E-Book, Englisch, 312 Seiten
Green The March East 1945
1. Auflage 2011
ISBN: 978-0-7524-7857-9
Verlag: The History Press
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 6 - ePub Watermark
The Final Days of Oflag IX A/H and IX A/Z
E-Book, Englisch, 312 Seiten
ISBN: 978-0-7524-7857-9
Verlag: The History Press
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 6 - ePub Watermark
PETER GREEN's father, Alan Green 1 Border, was imprisoned in Oflag IX A/Z at Rotenburg an der Fulda, after being captured at the end of Operation Market Garden. Cuttings from Illustrated magazine of May 1945 describing the camp's evacuation featured in the family album kept by his mother. They always fascinated Peter as a child. After the death of his father he discovered his father's POW diary and an album of photographs of the march, and he decided to try and learn more about his life at Rotenburg and the camp's walk eastwards away from the Americans. Like his father, Peter was born in Leicestershire, although the family's roots go back to Nidderdale, in Yorkshire. Following a career in government science and technical public relations, he created and now leads an Internet-based research news service for the world's media. Peter is married and lives in Swindon, England.
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LIBERATION ON THE FULDA?
Suddenly, after March 8th 1945, we were astonished to read that the Americans had captured the Rhine Bridge at Remagen – intact! As the crow flies, Remagen is about 180 kilometres from Rotenburg on the Fulda – under 120 miles.
Lieutenant ‘Butch’ Laing, Sherwood Foresters, Oflag IX A/Z, captured
Norway April 1940.
On 11 March the German daily radio bulletin reported, with no preamble of any kind, the news that there was an enemy bridgehead across the Rhine, at Remagen. The item pre-supposed that the listener already knew of the capture of the Ludendorff bridge: ‘The enemy have, despite strong resistance, managed to expand their foothold on the east bank of the Rhine.’ The Americans had in fact captured the railway bridge three days earlier, but it was not until 11 March that the Germans released the news. That day, Lee Hill wrote in his diary ‘…we had a Rhine bash! Quite the best meal I’ve had for some time, with tea good & strong for breakfast, good coffee & milk and sugar at 11.15, “Winnie” salmon & potatoes a la Bradley for lunch, tea at 3.30 and at supper we had toad in the hole, potatoes a la Montgomery, peas a l’Anglaise & Remagen Rice Pudding!’
Other men recorded similar bashes created in their own messes. Whilst the capture of the Remagen bridge meant that there would be no stalemate on the Rhine, freedom for the men in the Oflags was to be delayed. The road network from Remagen was not suited to a major advance eastwards and although the bridgehead was gradually expanded the Allies stuck to their original plans for the main assault across the Rhine to be by Montgomery’s 21st Army Group north of the Ruhr on 23 March. In the event, Patton’s 3rd Army beat Montgomery across by a day and managed to bounce the Rhine at Oppenheim south-west of Frankfurt on 22 March. By 24 March with the successful crossing by 21st Army Group there were three Allied bridgeheads across the Rhine.
The Allies’ plan was for the 21st Army Group to push across the north German plain with Hamburg, the Baltic and possibly Berlin as its objective. Its southernmost unit, US 9th Army under General Simpson, would form one arm of a pincer around the German Army Group B in the Ruhr. The other pincer would come from US 1st Army, under General Hodges, breaking out of the Remagen bridgehead. To protect 1st Army’s flank, Patton’s 3rd Army would move north-east from Oppenheim via Frankfurt towards Kassel. Once Kassel and the Ruhr were secured the American armies would turn eastwards and advance in line, with 1st Army along the southern flank of the Harz Mountains to the Elbe north of Leipzig and 3rd Army to the Czech border via Erfurt and Weimer. The factor therefore that would have most impact on the timing of the American advance eastwards was the speed with which they could close the Ruhr pocket and eliminate resistance at Kassel.
The military situation from mid March until 28 March 1945. (Peter Green)
The German forces that should have opposed the Americans had been badly cut up even before they withdrew behind the Rhine. In the north, Army Group H was soon to be confined to the Netherlands. South of them in the Ruhr was Army Group B, further south was Army Group G. The American advances from Remagen and from Frankfurt pinned a large part of Army Group G against the Rhine. Thereafter there was little that German commanders could do to prevent 1st and 3rd Army advancing at will. On 28 March, 3rd Armored Division, part of 1st Army, had reached Marburg, 50 miles from the Oflags. But the next day they turned 90 degrees northwards towards the Ruhr. That day the Division covered almost 100 miles before reaching Paderborn. Here, finally, its advance shuddered to a halt. Paderborn was at the centre of a military training area and the training units had been organised as SS Brigade Westfalen. The Brigade included part of Heavy Panzer Battalion 507 that was re-equipping with Tiger II tanks at Sennelager. Brigade Westfalen had been tasked to cut across the line of the American advance from the south. They and 3rd Armored met outside of Paderborn. For the next five days 1st Army had a severe fight on its hands trying to eliminate the SS’s Tigers, before it could link up with 9th Army coming from the north.
