3;List of Figures;11
4;Introduction;12
5;Part I Collective Intentionality Reconsidered;23
5.1;Chapter 1 Plural Action;24
5.1.1; 1 The Plural Agent Problem;26
5.1.2; 2 Collective Agents and Individual Autonomy;31
5.1.3; 3 The Dogma of Motivational Autarky;35
5.1.4; 4 Intentional Individualism;43
5.1.5; 5 Plural Agency and Methodological Individualism;47
5.2;Chapter 2 Overcoming the ‘Cartesian Brainwash’;50
5.2.1; 6 Collective Intentionality Without Collectivity?;50
5.2.2; 7 The Specter of the Group Mind;53
5.2.3; 8 Collective Intentionality: Irreducible and Relational;63
5.3;Chapter 3 On Not Doing One’s Part;67
5.3.1; 9 Joint Intention and Individual Participation;68
5.3.2; 10 Participation and Normativity;71
5.3.3; 11 The Structure of Dissidence;75
5.4;Chapter 4 Shared Feelings;79
5.4.1; 12 Affective Intentionality: A Matter of Feelings;79
5.4.2; 13 Shared Feelings: Content, Mode, and Subject;84
5.4.3; 14 Individualism About Feelings;89
5.4.4; 15 Phenomenological Fusion;97
6;Part II Collective Intentionality in the Social Sciences;104
6.1;Chapter 5 Social Identities in Experimental Economics;105
6.1.1;16 ‘Strong Reciprocity’ and Other Misnomers;106
6.1.2;17 Beyond Egoism and Altruism;109
6.1.3;18 The Role of Social Identities in Cooperation;113
6.1.4;19 ‘Nostrism’;116
6.2;Chapter 6 Rationalizing Coordination;121
6.2.1; 20 A Philosophical Scandal;121
6.2.2; 21 The Principle of Coordination;124
6.2.3; 22 “Team Thinking”;129
6.3;Chapter 7 Beyond Self-Goal Choice;136
6.3.1; 23 Commitment: Two Opposing Views;137
6.3.2; 24 Amartya Sen’s Critique of Self-Goal Choice;139
6.3.3; 25 Commitment: A Third Account;143
6.4;Chapter 8 Lending a Hand;148
6.4.1; 26 The Paradox of Altruistic Action;150
6.4.2; 27 The Structure of Everyday Altruism;154
6.4.3; 28 Another Solution to the Paradox;160
7;Part III Engaging the ‘Classics’: Four Critical Readings;169
7.1;Chapter 9 Martin Heidegger and the ‘Cartesian Brainwash’;170
7.1.1; 29 The Rift in Heidegger’s Concept of Everydayness;172
7.1.2; 30 Conventionalism and Its Limits;175
7.1.3; 31 Joint Action and the Social Dimension of Authenticity;182
7.1.4; 32 Collective Intentionality: Heideggerian Inspirations;187
7.2;Chapter 10 ‘Volksgeist’;196
7.2.1; 33 The Collective Mind – Past and Present;197
7.2.2; 34 Return of the Volksgeist?;200
7.2.3; 35 Lazarus’ Volksgeist: Some Problems;204
7.3;Chapter 11 Evolution by Imitation;211
7.3.1; 36 The Meme’s Eye View;212
7.3.2; 37 Meme Ontology;216
7.3.3; 38 Evolution by Association;220
7.3.4; 39 Hypnosis Versus ‘Openness to the External World’;224
7.4;Chapter 12 Consensus;229
7.4.1; 40 The Problem of Interaction;231
7.4.2; 41 Consensus;238
7.4.3; 42 Consensus and Contingency;243
7.4.4; 43 Consensus and Language;248
7.4.5; 44 Consensus and Commitment;254
8;Bibliography;259
9;Index;271