E-Book, Englisch, Band 2, 441 Seiten
E-Book, Englisch, Band 2, 441 Seiten
Reihe: New Directions in Jonathan Edwards Studies
ISBN: 978-3-647-56024-3
Verlag: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Kein
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Geisteswissenschaften Christentum, Christliche Theologie Systematische Theologie Geschichte der Theologie, Einzelne Theologen
- Geisteswissenschaften Christentum, Christliche Theologie Kirchengeschichte
- Geisteswissenschaften Christentum, Christliche Theologie Praktische Theologie Christliches Leben & Praxis
- Geisteswissenschaften Christentum, Christliche Theologie Christliche Kirchen, Konfessionen, Denominationen Protestantismus, evangelische und protestantische Kirchen Konfessionen amerikanischen Ursprungs
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Cover;1
2;Title Page;4
3;Copyright;5
4;Table of Contents;12
5;Body;22
6;Abbreviations;22
7;Introduction;24
7.1;1. Preamble;24
7.2;2. Historical perspectives;29
7.2.1;2.1 Eighteenth-century reception of Edwards's Freedom of Will;29
7.2.2;2.2 Nineteenth-century reactions to Edwards's Freedom of Will;31
7.2.3;2.3 Twentieth-century strands in Edwards studies;33
7.3;3. A brief sketch of Jonathan Edwards's context, life and academics;45
7.4;4. Logic;53
7.5;5. A brief sketch of three opposing sets of conditions considered requisite for freedom of will;56
7.5.1;Heereboord's classic-Reformed freedom ad utrumlibet;56
7.5.2;Whitby's freedom ad utrumlibet;57
7.5.3;Edwards's synthesis;57
7.6;6. Methodological assumptions;58
7.6.1;6.1 Scholastic method;59
7.6.2;6.2 Latin idiom;60
7.7;7. ?Stoic fate' and Edwards's Freedom of Will;61
7.8;8. Overview;62
8;Part One. the Harvard and Yale Curricula on Freedom of Will;68
9;1. Commencement broadside theses and quaestiones;70
9.1;1.1 Introduction;70
9.1.1;1.1.1 Harvard and Yale connection;71
9.1.2;1.1.2 Princeton;74
9.2;1.2 Survey of select Harvard, Yale, and Princeton commencement broadside theses and quaestiones;75
9.2.1;1.2.1 (Structural) order of nature;76
9.2.2;1.2.2 Moral necessity;78
9.2.3;1.2.3 Contingency;81
9.2.4;1.2.4 The will;82
9.2.5;1.2.5 Freedom;86
9.2.6;1.2.6 Free choice and indifference;87
9.2.7;1.2.7 Cognition;90
9.2.8;1.2.8 Propositions;94
9.2.9;1.2.9 Intuitive evidence and assent;97
9.2.10;1.2.10 Causes;99
9.2.11;1.2.11 Possibility;101
9.2.12;1.2.12 Foreknowledge;102
9.2.13;1.2.13 Decrees and God's will;103
9.2.14;1.2.14 Virtue;104
9.2.15;1.2.15 Newtonian physics;105
9.3;1.3 Summary;106
10;2. Adriaan Heereboord on Reformed freedom ad utrumlibet;108
10.1;2.1 Introduction;108
10.2;2.2 The acts of the will;110
10.2.1;2.2.1 Elicited acts and commands;110
10.2.2;2.2.2 The will and the desired end;111
10.2.3;2.2.3 Whether a neutral act of the will be permitted?;111
10.2.4;2.2.4 Choice and consent;113
10.3;2.3 The objects of the will;113
10.4;2.4 The motives of the will;116
10.4.1;2.4.1 Blind power;117
10.4.2;2.4.2 Duplex esse;117
10.4.3;2.4.3 Concurrence of object with the will;118
10.4.4;2.4.4 Cognition of object concurring with the will;119
10.5;2.5 Summary;120
10.6;2.6 Free choice;121
10.6.1;2.6.1 The nature of free choice;121
10.6.2;2.6.2 The relation of liberum arbitrium to the intellect;122
10.6.3;2.6.3 The will seeking the good necessarily and free choice seeking the good freely;124
10.6.4;2.6.4 Indifference belongs more to the judgment and arbitrium than the will;124
10.6.5;2.6.5 Why free choice is given to humans in both the understanding and the will.;125
10.6.6;2.6.6 Philosophers' common definition of free choice;126
10.6.7;2.6.7 Heereboord's requisites for humankind's free action;128