South of them, 3rd Army had cleared Frankfort by 28 March and was advancing north-eastwards towards Kassel. Its lead unit, 6th Armored, would pass 20 miles to the west of the high ground behind Rotenburg. But of more immediate concern to the Germans, and the best hope of liberation for the prisoners, was the next American unit to the south, 4th Armored. They would reach Bad Hersfeld 10 miles south of Rotenburg on 30 March and if they maintained their direction of advance would be east of the camps the following day.
Taking Kassel was originally intended to be 1st Army’s responsibility, but as they remained heavily engaged around Paderborn, it became a task for 3rd Army. This change of plan, brought about largely by the Germans demonstrating the superiority of Tiger tanks over 3rd Armored’s Shermans, would affect the men at Spangenberg and Rotenburg over the coming weeks. Instead of advancing on a broad front with 1st Army, Patton’s units would begin to push farther and faster east than other American units. This created an American salient around Erfurt.
With all hope of holding the Americans on the Rhine gone, the Germans began to plug the gap between Army Group B in the Ruhr and Army Group G in the south. Eleventh Army, a new army, was created from training groups and stragglers. General Fretter-Pico, a veteran of the Eastern Front, took command of one of its corps east of Kassel in early April. He was shocked to find no coherent front line nor any complete German units. His Corps had two newly formed Volksgrenadier Divisions, 26 and 326, and detachments and brigades scraped together from wherever men and equipment could be found. Both Volksgrenadier Divisions were considerably under strength. Hitler demanded that Kassel was to be held at all costs and the city was declared a fortress – ‘Festung Kassel’. The 166th Reserve Infantry Division from Denmark was rushed to bolster its defence. South of Kassel, Fretter-Pico began to create a defensive line along the Fulda. At Rotenburg the SS organised a collecting point for stragglers who were then allocated to ad hoc units. Although less than 100 feet wide south of Kassel, the Fulda does have high ground on its eastern bank that provided some basis for defence. Spangenberg, six miles east of the Fulda and Rotenburg, 500 yards to the west of the river, would lie on the new front line.
Kassel was also significant for the part it played in the administration of the Oflags. It was where the headquarters for Wehrkreis IX, including the prisoner of war administration, was based. If Kassel were to be lost to the Germans it would complicate matters for Oberst Schrader. His primary concern during the seven days before Easter would be how quickly the Americans moved. By 28 March he had the answer. At the speed that their armoured divisions were moving the Americans could arrive at the camps in two or at the most three days.
There had been some signs that the guards at both camps had become demoralised since the Allied landings in Normandy in 1944. In August 1944 a guard at Spangenberg had commented on news of the Allied advances through France that it was fine, but that they needed to go faster. Hauptmann Roth was overheard in late March saying, ‘It’s all up with Germany now.’ In January 1945 John Logan recorded one of the dog handlers at Rotenburg being carried out of the guard’s quarters drunk, singing the Internationale.
Spangenberg now saw a new source of income for the prisoners: the provision of ‘Holdentod’ – notes written in English that affirmed that the German holder had treated his English captives well. It was hoped these would bring better treatment if the guard was himself captured. At Rotenburg, Reverend George Forster remembered, ‘An Austrian officer, who had recently arrived, used to greet us when no Germans were present with two salutes. First he gave the normal “Heil Hitler”, then followed it with a sarcastic “Heil blutig Hitler”.’’ In January 1945 Hauptman Heyl was believed to have confessed to a senior British officer that Germany had lost the war.
Oflag IX A/Z’s guard detachment. The guards for both camps were provided by Landesschützenbataillon 631, a Territorial Army unit with its headquarters in the former castle of the Princes of Hesse at Rotenburg. According to the senior British camp medical officer, Captain John Kennedy RAMC, 80 officers and men of the guard accompanied them on their evacuation. The man giving instructions here is Unteroffizier Altmann. (Green Collection)
Lee Hill took few photographs of Oflag IX A/Z’s guards. This blurred image shows one of two dog handlers, either Obergefreiter Martin Christian Erhard or Alois Schleicher. Erhard was a witness at the Rockensuß war crime trial; he was a farmer from the village of Oberthalhausen, about six miles west of Rotenburg. Either before the march began or on the first day of the march he gave his home address to Captain Quas-Cohen and Lieutenant Smith and offered to shelter them if they escaped. (Marion Gerritsen-Teunissen Collection)
The guards may have been showing signs of demoralisation, but senior officers at both camps would do everything, within the Geneva Convention, to keep their prisoners from from being liberated. The option that the prisoners would have preferred was that they be left alone to be liberated or moved into nearby woods to shelter. However, the Geneva Convention was clear that prisoners should not be exposed to danger and...




