Values in the Supreme Court: Decisions, Division and Diversity

Erscheinungsjahr 2020
ISBN: 978-1-5099-2185-0
Verlag: HART PUB

Buch, Englisch, 232 Seiten, Hardback, Format (B × H): 164 mm x 236 mm, Gewicht: 500 g

Reihe: Hart Studies on Judging and th

This book examines the significance of values in Supreme Court decision making. Drawing on theories and techniques from psychology, it focuses on the content analysis of judgments and uses a novel methodology to reveal the values that underpin decision making. The book centres on cases which divide judicial opinion: Dworkin's hard cases 'in which the result is not clearly dictated by statute or precedent'. In hard cases, there is real uncertainty about the legal rules that should be applied, and factors beyond traditional legal sources may influence the decision-making process. It is in these uncertain cases - where legal developments can rest on a single judicial decision - that values are revealed in the judgments. The findings in this book have significant implications for developments in law, judicial decision making and the appointment of the judiciary.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Cahill-O'Callaghan, Rachel

Fachgebiete

• Rechtswissenschaften Ausländisches Recht Common Law (UK, USA, Australien u.a.)

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1. A Theoretical Framework for a Role of Values in Judicial Decisions

I. Judicial Discretion and the Exercise of Choice in Uncertain Decisions

II. Defining Values

III. A Foundation for the Role of Values, Uncertainty and Intuition in Judicial Decision Making

IV. Evidence of Instinct and Values in the Supreme Court
V. Constraint on the Influence of Values

2. Finding Values in Legal Judgments: A Model and a Method

I. A Psychological Model of Personal Values

II. A Note on the Selection of Judgments: Hard Cases in the UK Supreme Court

III. A Method to Identify Values in Legal Judgments

IV. Values in Legal Judgments - Examples

V. Limits of the Coding Scheme

3. The Value:Decision Paradigm: Validating the Method

I. The Case - R (on the Application of E) v JFS Governing Body [2009]

II. Are the Values Affirmed by Opposing Decisions Reflective of Intrinsic Personal Values? The Experiment

4. Does the Value:Decision Paradigm Apply to all Indeterminate Cases? Division, Dissent and Judicial Values

I. Defining Dissent and Division

II. Division in the UK Supreme Court

III. What Motivates Dissent?

IV. The Psychology of Dissent

V. Case Selection and Analysis

VI. Values in Cases which Divided Judicial Opinion

VII. Values, Division and the Subject Matter of the Case

VIII. The Value:Decision Paradigm in Cases with a Single Dissent

IX. Concurring Judgments in Consensus Decisions - Another Form of Disagreement

X. Division, Dissent, Uncertainty and Values

5. Values and Individual Decision Making: Diversity of Values and Consistency in Decisions

I. The Role of the Individual in Judicial Decisions

II. Individual Difference - Tacit Diversity in Judicial Decision Making

III. Diversity of Values in the Supreme Court

IV. Values Priorities Reflected in Judicial Decisions

V. The Value:Decision Paradigm in Individual Legal Decision Making

VI. Individual Values and Decisions

6. Values and Panel Decision Making: Shared Value Priorities and Agreement in Hard Cases

I. Agreement in the UK Supreme Court
II. Calculating Agreement in the Supreme Court

III. Shared Judicial Value Priorities

IV. Values and Agreement in Cases which Divide Judicial Opinion

V. Values and Agreement in the Supreme Court

7. The Role of Values in Judicial Decision Making in the UK Supreme Court

I. Transparency

II. Judicial Diversity

III. Judicial Appointment

Über Autor(innen)

Cahill-O'Callaghan, Rachel
Rachel Cahill-O'Callaghan is Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Cardiff.

Rachel Cahill-O'Callaghan is Senior Lecturer in Law at Cardiff University