10.6.8;2.6.8 Heereboord's definition of free choice;130
10.7;2.7 Summary;131
11;3. Adriaan Heereboord on necessity and contingency;133
11.1;3.1 Introduction;133
11.2;3.2 Kinds of necessity;134
11.2.1;3.2.1 Four kinds of necessity: one independent and three dependent;134
11.2.2;3.2.2 A twofold internal and a fourfold external kind of necessity;137
11.2.3;3.2.3 The division of efficient causes;139
11.2.4;3.2.4 Summary;140
11.3;3.3 Contingency;141
11.3.1;3.3.1 Definition of contingency;142
11.3.2;3.3.2 A fivefold division of contingency;143
11.3.3;3.3.3 Contingent causality;145
11.4;3.4 Divine free causes and kinds of indifference;150
11.4.1;3.4.1 Negative indifference;150
11.4.2;3.4.2 Privative indifference;151
11.4.3;3.4.3 Active indifference;152
11.5;3.5 Divine and humankind's willing and indifference;152
11.5.1;3.5.1 Divine willing and indifference;152
11.5.2;3.5.2 Humankind's willing and indifference;153
11.6;3.6 Indifferent free causes;154
11.6.1;3.6.1 The Jesuit line of compossibility and incompossibility;156
11.6.2;3.6.2 An alternative line of compossibility, incompossibility, and the divine prerequisites;159
11.7;3.7 Summary;165
12;4. Adriaan Heereboord on divine ideas and exemplar causality;168
12.1;4.1 Introduction to divine ideas;168
12.1.1;4.1.1 Whether there be the notion of idea in God;171
12.1.2;4.1.2 What idea in God is;172
12.2;4.2 The Ames and Heereboord line on divine ideas;174
12.2.1;William Ames;174
12.2.2;Heereboord;176
12.3;4.3 God knows his divine essence as imitable;177
12.4;4.4 The meaning of states of affairs (res) and of idea;179
12.5;4.5 God has in himself ideas of all possible states of affairs;183
12.5.1;Are the essences of states of affairs eternal?;184
12.6;4.6 Different senses in which truths in God's mind are eternal;186
12.7;4.7 Summary;188
13;5. Charles Morton on freedom of will;191
13.1;5.1 Introduction;191
13.2;5.2 Charles Morton's “Ethics” and “Pneumaticks” texts for students;192
13.3;5.3 Morton's Pneumaticks, chapter eight “Of Science in God.”;193
13.3.1;5.3.1 Definitions of God's knowledge;194
13.3.1.1;Morton and Heereboord's use of verbum mentis and speculum trinitatis;195
13.3.2;5.3.2 God's twofold knowledge;196
13.3.2.1;God's simple knowledge of understanding;196
13.3.2.2;God's knowledge of vision;197
13.3.2.3;Necessity and contingency of future states of affairs;199
13.3.2.4;Necessity and contingency of secondary causes in the compound and divided sense;199
13.3.2.5;Future contingent states of affairs either absolute or conditional;200
13.3.3;5.3.3 No middle knowledge;202
13.3.4;5.3.4 Morton's comments and reply to middle knowledge;203
13.3.5;5.3.5 Summary;204
13.4;5.4 Divine will;205
13.4.1;The primary object of love is God;206
13.4.2;The secondary objects of love are creatures and states of affairs;207
13.4.3;There is nothing good or true antecedent to the divine will;207
13.4.4;Verity, or truth-value, as object of the divine will;208
13.4.5;Complex verity of propositions (enunciationis);210
13.5;5.5 Liberty is a property of the divine will;210
13.5.1;God's act of self-love;211
13.5.2;God's act of love towards his creation;211
13.5.3;God's act of willing as decreeing is free;212
13.5.4;Morton's interpretation of liberty as property of the divine will;213
13.6;5.6 Divine decrees;213
13.6.1;5.6.1 Heereboord's definition of the divine decrees;214
13.6.2;5.6.2 Three “instants” in the act of decreeing;216
13.6.3;5.6.3 Summary;220
13.7;5.7 Morton's Ethics, chapter three “Of the Liberty of the Will”;221
13.7.1;5.7.1 Morton's definition of humankind's freedom of will;224
