Stainton / Chierchia / Viger Compositionality, Context and Semantic Values

Essays in Honour of Ernie Lepore
1. Auflage 2008
ISBN: 978-1-4020-8310-5
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 85, 282 Seiten

Reihe: Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy

Are natural languages genuinely compositional? What roles does context play in linguistic communication, and by what means? In particular, does context interfere with the compositional determination of truth conditions? What meanings should theorists assign to sentences if compositionality is to be retained? These are the central questions of this important volume of new philosophical essays in honour of Ernie Lepore.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Chierchia, Gennaro

Fintel, K.

Viger, Christopher

Stainton, Robert J.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Contents;6
2;Contributors;8
3;Ernie;10
4;Compositionality;14
4.1;“If”, “Unless”, and Quantification;15
4.1.1;1 Introduction: Quantified Conditionals and Compositionality;15
4.1.2;2 The Puzzle of Quantified Conditionals;17
4.1.3;3 The Semantics of Conditionals Containing “If”;19
4.1.4;4 The Semantics of Conditionals Containing “Unless”;29
4.1.5;5 Conclusion;41
4.1.6;References;42
4.2;Bridging the Paratactic Gap;43
4.2.1;1 Introduction;43
4.2.2;2 Davidson’s Analysis;44
4.2.3;3 Binding Problems;50
4.2.4;4 Sentences, Logical Forms and ‘Parataxis’;55
4.2.5;5 Conclusion;68
4.2.6;References;69
5;Context and “What Is Said”;71
5.1;On the Epistemic Utility of What is Said;72
5.1.1;1 Introduction;72
5.1.2;2 What is Said and Testimonial Knowledge;73
5.1.3;3 Speech Reports;76
5.1.4;4 Potential Problem: Testimonial Knowledge and the Context of Speech Reporting;78
5.1.5;5 A Dialectical Look at Possible Solutions;81
5.1.6;6 Epistemic Intuitions and What is Strictly Said;84
5.1.7;7 Conclusion;88
5.1.8;References;88
5.2;In Defense of Context Shifting Arguments;90
5.2.1;1 Introduction;90
5.2.2;2 The Debate Between Radical Pragmatics and Truth Conditional Semantics;91
5.2.3;3 Cappelen and Lepore’s Positive Views and the Case of “Incomplete Definite Descriptions”;95
5.2.4;4 Cappelen and Lepore’s Main Argument Against CSAs;100
5.2.5;5 Vagueness and a Reductio of the Main Argument;101
5.2.6;6 Why the Second Premise of the Main Argument Against CSAs Is False;102
5.2.7;7 Conclusion: Cappelen and Lepore Should Endorse CSAs;108
5.2.8;Notes;110
5.2.9;References;114
5.3;Contextualism, Skepticism and Objectivity;115
5.3.1;1 Assertion and Context;117
5.3.2;2 Knowledge and Belief;119
5.3.3;3 Two Uncontroversial Kinds of Context Dependence;122
5.3.4;4 Contextualism and the Skeptic;124
5.3.5;5 Some Examples;129
5.3.6;6 Contextualism and Objectivity;132
5.3.7;Notes;136
5.3.8;References;137
5.4;On Failing to Capture Some (or Even All) of What is Communicated;139
5.4.1;1 Introduction;139
5.4.2;2 The Problem of Irrelevance;141
5.4.3;3 Linguistic Theories as Scientific Theories;143
5.4.4;4 Rescuing the Attack on Minimalism?;150
5.4.5;5 Conclusion;153
5.4.6;Notes;154
5.4.7;References;154
6;Semantic Values;155
6.1;The Disunity of Truth;156
6.1.1;1 In Media Res: Supervaluations;156
6.1.2;2 Flashback: Frege’s Terminality Argument;159
6.1.3;3 Pre-Fregean Semantic Maximalism and Minimalism;161
6.1.4;4 The Disunity of Truth;165
6.1.5;5 Main Plot: Necessity is a Mode of Truth;167
6.1.6;6 Modality and ‘Possible Worlds’;172
6.1.7;7 The Emergence of Modal Language;173
6.1.8;8 Truth Pointwise and Setwise;176
6.1.9;9 What Makes a Mode of Truth a Mode of Truth?;178
6.1.10;10 Conclusio Res: Vagueness is a Modality;183
6.1.11;11 A Disunified Treatment of Vagueness;186
6.1.12;12 Two Objections to Supervaluationism;188
6.1.13;13 Dynamic Semantics and the Omniscience Argument;191
6.1.14;14 Update, Truth, and Disunity;195
6.1.15;References;199
6.2;Descriptions, Negation, and Focus;201
6.2.1;1 Initial Observations;203
6.2.2;2 Approaches to Definite Descriptions;205
6.2.3;3 Negation and Focus;211
6.2.4;4 Improper Descriptions and Negation;218
6.2.5;5 Negative Quantifiers;222
6.2.6;6 Conclusion;224
6.2.7;References;225
6.3;Evidentials: Some Preliminary Distinctions;229
6.3.1;1 Evidential Constructions;230
6.3.2;2 Evidence versus Source;231
6.3.3;3 The Object of Evidentiality;232
6.3.4;4 Singulary or Binary?;233
6.3.5;5 Application to Evidentials;236
6.3.6;6 Recursion in Binary Constructions;237
6.3.7;7 Slifting Diagnostics;240
6.3.8;8 Final Questions;240
6.3.9;Notes;241
6.3.10;References;242
6.4;The Direct Expression of Metaphorical Content;244
6.4.1;1 Preliminaries;244
6.4.2;2 Some Data;246
6.4.3;3 A Direct Expression Account of Cappy’s Metaphorical Utterance;248
6.4.4;4 A Reason for Rejecting a Direct Expression Account?;250
6.4.5;5 A Direct Expression Response;252
6.4.6;6 Linguistic Communication: Miraculous or Merely Incompletely Understood?;258
6.4.7;References;260
6.5;The Empirical Case for Bare Demonstratives in Vision;261
6.5.1;1 Background: Representation in Language and Vision;261
6.5.2;2 Some Parallels Between the Study of Vision and Language;263
6.5.3;3 What does all this have to do with Connecting Vision and the World?;274
6.5.4;Notes;276
6.5.5;References;278
7;Index;281