Thomas Animal Ethics and the Autonomous Animal Self

1. Auflage 2016
ISBN: 978-1-137-58685-8
Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 177 Seiten

Reihe: Religion and Philosophy

This book presents a radical and intuitive argument against the notion that intentional action, agency and autonomy are features belonging only to humans. Using evidence from research into the minds of non-human animals, it explores the ways in which animals can be understood as individuals who are aware of themselves, and the consequent basis of our moral obligations towards them.

The first part of this book argues for a conception of agency in animals that admits to degrees among individuals and across species. It explores self-awareness and its various levels of complexity which depend on an animals’ other mental capacities. The author offers an overview of some established theories in animal ethics including those of Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Bernard Rollin and Lori Gruen, and the ways these theories serve to extend moral consideration towards animals based on various capacities that both animals and humans have in common. The book concludes by challenging traditional Kantian notions of rationality and what it means to be an autonomous individual, and discussing the problems that still remain in the study of animal ethics.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Thomas, Natalie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Dedication;6
2;Series Editors’ Preface;7
3;Acknowledgements;10
4;Contents;12
5;1: Introduction;13
5.1;Reference;18
6;2: Animals as Agents;19
6.1; Introduction;19
6.2; Agency;20
6.3; Beliefs, Desires, Preferences, and Intentions;22
6.4; Rationality;28
6.5; Intentionality;32
6.6; Moral Agency;39
6.7; Conclusion;47
6.8;References;47
7;3: Self-Awareness and Selfhood in Animals;49
7.1; Introduction;49
7.2; Self-Consciousness and Self-Awareness;50
7.3; The Ecological Self and Evolutionary Continuity;61
7.4; Empirical Evidence for Selfhood in Animals;67
7.5; Objections to Selfhood in Animals;72
7.6; Conclusion;77
7.7;References;77
8;4: Autonomy and Animals;80
8.1; Introduction;80
8.2; The Common View of Autonomy;81
8.3; Minimal Autonomy;88
8.4; Aiming for Consistency;93
8.5; Autonomy and Duties;94
8.6; A Naturalized View of Autonomy;98
8.7; Obligations Towards Animals;100
8.8; Conclusion;105
8.9;References;105
9;5: Other Views of Animal Ethics;107
9.1; Introduction;107
9.2; Peter Singer and Utilitarianism;108
9.3; Tom Regan, Inherent Value, and Rights;116
9.4; Bernard Rollin and Teleology;125
9.5; Lori Gruen and Entangled Empathy;130
9.6; Conclusion;136
9.7;References;136
10;6: Kantian Ethics and Animals;138
10.1; Introduction;138
10.2; Kant on Animals;139
10.3; Wright on Kant and Animal Autonomy;142
10.4; Wood on Kant and Rational Nature;147
10.5; Korsgaard on Kant and Animal Nature;149
10.6; Conclusion;161
10.7;References;162
11;7: Conclusions and Further Directions;163
11.1;References;170
12;Bibliography;171
13;Index;178