Buch, Englisch, 272 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 434 g
Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy
Buch, Englisch, 272 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 434 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-975143-3
Verlag: Oxford University Press
Unique collaboration by a team of scholars from philosophy and religious studies
Combination of textual scholarship and systematic philosophy
The doctrine of the two truths - a conventional truth and an ultimate truth - is central to Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology. The two truths (or two realities), the distinction between them, and the relation between them is understood variously in different Buddhist schools; it is of special importance to the Madhyamaka school. One theory is articulated with particular force by Nagarjuna (2nd C CE) who famously claims that the two truths are identical to one another and yet distinct. One of the most influential interpretations of Nagarjuna's difficult doctrine derives from the commentary of Candrakarti (6th C CE). In view of ist special soteriological role, much attention has been devoted to explaining the nature of the ultimate truth; less, however, has been paid to understanding the nature of conventional truth, which is often described as "deceptive," "illusion," or "truth for fools." But because of the close relation between the two truths in Madhyamaka, conventional truth also demands analysis. Moonshadows, the product of years of collaboration by ten cowherds engaged in Philosophy and Buddhist Studies, provides this analysis. The book asks, "what is true about conventional truth?" and "what are the implications of an understanding of conventional truth for our lives?" Moonshadows begins with a philosophical exploration of classical Indian and Tibetan texts articulating Candrakati's view, and uses this textual exploration as a basis for a more systematic philosophical consideration of the issues raised by his account.
Zielgruppe
Scholars and students of Buddhism, of comparative philosophy
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
Acknowledgments
Preface
1.: An Introduction to Conventional Truth
Guy Newland and Tom J F Tillemans
2.: Taking Conventional Truth Seriously: Authority Regarding Deceptive Reality
Jay L Garfield
3.: Prasangika Epistemology in Context
Sonam Thakchöe
4.: Weighing the Butter, Levels of Explanation and Falsification: Models of the Conventional in Tsongkhapa's Account of Madhyamaka
Guy Martin Newland
5.: Identifying the Object of Negation and the Status of Conventional Truth: Why the dgag bya Matters So Much to Tibetan Madhyamikas
Jay L Garfield and Sonam Thakchöe
6.: Can a Madhyamaka be a Skeptic? The Case of Patsab Nyimadrak
Georges Dreyfus
7.: Madhyamaka and Classical Greek Skepticism
Georges Dreyfus and Jay L Garfield
8.: The (Two) Truths about Truth
Graham Priest, Mark Siderits and Tom J F Tillemans
9.: How Far can a Madhyamika Buddhist Reform Conventional Truth? Dismal Relativism, Fictionalism, Easy-easy Truth and the Alternatives
Tom J F Tillemans
10.: Is Everything Connected to Everything Else? What the Gopis Know
Mark Siderits
11.: Carnap's Pragmatism and the Two Truths
Bronwyn Finnigan and Koji Tanaka
12.: The Merely Conventional Existence of the World
Jan Westerhoff
13.: Two Truths: Two Models
Graham Priest
14.: Ethics for Madhyamikas
Bronwyn Finnigan and Koji Tanaka
References and Abbreviations
Index