Laslier / Sanver Handbook on Approval Voting

2010
ISBN: 978-3-642-02839-7
Verlag: Springer
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Wasserzeichen (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 480 Seiten, eBook

Reihe: Studies in Choice and Welfare

With approval voting, voters can approve of as many candidates as they want, and the one approved by the most voters wins. This book surveys a wide variety of empirical and theoretical knowledge accumulated from years of studying this method of voting.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Laslier, Jean-François

Sanver, M. Remzi

Inhaltsverzeichnis

to the Handbook on Approval Voting.- History of Approval Voting.- Acclamation Voting in Sparta: An Early Use of Approval Voting.- Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting.- Axiomatic Theory.- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences.- Axiomatizations of Approval Voting.- Committees.- Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections.- Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will?.- Strategic Voting.- The Basic Approval Voting Game.- Approval Voting in Large Electorates.- Computational Aspects of Approval Voting.- Probabilistic Exercises.- On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives.- Behavioral Heterogeneity Under Approval and Plurality Voting.- In Silico Voting Experiments.- Experiments.- Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting.- Framed Field Experiments on Approval Voting: Lessons from the 2002 and 2007 French Presidential Elections.- Approval Voting in Germany: Description of a Field Experiment.- Electoral Competition.- Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting.- Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections.- Meaning for Individual and Society.- Describing Society Through Approval Data.- Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference.