Frápolli The Priority of Propositions. A Pragmatist Philosophy of Logic

1. Auflage 2023
ISBN: 978-3-031-25229-7
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 475, 255 Seiten, eBook

Reihe: Synthese Library

This monograph is a defence of the Fregean take on logic. The author argues that Frege´s projects, in logic and philosophy of language, are essentially connected and that the formalist shift produced by the work of Peano, Boole and Schroeder and continued by Hilbert and Tarski is completely alien to Frege's approach in the Begriffsschrift. A central thesis of the book is that judgeable contents, i.e. propositions, are the primary bearers of logical properties, which makes logic embedded in our conceptual system. This approach allows coherent and correct definitions of logical constants, logical consequence, and truth and connects their use to the practices of rational agents in science and everyday life.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Frápolli, María José

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Part I: The Pragmatist BasisChapter 1. Pragmatism and Metaphysics: The General Background1. Metaphysics2. The conceptual articulation of reality3. Assertion4. Propositions and the formality of logic5. Arguments, inferences and argumentations
Chapter 2. Groundbreaking Principles1. Five principles2. Two models of propositional individuation3. Propositional identification4. Logical propositions5. Logic as a science
Chapter 3. Semantic and Pragmatic Hints in Frege's Logical Theory1. Frege’s projects2. The representation of abstract reality3. The analysis of discourse4. Two-factor semantics and the meaning of identity5. Special notions
Part II: Logical ConstantsChapter 4. Implying, Precluding, and Quantifying Over: Frege's Logical Expressivism1. Logical expressivism2. The conditional and negation3. Negation, incompatibility, falsehood4. Expressions of quantity and relations between concepts
Chapter 5. Lessons from Inferentialism and Invariantism1. What is the issue with logical constants?2. Analytically valid arguments3. Inferentialist approaches4. The Erlangen programme5. Invariant terms of logic6. A pragmatist excursus
Chapter 6. The Inference-Marker View of Logical Notions: What a Pragmatism Proposal Looks Like1. The proposal2. Some consequences of (IMV)3. Inferential significance4. Genuine logical notions
Part III: Further Applications of Propositional PriorityChapter 7. Grue, Tonk, and Russell's Paradox: What Follows from the Principle of Propositional Priority?1. Paradoxes2. Goodman’s ‘grue’3. Prior’s ‘tonk’4. Russell’s paradox5. Taking stock
Chapter 8. Visual Arguments: What is at Issue in the Multimodality Debate?1. Multiple modes2. Non-linguistic aspects of linguistic communication3. Sentences, pictures, and relational linguistic pragmatism4. Affordances5. Ineffability and conceptual articulation6. Visual thinking in mathematics7. Some conclusions
Chapter 9. Truth and Satisfaction: Frege Versus Tarski1. The scope of Tarski’s proposal2. Physicalism and the unity of science3. Correspondence and deflationism4. Satisfaction5. Frege on truth and judgeable contents
Chapter 10. Truth Ascriptions as Prosentences: Further Lessons of the Principle of Propositional Priority1. Why truth is so elusive2. The pragmatist strategy: Truth ascriptions and the Fregean Principle of Context3. Proforms4. Pragmatism, expressivism, and the priority of the proposition5. The prosentential approach to truth6. Truth and assertion

Über Autor(innen)

María J. Frápolli is a Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science at the Department of Philosophy I, University of Granada (Spain). From 2006 to 2012, she held the presidency of the Society of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Spain. Currently, she chairs the Spanish Society for Women in Philosophy (Analytic). From 2015 to 2017, Prof. Frápolli held a Marie-Sklodowska-Curie grant at the Department of Philosophy, University College London and, from 2017 to 2020, was Honorary Professor in the same department. She has worked on the philosophy of language, logic, and mathematics, always from a pragmatist and naturalist standpoint. Some of her books are the following. As author: The Nature of Truth. An Updated Approach to the Meaning of Truth Ascriptions, Springer (2013). As editor: Expressivisms, Knowledge and Truth, Cambridge University Press, (2019); Saying, Meaning, and Referring: Essays on François Recanati’s Philosophy of Language, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire (UK), Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition (2007); and F. P. Ramsey. Critical Reassessments. London (UK), Continuum Studies in British Philosophy, (2005).