Political Institutions and Party-Directed Corruption in South America

Erscheinungsjahr 2014
ISBN: 978-1-107-04044-1
Verlag: Cambridge University Press

Buch, Englisch, 300 Seiten, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 647 g

Reihe: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

An important question for the health and longevity of democratic governance is how institutions may be fashioned to prevent electoral victors from drawing on the resources of the state to perpetuate themselves in power. This book addresses the issue by examining how the structure of electoral institutions - the rules of democratic contestation that determine the manner in which citizens choose their representatives - affects political corruption, defined as the abuse of state power or resources for campaign finance or party-building purposes. To this end, the book develops a novel theoretical framework that examines electoral institutions as a potential vehicle for political parties to exploit the state as a source of political finance. Hypotheses derived from this framework are assessed using an unprecedented public employees' survey conducted by the author in Bolivia, Brazil and Chile.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Gingerich, Daniel W.

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Studien zu einzelnen Ländern und Gebieten
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Kultur Korruption
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Geschichte
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme Politische Parteien

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1. Institutions and political corruption: a framework; 2. Institutional design and the case for mechanism-based analysis; 3. Ballot structure, political corruption, and the performance of proportional representation; 4. An approach to overcoming the fundamental problem of inference in corruption studies; 5. Political career paths in the bureaucracy and the use of institutional resources in Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile; 6. Conclusion.

Über Autor(innen)

Gingerich, Daniel W.
Daniel W. Gingerich is Assistant Professor of Politics specializing in comparative politics at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville. He received his PhD from Harvard University, Massachusetts and has held fellowships in Princeton University's Center for the Study of Democratic Politics and the Inter-American Development Bank's Visiting Scholar's Program. Professor Gingerich's research focuses on understanding the causes and consequences of corruption and clientelism in Latin America as well as developing new methodologies to study these phenomena. He has published various articles in journals such as Political Analysis, the Quarterly Journal of Political Science, the British Journal of Political Science, and the Journal of Theoretical Politics. His scholarship has been funded by organizations such as the National Science Foundation.