Hochberg Introducing Analytic Philosophy

1. Auflage 2013
ISBN: 978-3-11-032076-3
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, Band 3, 280 Seiten

Reihe: LogosISSN

Philosophy took a "linguistic turn" in the twentieth century that was marked by the focus on theories of meaning, reference, description, predication and truth. Starting with the roots of the analytic tradition in Frege, Meinong and Bradley, this book follows its development in Russell and Wittgenstein and the writings of major philosophers of the analytic tradition and of various lesser, but well known and widely discussed, contemporary figures. In dealing with basic issues that have preoccupied analytic philosophers in the past century, the author notes how analytic philosophy is sometimes transformed from its original concern with careful and precise formulations of classical issues into the dismissal of such issues and the resultant spinning of intricate verbal webs, often signaling the rebirth of idealism in the guises of "contextualism" and "anti-realism." The book thus examines the change that came to dominate the analytic tradition by a shift of focus from the world, as what words are about, to a preoccupation with language itself.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Hochberg, Herbert

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Geschichte der Westlichen Philosophie Westliche Philosophie: 20./21. Jahrhundert
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Analytische Philosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;PREFACE;7
2;INTRODUCTION;11
3;CHAPTER 1: THE LINGUISTIC TURN;19
3.1;1a. Frege: Reference and Meaning;19
3.2;1b. Frege’s Context Principle and Dummett’s Linguistic Turn;39
3.3;1c. Frege’s Objects and Quine’s Criterion of Commitment;58
3.4;1d. Bradley and Bosanquet on Predication and Judgment;61
3.5;1e. Russell’s Analysis of Definite Descriptions;70
3.6;1f. Meinong’s Pure Objects of Thought: The Turn to Intentionality;72
3.7;1g. Predicates, Propositional Functions and Properties;78
3.8;1h. Reincarnating Meinong: Searle’s Intentional Speech Acts;82
4;CHAPTER 2: DESCRIBING AND DENOTING;89
4.1;2a. Russell’s Critique of Frege;89
4.2;2b. Facts and the Analysis of Judgment;99
4.3;2c. Referring to Facts;112
4.4;2d. Strawson’s Critique of Russell;115
4.5;2e. On Distinguishing Descriptive from Referential Use;129
4.6;2f. Kripke’s Causal Theory of Reference;131
5;CHAPTER 3: MEANING, TRUTH AND ANTI-REALISM;147
5.1;3a. Tarski’s Conception of Truth: Twisting the Linguistic Turn;147
5.2;3b. Positivism and Pragmatism in Carnap and Sellars;156
5.3;3c. Truth: Davidson’s Fast Track to the Meaning of “Meaning”;174
5.4;3d. Dummett’s Anti-Realism: Meaning as Use and Truth as Proof;199
5.5;3e. Quine’s Attack on Dogma: Analyticity and Meaning;215
6;CHAPTER 4: FACTS, INTENTIONS AND ABSTRACTION;219
6.1;4a. Facts: Problems and Solutions;219
6.2;4b. Truth and Modality;229
6.3;4c. Meaning and Intending;245
6.4;4d. Access to The Abstract;252
7;References;273
8;Index;1