Francisco Collective Action Theory and Empirical Evidence

1. Auflage 2010
ISBN: 978-1-4419-1476-7
Verlag: Springer
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 116 Seiten

This book comprises empirical tests of the theoretical implications of collective action theory specifically with regard to mobilization. It is based on the author's European Protest and Coercion Data, which won the Comparative Politics Section of American Political Science Association award for the best data set in 2007. The data is supplemented by historical investigations as well as other research. The volume is divided into six chapters. The introduction covers the theory of collective action in its many manifestations as well as the process of drawing out theoretical implications. The second chapter goes to the core of the mobilization issues, especially with regard to the role of leadership, which is inextricably linked to mobilization. The third chapter applies the concept of adaptation to the development of more productive tactics that promote mobilization in support of a public good and minimize the possibility of repression. In chapter four, five spatial hypotheses based on rationality and formal theories are developed and the role of time in protests is addressed. The fifth chapter focuses on the fundamental problems of terror with evidence from the Basque region of Spain and France from Ireland against the Provisional Irish Republican Army. The final chapter surveys the empirical evidence and summarizes the support of collective action theory. Testing collective action theory implications with empirical evidence will appeal to political scientists, sociologists, economists and researchers concerned with mobilization.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Francisco, Ronald A.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Acknowledgments;6
2;Contents;8
3;1 Testing Collective Action Theory;11
3.1;1.1 Introduction;11
3.2;1.2 Three Sources for Tests;14
3.3;1.3 Varieties of Empirical Evidence;15
3.4;1.4 A Retreat to the Mundane;16
3.5;1.5 The Plan of the Book;17
3.6;Bibliography;18
4;2 Leadership and Mobilization;20
4.1;2.1 Introduction;20
4.2;2.2 The Role of Leadership in Mobilization;22
4.3;2.3 Events as Catalysts in Mobilization;25
4.4;2.4 Does the Form of Government Matter?;28
4.5;2.5 Resources;29
4.6;2.6 Clandestine Mobilization;31
4.7;2.7 Mass Mobilization;32
4.8;2.8 When Leaders Have Incomplete Knowledge;33
4.9;2.9 Coordination Power;34
4.10;2.10 When Leaders are Replenished;35
4.11;2.11 Competing Leaders;36
4.12;2.12 Recruiting Violent Dissidents;37
4.13;2.13 Civil War;38
4.14;2.14 Pecuniary Incentives;39
4.15;2.15 After the Massacre;41
4.16;2.16 Leadership and Mobilization;41
4.17;Bibliography;42
5;3 Tactical Adaptation and Symbolic Protest;45
5.1;3.1 Introduction;45
5.2;3.2 Definitions and the Challenge of Analysis;46
5.3;3.3 Adaptation and Symbolic Protest in Autocratic States;49
5.4;3.4 Symbolic Protest in Repressive Systems;53
5.5;3.5 Adaptation, Innovation, and Diffusion in Democratic States;55
5.5.1;3.5.1 The Challenge of Publicity and Media Attention;55
5.5.2;3.5.2 Clothing or its Absence;55
5.5.3;3.5.3 Music;56
5.5.4;3.5.4 Bricks, Mortar, and Cement;57
5.5.5;3.5.5 Symbolic Action;57
5.5.6;3.5.6 Fake Signs;58
5.5.7;3.5.7 Two-sided Adaptation and Coevolution;59
5.6;3.6 Adaptation and Symbolic Protest: A Research Agenda;61
5.7;Bibliography;62
6;4 Dimensions of Space and Time in Protest and Repression;64
6.1;4.1 Introduction;64
6.2;4.2 Space in Theory and Evidence;65
6.2.1;4.2.1 Dissident Entrepreneurs Select and Use Space Based on Their Tactics;65
6.2.2;4.2.2 Dissident Entrepreneurs Seek to Shift Protesters into a Space that Reduces the Probability of Coercion and Maximizes Mobilization;68
6.2.3;4.2.3 Protester Site Selection;69
6.2.4;4.2.4 Tacit Coordination and Site Selection;70
6.2.5;4.2.5 Dissidents Adapt Not Only Tactically But Also Spatially When Faced with Large Coercion Forces;71
6.2.6;4.2.6 The State’s Dilemma Grows Larger as Dissident Mobilization Diffuses and Concentration Increases;72
6.2.7;4.2.7 Space in Protest and Repression;77
6.3;4.3 Time;78
6.3.1;4.3.1 Dictatorships and Rapid Collapse;79
6.3.2;4.3.2 The Special Case of Riots;81
6.3.3;4.3.3 Duration of Protest Under Heavy Repression;82
6.3.4;4.3.4 The Duration and Timing of Protest Events;85
6.3.5;4.3.5 Stability Over Time;87
6.3.6;4.3.6 Specification Problems and the Duration of Protest and Repression;87
6.4;Bibliography;88
7;5 Terror;90
7.1;5.1 Introduction;90
7.2;5.2 Why Do Terror Groups Form?;91
7.3;5.3 Necessary Supports of a Terror Group;93
7.3.1;5.3.1 Financing Terror;93
7.3.2;5.3.2 Recruitment;97
7.3.3;5.3.3 Safe Areas, Safe Houses, and Protective Support;99
7.3.4;5.3.4 Leadership;100
7.4;5.4 Methods of Combating a Terror Group;101
7.4.1;5.4.1 Arrests, Killings, and Forces Against Terror;102
7.4.2;5.4.2 “Critical Mass” in the Context of Terror;105
7.4.3;5.4.3 Political Arms, Negotiations, Cease-Fires, and Splintering;106
7.4.4;5.4.4 Loss of Popular Support;107
7.4.5;5.4.5 Extinct and Zombie Terror Organizations;108
7.4.6;5.4.6 The Possibility of Eliminating an International Terror Organization;108
7.5;Bibliography;109
8;6 Evidence for Collective Action Theory;111
8.1;6.1 Introduction;111
8.2;6.2 Evaluation;112
8.2.1;6.2.1 Wintrobe;112
8.2.2;6.2.2 DeNardo;112
8.2.3;6.2.3 Lichbach;114
8.3;6.3 Theory in the Light of Empirical Evidence;114
8.3.1;6.3.1 Leadership and Mobilization;115
8.3.2;6.3.2 Tactical Adaptation and Symbolic Protest;116
8.3.3;6.3.3 Dimensions of Space and Time;116
8.3.4;6.3.4 Terror;117
8.4;6.4 Collective Action Theory and Empirical Evidence;118
8.5;Bibliography;118
9;Index;119