13.7.2;5.7.2 Prerequisites to humankind's free acts of will;225
13.7.2.1;Freedom from compulsion;225
13.7.2.2;Freedom from necessity;225
13.7.2.3;Freedom of exercise;226
13.7.2.4;Freedom of specification;226
13.7.3;5.7.3 Opponents' view of freedom of exercise;227
13.7.4;5.7.4 Morton's claim that Reformed philosophy locates freedom in rational spontaneity;228
13.7.5;5.7.5 Summary analysis;231
14;Part Two. The Position of Jonathan Edwards on freedom of will;234
15;6. Jonathan Edwards's “Controversies” Notebook on predestination;236
15.1;6.1 Introduction;237
15.2;6.2 Divine decrees;239
15.2.1;6.2.1 Remonstrant Proposition Six;240
15.2.1.1;Remonstrants do not see how to reconcile foreseen faith and an independent decree;240
15.2.1.2;Supposed-scripture language of conditioned foreknowledge;241
15.2.2;6.2.2 Response to conditioned knowledge;242
15.2.2.1;Response ?;242
15.2.2.2;Response ?;243
15.2.2.3;Purely possible states of affairs;243
15.2.2.4;Futurition;244
15.2.2.5;Divine mental representation;244
15.2.2.6;If the latter occurs, then the former also happens (ut si hoc fit etiam illud fiat);245
15.2.2.7;God knows all other possible sequences of events, not just those that happen;247
15.2.2.8;Stapfer's caveat on conditionals;248
15.3;6.3 God's ordering of events does not destroy human freedom of will;248
15.3.1;6.3.1 Remonstrant Proposition Four:;249
15.3.2;6.3.2 Edwards's response: the stronger the inclination, the freer one is;250
15.4;6.4 Sequences of events;250
15.4.1;6.4.1 Synchronic representation of sequences of events in the divine mind;251
15.4.2;6.4.2 The sequence of states of affairs is best because God willed it;253
15.4.3;6.4.3 God's willing of bad states of affairs that belong to a series of events;254
15.4.4;6.4.4 Summary;255
15.5;6.5 Analysis of two technical terms;255
15.5.1;6.5.1 Signum rationis;256
15.5.2;6.5.2 Repraesentare;256
15.6;6.6 States of affairs passing on from one status to another;257
15.6.1;6.6.1 Stapfer's scheme;258
15.6.2;6.6.2 Edwards's scheme against the Arminian scheme;259
15.7;6.7 Summary analysis;261
16;7. Daniel Whitby on freedom ad utrumlibet and Edwards's reply;265
16.1;7.1 Introduction;265
16.1.1;7.1.1 Whitby's account of the turn from his ?Calvinist' education to the view of the early church on the doctrine of freedom of the will;267
16.1.2;7.1.2 The structure of Whitby's argument;269
16.1.3;7.1.3 Whitby's argument;272
16.1.3.1;Free choice (autexousia);273
16.1.3.2;A state of trial;274
16.1.3.3;Not essential to humankind as such, only to a state of trial;274
16.1.3.4;Freedom void of necessity;274
16.1.3.5;Freedom from a “divine physical influx”;275
16.1.3.6;Freedom ad utrumlibet is an inferior freedom;275
16.2;7.2 Whitby's claims;276
16.2.1;7.2.1 Whitby's claim from the early church fathers;277
16.2.2;7.2.2 Whitby's claim that ?Calvinists' show affinities to the ?Stoics';279
16.2.3;7.2.3 Whitby's claim for support from philosophers;280
16.3;7.3 Observations and analysis;281
16.3.1;7.3.1 On Whitby's free choice;282
16.3.2;7.3.2 On Whitby's state of trial;285
16.3.3;7.3.3 On Whitby's freedom void of necessity;286
16.3.4;7.3.4 On Whitby's freedom from the divine influx;290
16.4;7.4 Edwards's replies to Whitby's claims;293
16.4.1;7.4.1 Edwards's reply to Whitby's claim for support from early church fathers;293
16.4.2;7.4.2 Edwards's reply to some aspects of ?Stoic' doctrine;295
16.4.3;7.4.3 Edwards's reply to the ?Arminian' set of conditions requisite for freedom;297
16.4.4;7.4.4 Edwards's reply to three ?Arminian' evasions;298
16.4.4.1;The determining act structurally precedes an act of volition;298
