Buch, Englisch, 75 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 122 g
Buch, Englisch, 75 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 122 g
Reihe: Elements in Political Economy
ISBN: 978-1-009-32321-5
Verlag: Cambridge University Press
This Element presents newly-collected cross-national data on reelection rates of lower house national legislators from almost 100 democracies around the world. Reelection rates are low/high in countries where clientelism and vote buying are high/low. Drawing on theory developed to study lobbying, the authors explain why politicians continue clientelist activities although they do not secure reelection. The Element also provides a thorough review of the last decade of literature on clientelism, which the authors define as discretionary resource distribution by political actors. The combination of novel empirical data and theoretically-grounded analysis provides a radically new perspective on clientelism. Finally, the Element suggests that clientelism evolves with economic development, assuming new forms in highly developed democracies but never entirely disappearing.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
1. Introduction; 2. Dimensions of clientelism; 3. Interpretations of clientelism in existing literature; 4. Is clientelism effective? New empirical evidence; 5. An interest group interpretation of the prevalence of clientelism; 6. Rethinking clientelism and development; Appendix A – data definitions; Appendix B – data sources; References.