16.4.4.2;The determining act does not structurally precede the act of volition, the two acts occur simultaneously.;299
16.4.4.3;The act of volition comes to pass without a cause;300
16.5;7.5 Analysis of “order of nature”;300
16.6;7.6 Summary;301
17;8. Fundamental concepts in Jonathan Edwards's Freedom of Will;305
17.1;8.1 Introduction;305
17.2;8.2 Edwards's and his interlocutors's definitions of terms;307
17.2.1;8.2.1 The acts of the will;307
17.2.2;8.2.2 Volition and preference and the acts of the will;309
17.2.3;8.2.3 Objects of the will;311
17.2.4;8.2.4 The greatest apparent good;312
17.3;8.3 Necessity;321
17.3.1;8.3.1 Absolute necessity, the necessity of the consequence, and of the consequent: Calvin's line, Edwards's line, and the classic-Reformed line;325
17.3.1.1;The classic-medieval and early-modern line on implication;326
17.3.1.2;Calvin's levels of necessity;328
17.3.1.3;Analysis of Calvin's levels of necessity;330
17.3.1.4;Edwards's levels of necessity;334
17.3.1.5;Edwards on the necessity of the consequence;337
17.3.1.6;The causal function of the antecedent in an “If-then” conditional;342
17.3.1.7;Summary;343
17.3.2;8.3.2 Natural and moral necessity;345
17.4;8.4 Heereboord and Edwards: an analysis of acts of the will;348
17.4.1;8.4.1 Heereboord and Edwards on free choice;348
17.4.2;8.4.2 Heereboord and Edwards on the relation of objects to the will;348
17.5;8.5 Summary;350
18;9. Jonathan Edwards's argument for freedom of perfection;352
18.1;9.1 Introduction;352
18.1.1;9.1.1 Edwards's argument for moral necessity as a freedom of perfection;354
18.1.2;9.1.2 Analysis of Edwards's notion of freedom of perfection;361
18.1.2.1;Challenges to Lee's account of Edwards's dispositional ontology;366
18.2;9.2 The transformation of natural principles into moral causes;370
18.2.1;9.2.1 Natural inclinations;370
18.2.2;9.2.2 Edwards rejects a notion of natural necessity in favor of progressive growth of habits;372
18.3;9.3 Other sources on the notion of moral necessity as freedom of perfection;374
18.3.1;9.3.1 Descartes on freedom of perfection;375
18.3.1.1;A brief sketch of Descartes's notion of freedom of the divine will;375
18.3.1.2;A sketch of Descartes's view of human freedom of perfection;376
18.3.2;9.3.2 Heereboord on the classical notion of ?habit' and freedom of perfection;379
18.3.3;9.3.3 Turretin on the classical notion of “seeds of virtue” and “moral necessity”;380
18.3.4;9.3.4 Van Mastricht on a classic notion of freedom of perfection;382
18.4;9.4 Summary;384
19;10. Jonathan Edwards's “universal determining providence”;387
19.1;10.1 Introduction;387
19.2;10.2 Edwards's argument for God's universal determining providence;388
19.2.1;10.2.1 The argument;388
19.2.2;10.2.2 Analysis;393
19.2.2.1;The principle of superior fitness and Edwards's universal determining providence;393
19.2.2.2;Edwards and Newton on infinite space and duration;397
19.2.2.3;Edwards's reply to Isaac Watts on the notion of God's superior fitness;398
19.3;10.3 Edwards's universal determining providence: a theory of will transforms itself into a theory of causality;400
19.3.1;10.3.1 The principle of sufficient reason (PSR): “There cannot be anything coming to pass without a cause.”;403
19.3.2;10.3.2 The principle of the predicate in the subject (PPS), or, propositional containment;404
19.3.3;10.3.3 The principle of the noble cause (PNC): “There cannot be more in the effect than in the cause.”;406
19.4;10.4 Summary;407
20;Conclusion;410
21;Bibliography;423
21.1;Primary sources;423
21.2;Secondary literature;428
22;Index of Names;437
